{"id":3943,"date":"2026-05-09T05:22:31","date_gmt":"2026-05-09T05:22:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/?p=3943"},"modified":"2026-05-09T05:22:37","modified_gmt":"2026-05-09T05:22:37","slug":"use-of-presidents-rule-in-opposition-states","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/?p=3943","title":{"rendered":"USE OF PRESIDENT\u2018S RULE IN OPPOSITION STATES"},"content":{"rendered":"

TOPIC 11<\/h1>\n

Analyzing the Political and Constitutional Use of Article 356<\/em><\/h2>\n

\u201cThere is a provision in the Constitution that if the government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the President can intervene.\u201d With these words, B.R. Ambedkar introduced the most controversial article of the Indian Constitution \u2014 Article 356. Intended as a \u201csafety valve\u201d for extreme constitutional breakdown, it has become a political battering ram. From Jawaharlal Nehru dismissing the Communist government in Kerala (1959) to Indira Gandhi toppling opposition states in the 1970s, and now, the Modi government imposing President\u2018s Rule in Manipur (2025) and threatening it in West Bengal \u2014 Article 356 has been weaponized against political rivals far more often than it has been used to save democracy. This article traces the constitutional design, the historical misuse, the judicial checks imposed by the Supreme Court, and the contemporary battles over central rule in opposition states.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

WHAT<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Article 356 of the Constitution empowers the President to assume control of a state government \u2014 suspending or dissolving the state legislature and transferring all executive and legislative powers to the Centre \u2014 if the President is \u201csatisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.\u201d<\/p>\n

WHO<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 The central government (through the President, who acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers) imposes President\u2018s Rule; the Governor submits reports to trigger the provision; Parliament approves extensions; the Supreme Court reviews legality.<\/p>\n

WHEN<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 President\u2019s Rule has been imposed over 130 times since 1950. The Modi government (2014-2026) has invoked it multiple times, most recently in Manipur (February 2025, extended to August 2026), with threats of invocation in West Bengal (2025).<\/p>\n

WHERE<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Across India, but targeted most frequently at opposition-ruled states \u2014 Jammu & Kashmir (multiple times), Maharashtra (2019), Manipur (2025), and West Bengal (2025 threat).<\/p>\n

WHY<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Constitutionally, to restore governance when a state cannot function. Politically, critics argue, to punish opposition governments, destabilize rivals, or exploit political crises for central consolidation.<\/p>\n

HOW<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Through Governor\u2018s reports highlighting law and order breakdown, political instability, or constitutional violations, followed by presidential proclamation and parliamentary approval.<\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 1: THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK \u2013 ARTICLE 356 AND THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATE<\/strong><\/p>\n

1.1 What Article 356 Says<\/strong><\/p>\n

Article 356 provides that if the President, on receipt of a report from the Governor of a State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by Proclamation:<\/p>\n

    \n
  • \n

    Assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Make such incidental and consequential provisions as may be necessary<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    The Proclamation must be laid before each House of Parliament and ceases to operate at the expiration of two months unless approved by both Houses. Once approved, it continues for six months and can be extended for a maximum of three years with parliamentary approval every six months\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    1.2 The Constituent Assembly Debate \u2013 Ambedkar vs. Opponents<\/strong><\/p>\n

    The Constituent Assembly debated Articles 355 and 356 (then draft Articles 277-A and 278) on August 3-4, 1949. The debate was intense and revealed deep philosophical divisions\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    Ambedkar\u2018s Defense:<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Introducing the provision, Ambedkar stated: \u201cI think the House has agreed that the Constitution should provide some machinery for the breakdown of the Constitution… as a necessary consequence, we must also give liberty to the President to act even when there is no report by the Governor and when the President has got certain facts within his knowledge on which he thinks, he ought to act in the fulfilment of his duty.\u201d<\/p>\n

    Ambedkar envisioned Article 356 as a \u201csafety valve\u201d \u2014 akin to Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935 \u2014 to be used only in extreme circumstances, not as a routine political tool. On August 4, 1949, he responded to critics: \u201cIf at all they are brought into operation, I hope the President, who is endowed with these powers, will take proper precautions before actually suspending the administration of the provinces\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    The Opposition:<\/strong><\/p>\n

    H.V. Kamath strongly opposed it, calling it \u201ca constitutional crime to empower the President to interfere.\u201d He feared that Article 356 would become a weapon for the central government to dismiss democratically elected state governments on flimsy grounds\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar defended the provision: \u201cIf there is any unit … any difficulty with regard to the proper working of the Constitution, it would be the obvious duty of the Union government to intervene and set matters right\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    K. Santhanam articulated the legitimate use case: \u201cThere may be a physical breakdown of the Government in the State, as for instance, when there is widespread internal disturbance or external aggression… In that case, it is obvious that there is no provincial authority which can function and the only authority which can function is the Central Government\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    The Ambedkar-Bhargava Exchange:<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Thakur Das Bhargava noted that the provision covered situations where \u201cthe entire machinery has failed, and ordinary people do not enjoy the common liberties\u201d \u2014 including internal disturbance to peace and tranquillity\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    Ambedkar\u2018s Meaning of \u201cBreakdown\u201d:<\/strong><\/p>\n

    On August 4, 1949, Ambedkar clarified: \u201cThe expression \u2018failure of machinery\u2019 I find has been used in the Government of India Act, 1935. Everybody must be quite familiar therefore with its de facto and de jure meaning.\u201d He trusted that the President would exercise this power with \u201cproper precautions\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    The article was thus passed \u2014 but from its inception, the safeguards were procedural (parliamentary approval), not substantive (judicial review of the President\u2018s satisfaction).<\/p>\n

    \n

    SECTION 2: HISTORICAL MISUSE \u2013 THE WEAPONIZATION OF ARTICLE 356<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Ambedkar\u2018s \u201csafety valve\u201d quickly became a political crowbar.<\/p>\n

    2.1 The First Dismissal: Kerala (1959)<\/strong><\/p>\n

    The first-ever invocation of Article 356 was against the democratically elected Communist government of Kerala led by E.M.S. Namboodiripad in July 1959. The central government, led by Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress party, dismissed the state government citing \u201claw and order breakdown\u201d and \u201cpolitical instability.\u201d Critics have long argued that the real reason was ideological \u2014 removing India\u2018s first Communist government from power.<\/p>\n

    2.2 The Indira Gandhi Era \u2013 Mass Dismissals (1970s)<\/strong><\/p>\n

    The most infamous period of Article 356 misuse occurred during Indira Gandhi\u2018s tenure. After the 1971 general elections, the central government dismissed opposition-ruled state governments en masse \u2014 including those led by the Janata coalition, the Socialists, and regional parties. In several cases, the governments were dismissed despite commanding clear majorities in their assemblies.<\/p>\n

    2.3 The 1980s-1990s \u2013 Routine Abuse<\/strong><\/p>\n

    The misuse continued under successive governments. Between 1950 and 2014, Article 356 was invoked over 120 times. State governments were dismissed for reasons ranging from \u201cpolitical instability\u201d and \u201ccorruption\u201d to \u201cdisrespect to the central government\u201c and \u201dfailure to implement central schemes.\u201c Many of these dismissals were overturned by courts or condemned by political opponents.<\/p>\n

    2.4 The S.R. Bommai Case (1994) \u2013 Judicial Checks<\/strong><\/p>\n

    In the landmark S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India (1994) case, the Supreme Court fundamentally altered the constitutional landscape. The Court held that:<\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Principle<\/th>\nHolding<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    Not Absolute<\/strong><\/td>\nArticle 356 is not absolute \u2014 President\u2018s power is subject to judicial review<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Breakdown Test<\/strong><\/td>\nThe breakdown must be of the\u00a0constitutional machinery<\/em>, not mere law and order problems<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Floor Test<\/strong><\/td>\nIn cases of disputed majority, the Governor must conduct a floor test before recommending President\u2019s Rule<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Basic Structure<\/strong><\/td>\nProclamation under Article 356 can be struck down if it violates the basic structure<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Limited Duration<\/strong><\/td>\nThe Court imposed strict timelines and conditions on extensions<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    As one analysis notes, the Supreme Court underlined that Article 356 should only be invoked as\u00a0\u201ca last resort\u201d<\/strong>\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    \n

    SECTION 3: THE MODI GOVERNMENT\u2018S USE OF ARTICLE 356 \u2013 PATTERNS AND TRENDS<\/strong><\/p>\n

    The BJP under Prime Minister Modi has invoked Article 356 in both BJP-ruled and opposition-ruled states \u2014 but the pattern reveals a targeted approach.<\/p>\n

    3.1 Data: Article 356 Proclamations (BJP Era)<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Based on the Dataful dataset of President\u2018s Rule instances\u00a0:<\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    State<\/th>\nDate of Proclamation<\/th>\nDate of Revocation<\/th>\nParty in Power at Centre<\/th>\nParty in Power at State<\/th>\nReason<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    Jammu & Kashmir<\/strong><\/td>\n19 June 2018<\/td>\n30 Oct 2019<\/td>\nNDA (BJP)<\/td>\nPDP+BJP coalition (collapsed)<\/td>\nPolitical instability \u2014 CM resigned after coalition partner withdrew support<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Maharashtra<\/strong><\/td>\n12 Nov 2019<\/td>\n23 Nov 2019<\/td>\nNDA (BJP)<\/td>\nNDA (pre-poll alliance)<\/td>\nPolitical instability \u2014 hung Assembly after elections; no party could form government<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Jammu & Kashmir<\/strong><\/td>\n31 Oct 2019<\/td>\n13 Oct 2024<\/td>\nNDA (BJP)<\/td>\nGovernor Rule (converted)<\/td>\nImposed under Section 73 of JK Reorganisation Act (Article 356 does not apply to UTs) \u2014 state reorganised into UTs<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Manipur<\/strong><\/td>\n13 Feb 2025<\/td>\n4 Feb 2026 (extended to Aug 2026)<\/td>\nNDA (BJP)<\/td>\nBJP (CM N. Biren Singh resigned)<\/td>\nLaw and order crisis \u2014 ethnic violence since May 2023; CM resigned to avoid no-confidence motion<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    3.2 Manipur (2025-2026) \u2013 The Most Significant Invocation<\/strong><\/p>\n

    The imposition of President\u2018s Rule in Manipur in February 2025 represents the most significant and controversial invocation of Article 356 under the Modi government.<\/p>\n

    Background \u2013 The Ethnic Violence (2023-2025):<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Since May 3, 2023, Manipur has been engulfed in large-scale ethnic violence between the majority Meitei community and the minority Kuki-Zomi tribes. The violence was triggered by protests over the Meitei community\u2018s demand for Scheduled Tribe (ST) status, which would give them reservations in education and government jobs \u2014 a status the Kuki-Zomi feared would dilute their existing benefits\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    Between May 3, 2023, and November 2024, more than\u00a0250 people<\/strong>\u00a0were killed, and over\u00a0one lakh people<\/strong>\u00a0displaced from their homes. Hundreds of temples, churches, homes, and other properties were destroyed. Over\u00a05,000 weapons<\/strong>\u00a0were taken from police stations and other locations during the chaos\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    The Governor\u2018s Report and CM\u2018s Resignation:<\/strong><\/p>\n

    On February 9, 2025, Chief Minister N. Biren Singh resigned from his post. Insiders said Singh \u2014 a BJP member \u2014 resigned \u201cto quell dissidence within the party and to avert the possibility of a no-confidence motion against him by the Congress-led opposition in the state assembly\u201d\u00a0. A legislative assembly session was scheduled to begin on February 10.<\/p>\n

    Following his resignation, the state Governor submitted a report to the President recommending imposition of President\u2018s Rule, citing the breakdown of law and order and the inability to carry on governance in accordance with the Constitution\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    The Proclamation:<\/strong><\/p>\n

    On February 13, 2025, President Droupadi Murmu imposed President\u2018s Rule in Manipur under Article 356\u00a0. The proclamation:<\/p>\n

      \n
    • \n

      Suspended the Manipur Legislative Assembly (powers transferred to Parliament)<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    • \n

      Placed all executive functions under the President\u2018s direct control (administered through the Governor)<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    • \n

      Disabled specific articles concerning legislative procedures and governance to enable central administration<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      President\u2018s Rule was initially imposed for six months. In August 2025, Parliament approved a six-month extension. The state remained under central rule until February 2026, with a further extension possible\u00a0.<\/p>\n

      The Constitutional Debate \u2013 Was Manipur a Valid Case?<\/strong><\/p>\n

      The Manipur case has sparked intense constitutional debate. Senior Advocate Dushyant Dave argued in\u00a0The Hindu<\/em>\u00a0(November 2024) that Manipur represented \u201ca classic case of the failure of the constitutional machinery, necessitating invocation of Article 356\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

      Dave noted that the President can act under Article 356 \u201cif, \u2018otherwise,\u2019 satisfied that a situation has arisen\u201d \u2014 meaning the President need not wait for a Governor\u2018s report. He reminded readers that Ambedkar gave the President \u201cliberty to act even when there is no report by the Governor\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

      However, critics raised two counterarguments:<\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Counterargument<\/th>\nExplanation<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      BJP-led Government Failed<\/strong><\/td>\nThe violence occurred under the watch of a BJP Chief Minister (N. Biren Singh) and a BJP-led central government. If the central government failed to prevent or control the violence for nearly two years, does it deserve credit for finally invoking Article 356?<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Punishing the State, Not the Government<\/strong><\/td>\nPresident\u2018s Rule punishes the entire state \u2014 suspending its legislature \u2014 not just the failed Chief Minister. The people of Manipur lost their elected representatives because their CM resigned.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The Supreme Court\u2018s Role (or Lack Thereof):<\/strong><\/p>\n

      The Supreme Court was criticized for its delayed and ineffective response. After the May 2023 violence, the Court held hearings but largely accepted the government\u2018s assurances. On May 8, 2023, the Court recorded the Solicitor General\u2018s statement that \u201cno violence has been reported in the State during the course of the previous two days and the situation is gradually returning to normalcy\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

      By July 2023, the Court was forced to take suo motu notice of horrific incidents \u2014 including a video of women being paraded naked by a mob. The Court observed: \u201cWhat is portrayed in the media would indicate gross constitutional violations and infractions of human rights. Using women as instruments for perpetrating violence is simply unacceptable in a constitutional democracy\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

      Despite 27 hearings, the violence continued. Dave noted: \u201cIt is shocking that under the watchful eyes of the ultimate protector of fundamental rights, the mayhem continues, depriving the three million people of Manipur of fundamental rights\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

      \n

      SECTION 4: THE WEST BENGAL THREAT \u2013 POLITICAL MANOEUVRING (2024-2025)<\/strong><\/p>\n

      While Manipur saw actual imposition of President\u2018s Rule, West Bengal witnessed threats of its invocation \u2014 revealing the political weaponization of Article 356.<\/p>\n

      4.1 The RG Kar Hospital Incident (August 2024)<\/strong><\/p>\n

      Following the rape and murder of a trainee doctor at RG Kar Hospital in Kolkata (August 2024), the BJP demanded the resignation of Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee and threatened to seek President\u2018s Rule. BJP leaders argued that the state government had failed to maintain law and order and that central intervention was necessary\u00a0.<\/p>\n

      4.2 Governor C.V. Ananda Bose\u2019s Report (May 2025)<\/strong><\/p>\n

      In May 2025, West Bengal Governor C.V. Ananda Bose sent a report to Union Home Minister Amit Shah on communal violence in Murshidabad district. The report reportedly suggested that the Union government consider invoking Article 356 if the situation worsened, and recommended deployment of Central forces, a judicial inquiry, and central intervention\u00a0.<\/p>\n

      4.3 Opposition Unity \u2013 A Rare Sight<\/strong><\/p>\n

      The Governor\u2018s report triggered rare political unity among opposition parties.<\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Party<\/th>\nPosition<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Trinamool Congress (TMC)<\/strong><\/td>\nStrongly criticized the report as \u201cbiased and aligned with the BJP\u2018s political agenda.\u201d State general secretary called it an instruction from the Union government.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      CPI(M)<\/strong><\/td>\nState secretary Mohammed Salim argued that transferring power to the Governor under President\u2019s Rule would not solve problems. \u201cThe people of this state have had bitter experiences with President\u2018s rule,\u201d he noted. He cited Manipur as an example: \u201cIn Manipur, despite a \u2018double-engine\u2019 government, people\u2019s lives remain endangered\u201d\u00a0.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Congress<\/strong><\/td>\nCalled the Governor\u2018s statement \u201cconstitutionally unwanted,\u201d \u201cpolitically motivated,\u201d and \u201cagainst the federal structure.\u201d Congress alleged that the \u201cbroader context of the ideological objectives of the RSS and the BJP\u201d included the \u201clong-term plan of fragmenting West Bengal \u2014 culturally rich and politically resilient \u2014 into smaller administrative units\u201d\u00a0.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The Congress statement added<\/strong>: \u201cThe imposition of President\u2018s rule, therefore, is not just a question of governance \u2014 it is a calculated attempt to undermine Bengal\u2019s political autonomy and pave the way for divide-and-rule politics. It must be opposed unequivocally by all democratic forces\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

      4.4 Why President\u2018s Rule Was Not Imposed<\/strong><\/p>\n

      Despite the Governor\u2018s report and BJP rhetoric, President\u2019s Rule was not imposed in West Bengal. The reasons likely included:<\/p>\n

        \n
      • \n

        The Mamata Banerjee government retained a majority in the Assembly<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      • \n

        The Supreme Court\u2018s Bommai precedent would have required a floor test, which the TMC would likely have won<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      • \n

        Political cost \u2014 imposition would have triggered massive protests and further opposition unity<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      • \n

        The 2025 proposed legislation (discussed below) offered an alternative mechanism<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

        \n

        SECTION 5: THE NEW FRONTIER \u2013 ARTICLE 356 \u201cTHROUGH THE BACKDOOR\u201d (2025)<\/strong><\/p>\n

        Perhaps the most significant development in the constitutional battle over Article 356 is not the article itself, but the government\u2018s attempt to achieve the same outcome through new legislation.<\/p>\n

        5.1 The Proposed Constitutional Amendment (August 2025)<\/strong><\/p>\n

        On August 20, 2025, Home Minister Amit Shah introduced three bills in the Lok Sabha that would provide a legal framework for the removal of the Prime Minister, Union Ministers, Chief Ministers, and ministers who are \u201carrested and detained in custody on account of serious criminal charges\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

        Key Provisions of the 130th Constitutional Amendment Bill:<\/strong><\/p>\n

        \n
        \n
        <\/div>\n
        <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Provision<\/th>\nDetail<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
        Trigger<\/strong><\/td>\nArrest and detention in custody for 30 consecutive days<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Charges<\/strong><\/td>\nAllegation of committing an offence punishable with imprisonment for five years or more<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Effect<\/strong><\/td>\nThe CM\/Minister shall be removed from office by the 31st day<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Return<\/strong><\/td>\nCould return to their posts once freed from jail<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

        5.2 The Exception \u2013 Arvind Kejriwal<\/strong><\/p>\n

        The proposed law was explicitly modeled on the case of Arvind Kejriwal, who was arrested in March 2024 \u2014 the first serving Chief Minister in India\u2018s history to be arrested and remain in office. All previous CMs facing arrest (Lalu Prasad, Hemant Soren) had resigned beforehand, putting a replacement in the CM\u2018s chair. Kejriwal was the exception\u00a0.<\/p>\n

        Kejriwal was arrested by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) in the Delhi excise policy case on March 21, 2024. He was granted interim bail to campaign from May 10 to June 1, then re-arrested by the CBI on June 26 \u2014 a move the Supreme Court itself said raised \u201cserious questions about timing.\u201d After over five months in custody, he secured bail in both cases in September\u00a0.<\/p>\n

        5.3 Critics: \u201cArticle 356 Through the Back Door\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

        Opposition leaders and constitutional experts reacted with alarm:<\/p>\n

        \n
        \n
        <\/div>\n
        <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Critic<\/th>\nStatement<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
        Priyanka Gandhi (Congress MP)<\/strong><\/td>\n\u201cI see the bill for the removal of CMs and ministers as draconian, undemocratic and unconstitutional… Tomorrow, you can put any kind of a case on a CM, have him arrested for 30 days without conviction, and he ceases to be the Chief Minister\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        MK Stalin (Tamil Nadu CM)<\/strong><\/td>\n\u201cThe 130th Constitutional Amendment is not reform \u2014 this is a Black Day and this is a Black Bill. 30-day arrest = Removal of an elected CM. No trial, no conviction \u2014 just BJP\u2018s diktat. This is how dictatorships begin: Steal votes, Silence rivals and Crush States\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        MK Sharmila (Social activist)<\/strong><\/td>\n\u201cOne more devious and draconian bill whose primary objective is to target opposition ruled states… Democracy in India has become a pathetic joke\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

        5.4 The Data Problem \u2013 ED\u2018s Dismal Conviction Rate<\/strong><\/p>\n

        The government\u2018s own data undercut the rationale for the bill. In March 2025, the government presented data in Parliament showing that in the last 10 years, the ED had filed cases against\u00a0193 politicians<\/strong>\u00a0but had secured only\u00a0two convictions<\/strong>. The ED\u2018s success rate against politicians was a miserable\u00a01%<\/strong>\u00a0.<\/p>\n

        Chief Justice of India\u00a0B.R. Gavai<\/strong>\u00a0noted that the ED had been \u201csuccessful\u201d in incarcerating people for years without convictions. Justice\u00a0Ujjal Bhuyan<\/strong>\u00a0pointed to the ED\u2018s dismal conviction rate and observed: \u201cThere is a difference between law enforcing and law violating…\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

        The proposed bill, critics argued, would allow the government to remove elected CMs based on ED arrests \u2014 an agency that convicts only 1% of politicians it charges \u2014 without trial, without conviction, and without judicial review.<\/p>\n

        \n

        SECTION 6: THE BATTLE OVER GOVERNOR\u2018S REPORTS \u2013 PUNCHHI COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS<\/strong><\/p>\n

        The role of Governors in recommending President\u2019s Rule has been a persistent concern. The Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi Commission (2007-2010) \u2014 whose report was submitted to the government but never fully implemented \u2014 made several radical recommendations regarding Articles 355 and 356\u00a0.<\/p>\n

        Key Punchhi Commission Recommendations:<\/strong><\/p>\n

        \n
        \n
        <\/div>\n
        <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Recommendation<\/th>\nDetail<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
        Localised Emergency<\/strong><\/td>\nInstead of imposing President\u2018s Rule on an entire state, the Centre should be able to bring specific \u201ctrouble-torn areas\u201d (a district or parts of a district) under central rule for a limited period (not exceeding three months)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Override Structure<\/strong><\/td>\nCreate an overriding structure to maintain internal security along the lines of the US Homeland Security department<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Central Forces Deployment<\/strong><\/td>\nState consent should not be a hurdle in deploying central forces during communal conflagration; deployment should be for only one week, with post-facto state consent<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Governor\u2018s Tenure<\/strong><\/td>\nGovernors should have a fixed five-year tenure and be removed only through impeachment by the state Assembly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Governor\u2018s Discretion<\/strong><\/td>\nThe scope of Governor\u2019s discretionary powers under Article 163(2) should be limited by constitutional amendment<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Time Limit for Decisions<\/strong><\/td>\nGovernors should not sit on decisions and must decide matters within a four-month period<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

        The Punchhi Commission\u2018s recommendations were never implemented. The current government\u2018s handling of Governor\u2018s reports \u2014 particularly in West Bengal (2025) \u2014 suggests that the problem of gubernatorial overreach remains unresolved.<\/p>\n

        \n

        SECTION 7: THE SARKARIA COMMISSION AND BJP\u2018S HISTORICAL POSITION (1997)<\/strong><\/p>\n

        The irony of the current BJP government\u2018s invocation of Article 356 is that the party once led the charge against its misuse.<\/p>\n

        The Jaipur Resolution (June 1997):<\/strong><\/p>\n

        In June 1997, Chief Ministers of BJP-ruled states \u2014 Delhi, Haryana, Punjab, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan \u2014 adopted the Jaipur Resolution under the leadership of Rajasthan Chief Minister Bhairon Singh Shekhawat. The resolution demanded the implementation of the Sarkaria Commission\u2018s recommendations and issued an ultimatum to the Centre to do so by December 31\u00a0.<\/p>\n

        The Resolution\u2018s Demands:<\/strong><\/p>\n

          \n
        • \n

          The misuse of Article 356 by the Centre to bring down elected governments should be stopped<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

        • \n

          Punjab Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal demanded the scrapping of the article altogether<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

        • \n

          The resolution observed that the issue was important and other states should also put up a forceful demand<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

          The Abandoned Position:<\/strong><\/p>\n

          Today, the same party that once demanded the scrapping of Article 356 has:<\/p>\n

            \n
          • \n

            Imposed President\u2018s Rule in Manipur (2025)<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

          • \n

            Threatened President\u2019s Rule in West Bengal (2025)<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

          • \n

            Proposed a law to remove arrested CMs (2025) \u2014 effectively achieving Article 356\u2018s outcome without invoking the article itself<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

            This abandonment of principle has not gone unnoticed by political observers.<\/p>\n

            \n

            SECTION 8: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS \u2013 ARTICLE 356 IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT<\/strong><\/p>\n

            \n
            \n
            <\/div>\n
            <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
            Decade<\/th>\nNumber of Impositions<\/th>\nKey Targets<\/th>\nDominant Party<\/th>\nPattern<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
            1950s<\/td>\n~10<\/td>\nKerala (1959)<\/td>\nCongress<\/td>\nIdeological (Communist government)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            1960s<\/td>\n~15<\/td>\nMultiple<\/td>\nCongress<\/td>\nPolitical instability<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            1970s<\/td>\n~40<\/td>\nOpposition states en masse<\/td>\nCongress (Indira Gandhi)<\/td>\nMass dismissals after 1971 elections<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            1980s<\/td>\n~35<\/td>\nMultiple<\/td>\nCongress & others<\/td>\nRoutine political weapon<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            1990s<\/td>\n~20<\/td>\nMultiple<\/td>\nVarious<\/td>\nReduced after Bommai (1994)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            2000s<\/td>\n~10<\/td>\nLimited<\/td>\nVarious<\/td>\nRelatively restrained<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            2014-2026<\/td>\n~7<\/td>\nJ&K, Maharashtra, Manipur<\/td>\nBJP<\/td>\nSelective (opposition states + coalition crises)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

            Observation<\/strong>: While the raw number of impositions has declined under the Modi government compared to the 1970s-1980s, the\u00a0political significance<\/strong>\u00a0of each imposition has increased. The Manipur imposition (2025) \u2014 the longest continuous President\u2018s Rule in recent history \u2014 represents a qualitative shift in the use of Article 356.<\/p>\n

            \n

            SECTION 9: CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS \u2013 WHY ARTICLE 356 IS STILL CONTROLLED<\/strong><\/p>\n

            Despite political misuse, several safeguards remain:<\/p>\n

            \n
            \n
            <\/div>\n
            <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
            Safeguard<\/th>\nMechanism<\/th>\nEffectiveness<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
            Parliamentary Approval<\/strong><\/td>\nProclamation must be approved by both Houses within two months<\/td>\nWeak \u2014 government usually has majority<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            Six-Month Limit<\/strong><\/td>\nProclamation lapses after six months unless extended<\/td>\nWeak \u2014 extensions are routine<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            Judicial Review (Bommai)<\/strong><\/td>\nSupreme Court can strike down mala fide proclamations<\/td>\nStrong \u2014 but requires petition and litigation<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            Floor Test Requirement<\/strong><\/td>\nIn disputed majority cases, Governor must conduct floor test<\/td>\nStrong \u2014 but often avoided through resignation<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            Public Opinion<\/strong><\/td>\nPolitical cost of dismissing elected government<\/td>\nModerate \u2014 depends on media and opposition<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

            The Bommai precedent remains the most significant check. As the Supreme Court held, Article 356 should only be invoked as\u00a0\u201ca last resort.\u201d<\/strong>\u00a0The Court can examine whether the President\u2018s satisfaction was based on relevant material, whether it was mala fide, and whether it violated the basic structure.<\/p>\n

            \n

            SECTION 10: THE FUTURE \u2013 ARTICLE 356 IN THE SAFFRON ERA<\/strong><\/p>\n

            The trajectory of Article 356 under the BJP government suggests three trends:<\/p>\n

            Trend 1: Selective but Strategic Use<\/strong><\/p>\n

            Unlike the mass dismissals of the 1970s, the Modi government has used Article 356 selectively \u2014 but each use has been strategically significant: J&K (reorganisation), Maharashtra (coalition crisis), Manipur (law and order breakdown).<\/p>\n

            Trend 2: Governor-Driven Initiation<\/strong><\/p>\n

            In both Manipur and West Bengal (threatened), the Governor\u2018s report was the trigger. The Punchhi Commission\u2018s recommendations on limiting Governor discretion \u2014 never implemented \u2014 would have addressed this concern.<\/p>\n

            Trend 3: Circumventing Article 356 Through New Legislation<\/strong><\/p>\n

            The proposed 130th Constitutional Amendment Bill (2025) \u2014 removing arrested CMs \u2014 represents a new frontier. If passed, it would allow the central government to achieve the outcome of President\u2018s Rule (removing an elected CM) without invoking Article 356, without parliamentary approval, and without the safeguards of the Bommai precedent.<\/p>\n

            As one analysis noted: \u201cThis proposed legislation is being seen as an opportunity for the Centre to impose Article 356 through the back door. When the Centre could use it to sack a CM and her\/his ministers after the politicians are just charged, and not convicted\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

            \n

            CONCLUSION \u2013 THE SAFETY VALVE THAT BECAME A POLITICAL WEAPON<\/strong><\/p>\n

            Article 356 was conceived as a safety valve \u2014 a provision of last resort for constitutional breakdown. In practice, it has become a political weapon, used by governments of all ideological stripes to dismiss rival state governments.<\/p>\n

            Under the Modi government, the use of Article 356 has been more restrained in frequency than the excesses of the 1970s, but more strategic in intent. The Manipur imposition (2025) \u2014 following nearly two years of ethnic violence and the resignation of a BJP Chief Minister \u2014 occupies a constitutional gray zone: legitimate in its stated justification, but compromised by the central government\u2018s failure to prevent the crisis it now claims to resolve.<\/p>\n

            The proposed 130th Amendment (2025) represents a more fundamental shift: circumventing Article 356 altogether, allowing the removal of elected CMs based on arrests by central agencies \u2014 agencies that convict only 1% of politicians they charge.<\/p>\n

            The central question<\/strong>\u00a0is no longer whether Article 356 will be misused. It is whether India\u2018s constitutional democracy will evolve toward greater federal autonomy \u2014 or toward a centralized system where opposition-ruled states can be destabilized, suspended, and dissolved at the Centre\u2018s discretion.<\/p>\n

            The Bommai judgment\u2018s warning echoes: Article 356 is a \u201clast resort.\u201d But in saffron India, the last resort is becoming the first option.<\/p>\n

            \n

            SUMMARY TABLE: ARTICLE 356 \u2013 CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN VS. POLITICAL REALITY<\/strong><\/p>\n

            \n
            \n
            <\/div>\n
            <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
            Aspect<\/th>\nConstitutional Design (Ambedkar)<\/th>\nPolitical Reality (Modi Era)<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
            Purpose<\/strong><\/td>\n\u201cSafety valve\u201d for extreme constitutional breakdown<\/td>\nPolitical tool to destabilize opposition governments<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            Trigger<\/strong><\/td>\nGovernor\u2018s report or President\u2019s \u201cotherwise\u201d satisfaction<\/td>\nGovernor\u2018s report (often politically aligned)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            Famous Cases<\/strong><\/td>\nHypothetical \u2014 Ambedkar hoped never used<\/td>\nManipur (2025), West Bengal (threatened 2025)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            Judicial Check<\/strong><\/td>\nNot in original design; Bommai (1994) added judicial review<\/td>\nSC can strike down, but delays and deference limit effectiveness<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            Parliamentary Approval<\/strong><\/td>\nStrong safeguard<\/td>\nWeak \u2014 government controls both Houses<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            BJP\u2018s Historical Position<\/strong><\/td>\nDemanded scrapping of Article 356 (1997)<\/td>\nImposes President\u2019s Rule selectively (2025)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            Alternative Mechanism<\/strong><\/td>\nNone envisioned<\/td>\nProposed 130th Amendment (2025) \u2014 removal of arrested CMs without Article 356<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
            \n

            END OF TOPIC 11<\/strong><\/p>\n

            Next Topic (Topic 12):<\/strong>\u00a0\u201cThe Speaker\u2018s Gavel \u2013 How Parliamentary Presiding Officers Became Partisan Actors<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

            TOPIC 11 Analyzing the Political and Constitutional Use of Article 356 \u201cThere is a provision in the Constitution that if the government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the President can intervene.\u201d With these words, B.R. Ambedkar introduced the most controversial article of the Indian Constitution […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3944,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"googlesitekit_rrm_CAowk73GDA:productID":"","footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[67,66],"tags":[1015,1018,1020,1007,1031,1025,1026,772,1027,829,1024,1030,1017,1019,1028,1016,1022,1029,1021,1023],"class_list":["post-3943","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-social-issues","category-society-responsibility","tag-article-356-india","tag-bjp-and-article-356","tag-centre-vs-states-india","tag-constitutional-crisis-india","tag-constitutional-governance-india","tag-constitutional-provisions-india","tag-democracy-and-federalism","tag-federalism-in-india","tag-governor-powers-india","tag-indian-constitution-debate","tag-indian-federal-politics","tag-indian-political-history","tag-misuse-of-presidents-rule","tag-opposition-states-india","tag-political-misuse-constitution","tag-presidents-rule-controversy","tag-presidents-rule-manipur","tag-state-government-dismissal-india","tag-supreme-court-bommai-judgment","tag-west-bengal-political-controversy"],"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3943","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3943"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3943\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3945,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3943\/revisions\/3945"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/3944"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3943"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=3943"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=3943"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}