{"id":3962,"date":"2026-05-09T05:58:31","date_gmt":"2026-05-09T05:58:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/?p=3962"},"modified":"2026-05-09T07:28:50","modified_gmt":"2026-05-09T07:28:50","slug":"3962-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/?p=3962","title":{"rendered":"PARLIAMENTARY DISRUPTIONS AND SHORTENED SESSIONS"},"content":{"rendered":"

TOPIC 15<\/h1>\n

How Adjournments, Walkouts, and Curtailed Sittings Affect Debate, Accountability, and Democratic Functioning<\/h2>\n
\n

On the morning of November 25, 2024, as the Winter Session of Parliament commenced, Opposition MPs stormed the Well of the House demanding an immediate discussion on electoral fraud and the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of voter rolls. The Lok Sabha was adjourned twice within the first hour, and then for the entire day. The session that followed would see productivity plummet to 52% in the Lok Sabha \u2014 the ninth lowest since 2014\u00a0. In the Rajya Sabha, productivity fell to just 39%\u00a0.<\/strong><\/em>Two months later, in March 2026, the Goa Legislative Assembly witnessed a Budget Session scheduled to run until March 27 abruptly curtailed. The government cited the Model Code of Conduct triggered by a by-poll. The budget passed with minimal debate on demands for grants, opposition voices were sidelined, and elected representatives were denied the time to scrutinize spending priorities\u00a0.<\/strong><\/em>These are not isolated incidents. They are symptoms of a deeper democratic malaise: the systematic erosion of parliamentary deliberation through disruptions, adjournments, and shortened sessions. Forty years ago, the Lok Sabha sat for an average of 120 days a year. Today, that number has fallen to 70\u00a0. The British Parliament meets for 150 days; the US House of Representatives for 140. India\u2019s parliamentarians, once the custodians of the nation\u2018s scrutiny, now spend more time protesting or being silenced than debating\u00a0.<\/strong><\/em>This article examines how parliamentary disruptions \u2014 whether by the Opposition demanding accountability or the government avoiding it \u2014 have undermined the very foundations of India\u2019s democratic functioning.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

 <\/p>\n

WHAT<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 The systematic disruption of parliamentary proceedings through adjournments, walkouts, slogan-shouting, and the consequent shortening of legislative sessions \u2014 often resulting in laws being passed without debate, Question Hour being largely non-functional, and the government evading accountability.<\/p>\n

WHO<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Both the Opposition (which uses disruptions to force discussions on pressing issues) and the ruling party (which has been accused of steamrolling legislation, bypassing committees, and curtailing sessions to avoid scrutiny). Speakers and Chairmen preside over the chaos, often unable or unwilling to restore order.<\/p>\n

WHEN<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 The trend has intensified since 2014. The Winter Session of 2024 was among the least productive since the NDA came to power, with lost hours often exceeding productive hours\u00a0.<\/p>\n

WHERE<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Across the Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, and State Legislative Assemblies (with Goa\u2018s truncated Budget Session in 2026 serving as a recent case study)\u00a0.<\/p>\n

WHY<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Officially, disruptions are caused by the Opposition\u2019s refusal to allow the House to function until their demands are met. Critics argue the government also benefits: when the House is disrupted, Question Hour is cancelled, ministers avoid oral questioning, and controversial legislation can be passed in minutes without meaningful scrutiny.<\/p>\n

HOW<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Through the use of adjournment motions, walkouts, slogan-shouting in the Well, the invocation of Rule 374-A (mass suspension of MPs), and the executive\u2018s power to summon and prorogue Parliament at will.<\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 1: THE DECLINING PRODUCTIVITY OF PARLIAMENT \u2013 DATA AND TRENDS<\/strong><\/p>\n

1.1 The Winter Session of 2024 \u2013 A Case Study in Lost Time<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Winter Session of 2024, which ran from November 25 to December 20, was marked by daily protests, scuffles, and eventually an FIR against the Leader of Opposition Rahul Gandhi\u00a0. Data from PRS Legislative Research reveals a dramatic drop in productivity:<\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
House<\/th>\nScheduled Hours<\/th>\nHours Worked<\/th>\nProductivity<\/th>\nHours Lost to Disruptions<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Lok Sabha<\/strong><\/td>\n~119 hours<\/td>\n62 hours<\/td>\n52%<\/td>\n65 hours<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Rajya Sabha<\/strong><\/td>\n~113 hours<\/td>\n44 hours<\/td>\n39%<\/td>\n~69 hours<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

While the Winter Session held 20 sittings \u2014 the most of any session that year \u2014 it was the least productive since the Monsoon Session of 2023. Only two sessions since 2014 have seen more hours lost to disruptions: 78 hours in the 2021 Monsoon Session and 96 hours in the 2023 Budget Session\u00a0.<\/p>\n

Of the time the Lok Sabha actually functioned, just 23 hours were dedicated to\u00a0legislative business<\/strong>\u00a0\u2014 the actual work of passing laws. Much of the functioning time was spent on a discussion marking 75 years of the Constitution\u00a0. In the Rajya Sabha, just 9 hours were spent on legislative business.<\/p>\n

1.2 The Budget Session Contrast \u2013 When the House Wants to Work<\/strong><\/p>\n

The preceding session \u2014 the post-election Budget Session of 2024 \u2014 tells a different story. The Lok Sabha worked for 135% of its scheduled time, or over 115 hours, sitting for 34 extra hours to make up for lost time\u00a0. This suggests that when political will exists, Parliament can function efficiently. The question is: why does that will disappear so frequently?<\/p>\n

1.3 The Long-Term Decline \u2013 From 120 Days to 70 Days<\/strong><\/p>\n

PRS Legislative Research has documented a steady decline in the number of sitting days:<\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Decade<\/th>\nAverage Sitting Days per Year (Lok Sabha)<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
1950s-1960s<\/td>\n~120 days<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2014-2024<\/td>\n~70 days<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

In the United Kingdom, the House of Commons meets for an average of 150 days a year. The US House of Representatives meets for 140 days. Canada\u2018s Parliament meets for 127 days. Germany\u2019s Bundestag meets for 104 days. Only Australia (65 days) is comparable to India\u2018s 68-70 days\u00a0.<\/p>\n

When Parliament meets for fewer days, and when a significant portion of those days is lost to disruptions, the institution\u2019s ability to hold the government accountable is fundamentally weakened.<\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 2: THE CONSEQUENCES \u2013 WHAT IS LOST WHEN PARLIAMENT DOES NOT FUNCTION<\/strong><\/p>\n

2.1 The Death of Question Hour \u2013 Accountability Silenced<\/strong><\/p>\n

Question Hour, where Members of Parliament (MPs) quiz ministers about the functioning of their ministries, is the most visible mechanism for executive accountability. It is also the first casualty of parliamentary disruption\u00a0.<\/p>\n

During the monsoon session of 2021, Question Hour barely took place. Ministers neither had to answer oral questions nor face pointed follow-ups on the work done by their ministries. While MPs could still get written answers, the dynamic, adversarial nature of oral questioning \u2014 the ability to press a minister, to demand clarification, to catch them off-guard \u2014 was entirely lost\u00a0.<\/p>\n

As PRS Legislative Research noted: \u201cThe first casualty of a non-functioning Parliament is accountability of the government\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

2.2 The Ten-Minute Law \u2013 Legislation Without Debate<\/strong><\/p>\n

Perhaps the most alarming consequence of parliamentary disruption is the speed with which laws are passed. During the monsoon session of 2021, amid continuing disruptions, the Lok Sabha took an average of\u00a0less than 10 minutes to pass a law<\/strong>. The Rajya Sabha passed each law in less than half an hour\u00a0.<\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
House<\/th>\nAverage Time to Pass a Law<\/th>\nNumber of Bills with No MP Speaking<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Lok Sabha<\/td>\n<10 minutes<\/td>\n13 (only minister spoke)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Rajya Sabha<\/td>\n<30 minutes<\/td>\n\u2014<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

In 13 bills passed by the Lok Sabha during that session, no Member of Parliament other than the minister in charge of the bill spoke at all\u00a0. The passage of these laws was \u201cmore in form than in substance.\u201d<\/p>\n

2.3 The Bypassing of Parliamentary Committees \u2013 The Death of Scrutiny<\/strong><\/p>\n

The most significant institutional casualty of the post-2014 era has been the parliamentary committee system. When a bill is referred to a standing committee, it undergoes detailed scrutiny: experts are consulted, citizens can make representations, and opposition and ruling party members work together to refine the legislation.<\/p>\n

Since the BJP-led NDA came to power in 2014, the percentage of bills being referred to committees has dramatically declined\u00a0:<\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Lok Sabha (Years)<\/th>\n% of Bills Referred to Committees<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
14th (2004-09, UPA)<\/td>\n60%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
15th (2009-14, UPA)<\/td>\n71%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
16th (2014-19, NDA)<\/td>\n27%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
17th (2019-24, NDA)<\/td>\n~25%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
18th (2024-present)<\/td>\n26%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

In the winter session of 2025, the government introduced 11 bills and pushed them through Parliament without scrutiny by standing committees. Only 12% of the government\u2018s legal proposals in the current Lok Sabha have been sent to committees. This number was 71% under the UPA\u00a0.<\/p>\n

The Consequence:<\/strong>\u00a0Critical legislations are rushed through with scant deliberation. The Viksit Bharat Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission Bill (replacing MNREGS) was passed in 48 hours. The Insurance Amendment Bill (allowing 100% FDI) and the Nuclear Energy Bill (allowing private companies to operate nuclear plants) were passed amid opposition protests and walkouts. None were referred to committees\u00a0.<\/p>\n

The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill (2019)<\/strong>, which effectively abrogated Article 370, was not referred to a committee. The three farm bills (2020), which triggered widespread protests across India, were first promulgated as ordinances and then passed without committee scrutiny\u00a0.<\/p>\n

Dr Ronojoy Sen of the NUS Institute of South Asian Studies notes: \u201cThe circumvention of committees has led to demands by some for mandatory scrutiny of legislation. These suggestions are unlikely to be implemented since improvements to the committee system have not been the highest priority of the government or the parliament in recent times\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

2.4 The Truncated Session \u2013 When Governments Run Away from Accountability<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Goa Legislative Assembly\u2018s Budget Session in March 2026 offers a stark example of executive overreach. The session, originally scheduled to run until March 27, was abruptly curtailed. The government cited the Model Code of Conduct triggered by a by-poll\u00a0.<\/p>\n

The Outcome:<\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
  • \n

    The budget passed with minimal debate on demands for grants<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Opposition voices were largely sidelined<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Elected representatives were denied time to scrutinize spending priorities<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Questions on alleged fiscal mismanagement, environmental concerns, and regional disparities went unasked<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    As Fr Victor Ferrao observed in an analysis of the episode:<\/p>\n

    \u201cA government that chooses curtailment over creative accommodation chooses convenience over conviction. It signals contempt for the very idea that elected representatives owe the public a thorough accounting. Goa\u2019s truncated session is therefore not merely an administrative decision but a symptom of a deeper democratic malaise: the creeping substitution of executive efficiency for legislative accountability\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    2.5 The Casualty of Parliamentary Oversight \u2013 The Medha Patkar Incident<\/strong><\/p>\n

    The erosion of parliamentary scrutiny extends beyond the floor of the House to committees themselves. In July 2025, a meeting of the Standing Committee on Rural Development was abruptly cancelled after BJP MPs walked out to protest the committee\u2018s decision to hear activist Medha Patkar\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    The committee had convened to review the implementation of the land acquisition law. Patkar and actor Prakash Raj were invited as experts to share their views. Before proceedings formally began, NDA MPs protested their presence. As the invited guests entered the committee hall, five BJP MPs walked out.<\/p>\n

    Despite the walkout, the remaining members continued \u2014 only to receive an official communication from the Speaker\u2018s office declaring that the meeting could not proceed due to lack of quorum\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    CPI(M) MP K Radhakrishnan called it unprecedented: \u201cIt needs to be examined if this is the first time in the history of Indian democracy that a standing committee meeting was disrupted and cancelled after a political walkout despite the presence of invited experts. Such a precedent undermines the very spirit of parliamentary oversight and democratic consultation\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    CPI MP P Sandosh Kumar added: \u201cThe BJP has become so intolerant that it can\u2018t even hear the words of Medha Patkar and Prakash Raj. This is unbecoming of the ruling party; it should hear all sides. An alarming sign of the BJP\u2019s future India concept\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    \n

    SECTION 3: THE STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS \u2013 WHY PARLIAMENT IS SO EASILY DISRUPTED<\/strong><\/p>\n

    3.1 The Executive\u2018s Power to Summon and Prorogue<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Parliament does not have the power to convene itself. The President, on the advice of the Council of Ministers, summons Parliament. This means the government decides when Parliament meets\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    As PRS Legislative Research notes: \u201cAs a body that is entrusted to be the \u2018watchdog\u2018 of our democracy, these restraints result in its weakening. Since parliament does not have the power to convene itself, it has been suggested that it should meet for a minimum number of working days in a year\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution recommended a minimum of 120 working days for Lok Sabha and 100 for Rajya Sabha. Vice President Hamid Ansari suggested 130 days. These recommendations have never been implemented\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    3.2 The Time Lost to Disruptions \u2013 A Two-Way Street<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Disruptions are not the monopoly of any single party. Both the ruling party and the opposition have been responsible for adjournments, walkouts, and slogan-shouting. However, the consequences are asymmetrical.<\/p>\n

    When the ruling party benefits from the status quo, it has little incentive to restore order. As PRS noted: \u201cThe normalisation of disruption and the steamrolling of legislation in the monsoon session are warning signs that parliamentary functioning needs an urgent overhaul. If this pattern continues, the new Parliament building will be a modern and spacious venue for a dysfunctional institution\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    3.3 The Ineffectiveness of Disciplinary Mechanisms<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Parliament has mechanisms to discipline disruptive MPs \u2014 suspension, expulsion, denial of entry. But these have proven largely ineffective. MPs disrupt Parliament on the instruction of their political parties, and disciplining them has not worked as a deterrent\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    The mass suspension of 146 Opposition MPs in December 2023 under Rule 374-A \u2014 without a formal motion \u2014 was a dramatic escalation. It raised questions about whether the rules themselves have become weapons to silence dissent rather than tools to maintain order.<\/p>\n

    3.4 The Deliberative Deficit \u2013 Ambedkar\u2018s Warning<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Dr B.R. Ambedkar, the chief architect of the Indian Constitution, was unambiguous that democracy is not merely the counting of votes on election day but the continuous, rigorous working of institutions through debate and accountability. He insisted that a legislature must have adequate time and space to examine every demand for grants, question executive proposals, and ventilate public grievances\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    \u201cWithout this,\u201d Ambedkar argued, the Constitution becomes a mere \u201cgrammar of politics\u201d devoid of life\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    Ambedkar drew a sharp distinction between formal democracy (elections and majorities) and substantive democracy (deliberation that keeps power on trial). He feared that executive convenience could erode legislative sovereignty, turning elected representatives into passive endorsers of the government\u2018s will\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    In the curtailed Goa session, Ferrao argues, we see precisely the danger Ambedkar foresaw: \u201cThe government did not merely shorten proceedings; it pre-empted the constitutional obligation (under Articles 202 and 203) to allow full financial scrutiny. By invoking the Model Code of Conduct as a shield, the ruling dispensation appeared to flee the very accountability that Dr Ambedkar placed at the centre of republican governance\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    \n

    SECTION 4: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON \u2013 INDIA vs. OTHER DEMOCRACIES<\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Country<\/th>\nAverage Sitting Days per Year<\/th>\nDisruption Culture<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    India<\/strong><\/td>\n~70 days<\/td>\nFrequent; sessions often wash out<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    United Kingdom<\/strong><\/td>\n~150 days<\/td>\nRare; cross-party consensus on procedure<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    United States<\/strong><\/td>\n~140 days<\/td>\nRare; partisan but functional<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Canada<\/strong><\/td>\n~127 days<\/td>\nUncommon<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Germany<\/strong><\/td>\n~104 days<\/td>\nVery rare<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Australia<\/strong><\/td>\n~65 days<\/td>\nLess frequent than India<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    India\u2018s Parliament sits for fewer days than almost any other major democracy. And of the days it does sit, a significant portion \u2014 sometimes the majority \u2014 is lost to disruptions\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    The UK Comparison:<\/strong>\u00a0The British Parliament is in session throughout the year. Its session begins in the spring and meets for 12 months, with breaks for festivals and holidays. India\u2019s convention of three sessions (Budget, Monsoon, Winter) is a colonial legacy but has been increasingly truncated\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    As PRS notes: \u201cWhen Parliament is in session, members have the opportunity to put questions to Government ministers and participate in debates. If the number of days for which Parliament meets is limited, its ability to hold the Government accountable is weakened\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    \n

    SECTION 5: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DISRUPTION<\/strong><\/p>\n

    5.1 Why the Opposition Disrupts<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Opposition parties disrupt Parliament for a straightforward reason: they cannot force the government to debate issues through normal channels. When the government refuses to schedule a debate on a contentious issue (e.g., electoral fraud, rising fuel prices, ethnic violence in Manipur), the opposition\u2018s only tool to gain attention is disruption.<\/p>\n

    As socialist leader Madhu Dandavate once remarked, asense of accommodation by the treasury benches and a sense of responsibility by the Opposition benches<\/strong>\u00a0is the balance essential for the smooth running of Parliament. When that balance breaks, both sides blame the other\u00a0.<\/p>\n

    5.2 Why the Government Tolerates (or Encourages) Disruption<\/strong><\/p>\n

    The ruling party also benefits from disruption in specific ways. A non-functioning Parliament means:<\/p>\n

      \n
    • \n

      No Question Hour \u2192 ministers avoid accountability<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    • \n

      No committee scrutiny \u2192 laws pass without debate<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    • \n

      No opposition speeches \u2192 negative news cycles are avoided<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    • \n

      Session curtailment \u2192 government controls the narrative<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      As the 2021 monsoon session demonstrated, the government accomplished almost all of its legislative agenda amid the slogan-shouting and placard-waving. The one significant law it did not bring before Parliament was an amendment to delicense electricity distribution \u2014 suggesting that when the government truly wants to pass a bill, it finds a way, disruptions notwithstanding\u00a0.<\/p>\n

      5.3 The Zero-Sum Game<\/strong><\/p>\n

      The current dynamic is a zero-sum game: the opposition disrupts to force accountability; the government tolerates disruption because it can pass laws anyway. Neither side has an incentive to restore deliberative democracy.<\/p>\n

      The result, as PRS notes, is that \u201cParliament can change its rules to give MPs more teeth in questioning the government and empower its committees to become critical stakeholders in the law-making process. This will increase the stake that MPs have in the effective functioning of the institution, and disincentivise them from disrupting it. But this alone will not stop parliamentary disruptions\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

      \n

      SECTION 6: THE WAY FORWARD \u2013 REFORM PROPOSALS<\/strong><\/p>\n

      6.1 Fix Minimum Sitting Days<\/strong><\/p>\n

      The most straightforward reform is to fix a minimum number of sitting days by statute. As PRS notes, if Parliament were to meet more frequently, \u201cthe pressure of completing legislative business in a limited time will also ease up leading to lesser number of pending bills. More parliamentary sitting days will allow both the treasury and opposition benches adequate time to bring their issues to the floor of the House\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

      6.2 Mandatory Committee Scrutiny<\/strong><\/p>\n

      The decline in bills referred to committees \u2014 from 71% under UPA to 26% under NDA \u2014 is a constitutional scandal. Requiring that all government bills be automatically referred to standing committees for scrutiny (with exceptions only for urgent national security matters) would restore the deliberative character of Parliament.<\/p>\n

      6.3 Empower the Speaker to Act Impartially<\/strong><\/p>\n

      The Speaker\u2018s inability to maintain order without appearing partisan is a structural flaw. Reforms that insulate the Speaker from party control \u2014 such as requiring the Speaker to resign from their party upon election \u2014 could restore the neutrality of the Chair.<\/p>\n

      6.4 The Dandavate Formula<\/strong><\/p>\n

      Madhu Dandavate\u2018s formula remains the ideal: a sense of accommodation by the treasury benches and a sense of responsibility by the Opposition benches. This balance \u201ccan only be achieved by both sides working together to uphold the dignity of Parliament\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

      \n

      CONCLUSION \u2013 THE GRAND INQUEST THAT FALLS SILENT<\/strong><\/p>\n

      Two hundred and seventy years ago, British parliamentarian William Pitt described the House of Commons as the \u201cgrand inquest of the nation.\u201d The legislature, he argued, has a duty \u201cto inquire into every step of public management, either abroad or at home, in order to see that nothing has been done amiss\u201d\u00a0.<\/p>\n

      Over the last decade, India\u2018s grand inquest has increasingly fallen silent. When it does speak, it speaks in shouts and slogans, not in debate. When it passes laws, it passes them in ten minutes, not ten hours. When the government faces scrutiny, it cancels Question Hour. When the opposition demands accountability, it storms the Well.<\/p>\n

      This is not the democracy Ambedkar envisioned. This is not the Parliament that Sardar Patel, Nehru, and the Constituent Assembly designed.<\/p>\n

      What Has Been Lost:<\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Loss<\/th>\nExplanation<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Executive accountability<\/strong><\/td>\nQuestion Hour non-functional; ministers avoid oral questioning<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Legislative scrutiny<\/strong><\/td>\nLaws passed in minutes, often with only the minister speaking<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Committee oversight<\/strong><\/td>\nPercentage of bills referred to committees dropped from 71% to 26%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Deliberative democracy<\/strong><\/td>\nShouting and slogan-shouting replace debate and argument<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Public trust<\/strong><\/td>\nCitizens see Parliament as a circus, not a serious institution<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      What Remains:<\/strong><\/p>\n

      Dr B.R. Ambedkar and J\u00fcrgen Habermas, despite their different contexts, agreed on one fundamental principle:\u00a0legitimacy requires genuine deliberation<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

      Ambedkar supplied the institutional safeguard: legislatures must be allowed to function fully lest democracy degenerate into elected oligarchy. Habermas supplied the normative standard: legitimacy requires genuine deliberation, not its simulation\u00a0.<\/p>\n

      In the truncated sessions and disrupted Houses of modern India, both standards have been breached. The budget, however technically legal, lacks the moral and discursive weight that sustained debate would have conferred. Citizens are left wondering whether allocations reflect careful scrutiny or partisan expediency.<\/p>\n

      The Unanswered Question:<\/strong><\/p>\n

      Democracy dies not with dramatic coups but with quiet erosions \u2014 shortened debates, muted voices, budgets passed in haste. If Goan democracy is to retain its vitality, the Assembly must be restored as a forum of robust contestation. Citizens, civil society, and the judiciary have the challenge to insist that sessions are not privileges to be doled out at executive pleasure but rights to be fiercely guarded\u00a0.<\/p>\n

      As the new Parliament building rises in New Delhi \u2014 a modern, spacious edifice \u2014 the question is not about its architecture. The question is whether the institution it houses will recover its voice, its purpose, and its constitutional duty to be the grand inquest of the nation.<\/p>\n

      Or whether it will remain a modern, spacious venue for a dysfunctional institution.<\/p>\n

      \n

      SUMMARY TABLE: PARLIAMENTARY PRODUCTIVITY \u2013 NDA ERA (2014-2026)<\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Aspect<\/th>\n2014-2019 (16th LS)<\/th>\n2019-2024 (17th LS)<\/th>\n2024-2026 (18th LS)<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Avg. Sitting Days\/Year<\/strong><\/td>\n~70<\/td>\n~68<\/td>\n~65 (projected)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Bills Referred to Committees<\/strong><\/td>\n27%<\/td>\n~25%<\/td>\n26%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Notable Low Productivity Session<\/strong><\/td>\n2021 Monsoon (78 hrs lost)<\/td>\n2023 Budget (96 hrs lost)<\/td>\n2024 Winter (65 hrs lost)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Question Hour Functionality<\/strong><\/td>\nOften disrupted<\/td>\nFrequently cancelled<\/td>\nSporadic<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Committees Bypassed<\/strong><\/td>\nIncreasing trend<\/td>\nContinued<\/td>\nAccelerated<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Session Curtailment<\/strong><\/td>\nOccasional<\/td>\nFrequent<\/td>\nbecomes standard practice (Goa 2026)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
      \n

      END OF TOPIC 15<\/strong><\/p>\n

      Next Topic (Topic 16):<\/strong>\u00a0\u201cOrdinance Raj \u2013 When the Executive Legislates Instead of Parliament\u201d<\/p>\n

      To be continued tomorrow with in-depth analysis of how the government has increasingly used ordinances to bypass parliamentary scrutiny, particularly during the pandemic and political crises.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      TOPIC 15 How Adjournments, Walkouts, and Curtailed Sittings Affect Debate, Accountability, and Democratic Functioning On the morning of November 25, 2024, as the Winter Session of Parliament commenced, Opposition MPs stormed the Well of the House demanding an immediate discussion on electoral fraud and the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of voter rolls. The Lok Sabha […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3963,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"googlesitekit_rrm_CAowk73GDA:productID":"","footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[67,66],"tags":[1101,1103,1094,1106,1107,1099,1105,759,1069,1100,1110,1068,1109,1104,1070,1096,1097,1108,1102,1098],"class_list":["post-3962","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-social-issues","category-society-responsibility","tag-adjournments-in-parliament","tag-budget-session-debate","tag-constitutional-governance","tag-democratic-functioning","tag-electoral-fraud-debate","tag-goa-legislative-assembly","tag-government-accountability","tag-india-politics","tag-indian-parliament","tag-legislative-productivity","tag-legislative-scrutiny","tag-lok-sabha","tag-model-code-of-conduct","tag-opposition-protest","tag-parliamentary-democracy","tag-parliamentary-disruptions","tag-rajya-sabha","tag-special-intensive-revision","tag-walkouts-in-parliament","tag-winter-session-2024"],"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3962","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3962"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3962\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3998,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3962\/revisions\/3998"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/3963"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3962"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=3962"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=3962"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}