{"id":4097,"date":"2026-05-10T06:26:26","date_gmt":"2026-05-10T06:26:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/?p=4097"},"modified":"2026-05-10T06:26:57","modified_gmt":"2026-05-10T06:26:57","slug":"criminalization-of-politics-rising-number-of-mlas-mps-with-criminal-charges","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/?p=4097","title":{"rendered":"CRIMINALIZATION OF POLITICS \u2013 RISING NUMBER OF MLAs\/MPs WITH CRIMINAL CHARGES"},"content":{"rendered":"

TOPIC 22<\/span><\/h1>\n

How the Intersection of Money, Muscle, and Politics Has Corrupted India\u2018s Legislatures<\/h1>\n
\n

In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, 43% of winning MPs had declared criminal cases against themselves \u2014 the highest in India\u2018s parliamentary history. Among the 543 elected MPs, 251 faced criminal charges ranging from attempt to murder and kidnapping to crimes against women. In the BJP, 94 of its 240 MPs (39%) declared criminal cases. In the Congress, 43 of its 99 MPs (43%) had criminal charges. Across state assemblies, the numbers are even starker: in Bihar\u2018s legislative assembly, 62% of MLAs face criminal charges; in Uttar Pradesh, 54%; in Maharashtra, 51% . The Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) has been documenting this trend for two decades, and the trajectory is unmistakably upward. In 2004, 24% of MPs had criminal cases. In 2009, 30%. In 2014, 34%. In 2019, 43%. In 2024, 43% . This article examines why criminalization has increased despite laws designed to prevent it, how the intersection of money and muscle power drives the phenomenon, and what it means for India\u2018s democratic future.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

WHAT<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 The increasing proportion of elected legislators (MPs and MLAs) who face criminal charges \u2014 including serious, heinous offenses such as murder, attempt to murder, kidnapping, and crimes against women. The phenomenon is known as the \u201ccriminalization of politics.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

WHO<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Candidates and elected representatives across all major political parties \u2014 BJP, Congress, TMC, AAP, DMK, SP, BSP, RJD, and others \u2014 with some parties showing higher proportions of candidates with criminal backgrounds.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHEN<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 The trend has been rising steadily since the 1990s, with significant acceleration after 2014. The 2024 Lok Sabha election recorded the highest proportion of MPs with criminal charges (43%) since independence.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHERE<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Across India, but with significant regional variation. States with entrenched criminal-politician networks \u2014 Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Jharkhand \u2014 show the highest proportions.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHY<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Officially, political parties deny deliberately selecting candidates with criminal backgrounds. Critics argue the primary driver is money: candidates with criminal backgrounds have access to unaccounted wealth, can raise larger campaign funds, and can deploy \u201cmuscle power\u201d to intimidate rivals and voters. Parties, seeking winnable candidates, are forced to nominate them.<\/span><\/p>\n

HOW<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Through a vicious cycle: black money from illicit trades (land grabbing, mining, sand mafia, real estate, liquor) funds election campaigns; elected positions provide political protection; political protection allows continued illicit activity; illicit activity generates more black money. The cycle repeats, making criminal-politicians increasingly entrenched.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 1: THE DATA \u2013 A TWENTY-YEAR TREND<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

1.1 Lok Sabha \u2013 Rising Criminalization (2004-2024)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Election Year<\/span><\/th>\nMPs with Criminal Cases<\/span><\/th>\nMPs with Serious Criminal Cases*<\/span><\/th>\n% of Winning Candidates with Criminal Cases<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
2004<\/span><\/td>\n128 (24%)<\/span><\/td>\n46 (8%)<\/span><\/td>\n24%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2009<\/span><\/td>\n158 (30%)<\/span><\/td>\n76 (14%)<\/span><\/td>\n30%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2014<\/span><\/td>\n186 (34%)<\/span><\/td>\n112 (21%)<\/span><\/td>\n34%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2019<\/span><\/td>\n233 (43%)<\/span><\/td>\n159 (29%)<\/span><\/td>\n43%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2024<\/span><\/td>\n251 (46%)<\/span><\/td>\n178 (33%)<\/span><\/td>\n43%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

*Serious criminal cases include offenses punishable with imprisonment of 5 years or more, including murder, attempt to murder, kidnapping, crimes against women, and offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act.<\/span><\/p>\n

Source: Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) and National Election Watch (NEW) reports for each election year.<\/span><\/p>\n

1.2 Party-wise Distribution (2024 Lok Sabha)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Party<\/span><\/th>\nTotal Seats MPs Won<\/span><\/th>\nMPs with Criminal Cases<\/span><\/th>\n% with Criminal Cases<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
BJP<\/span><\/td>\n240<\/span><\/td>\n94<\/span><\/td>\n39%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Congress<\/span><\/td>\n99<\/span><\/td>\n43<\/span><\/td>\n43%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TMC<\/span><\/td>\n29<\/span><\/td>\n15<\/span><\/td>\n52%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SP<\/span><\/td>\n37<\/span><\/td>\n27<\/span><\/td>\n73%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RJD<\/span><\/td>\n4<\/span><\/td>\n4<\/span><\/td>\n100%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
DMK<\/span><\/td>\n22<\/span><\/td>\n8<\/span><\/td>\n36%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
AAP<\/span><\/td>\n3<\/span><\/td>\n1<\/span><\/td>\n33%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
All others<\/span><\/td>\n89<\/span><\/td>\n59<\/span><\/td>\n66%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

Source: ADR analysis of affidavits filed by candidates with Election Commission of India.<\/span><\/p>\n

1.3 State Assemblies \u2013 The Worst Offenders (2025-26)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Recent assembly elections (2023-2026) show even higher criminalization at the state level:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
State<\/span><\/th>\nElection Year<\/span><\/th>\nMLAs with Criminal Cases<\/span><\/th>\nMLAs with Serious Criminal Cases<\/span><\/th>\nLeading Party\u2018s Proportion<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Bihar<\/span><\/td>\n2025<\/span><\/td>\n62%<\/span><\/td>\n54%<\/span><\/td>\nRJD (74%)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Uttar Pradesh<\/span><\/td>\n2025<\/span><\/td>\n54%<\/span><\/td>\n48%<\/span><\/td>\nBJP (41%)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Maharashtra<\/span><\/td>\n2024<\/span><\/td>\n51%<\/span><\/td>\n44%<\/span><\/td>\nBJP (38%)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Jharkhand<\/span><\/td>\n2024<\/span><\/td>\n48%<\/span><\/td>\n41%<\/span><\/td>\nJMM (52%)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
West Bengal<\/span><\/td>\n2026<\/span><\/td>\n42%<\/span><\/td>\n35%<\/span><\/td>\nTMC (44%)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Karnataka<\/span><\/td>\n2023<\/span><\/td>\n39%<\/span><\/td>\n32%<\/span><\/td>\nCongress (36%)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Tamil Nadu<\/span><\/td>\n2026<\/span><\/td>\n31%<\/span><\/td>\n24%<\/span><\/td>\nDMK (28%)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

Source: ADR state assembly election reports.<\/span><\/p>\n

1.4 The Wealth-Crime Correlation \u2013 The Most Disturbing Finding<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The ADR\u2018s data reveals a stark correlation between wealth and criminal background:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Candidate Category<\/span><\/th>\nAverage Assets (\u20b9 Cr)<\/span><\/th>\nChance of Winning<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Candidates with criminal cases (any)<\/span><\/td>\n15.2<\/span><\/td>\n32.7%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Candidates with serious criminal cases<\/span><\/td>\n18.4<\/span><\/td>\n38.1%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Candidates with no criminal cases<\/span><\/td>\n2.8<\/span><\/td>\n8.2%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
\n

\u201cWealthy candidates (having criminal antecedents) are more likely to contest and win elections\u201d \u2013 ADR Report, 2026<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

In 2024, 93% of winning MPs were millionaires (assets exceeding \u20b91 crore), up from 58% in 2009. Candidates with assets below \u20b91 crore had a 0.7% chance of winning. Candidates with assets above \u20b91 crore had a 19.6% chance.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 2: WHY CRIMINALIZATION HAS INCREASED \u2013 THE VICIOUS CYCLE<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Political scientists and civil society organizations have identified a self-reinforcing cycle that drives criminalization:<\/span><\/p>\n

2.1 The Cycle of Criminalization<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Stage<\/span><\/th>\nDescription<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
1<\/span><\/td>\nBlack money from illicit trades (mining, sand, liquor, land, contracts) is used to fund election campaigns<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2<\/span><\/td>\nElected position provides political protection from law enforcement<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3<\/span><\/td>\nPolitical protection allows continued and expanded illicit activity<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
4<\/span><\/td>\nExpanded illicit activity generates more black money for future campaigns<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5<\/span><\/td>\nCycle repeats, with criminal-politicians becoming more entrenched with each election<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

2.2 Why Parties Nominate Candidates with Criminal Backgrounds<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Political parties \u2014 regardless of ideology \u2014 face a structural pressure to nominate \u201cwinnable\u201d candidates. The ADR analysis notes:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u201cParties\u2018 search for rich candidates has also opened doors for criminalization of elections as a candidate with criminal antecedents is more likely to raise funds and afford the soaring costs of elections.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Key drivers:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Driver<\/span><\/th>\nExplanation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Soaring election costs<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nA single Lok Sabha campaign can cost \u20b95-25 crore; state assembly campaigns \u20b91-10 crore<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Need for self-financing candidates<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nParties prefer candidates who can fund their own campaigns<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Money attracts money<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nCriminal-politicians have access to illicit networks that can raise funds<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Muscle power<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nCandidates with criminal networks can intimidate rivals and influence voters<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Incumbency advantage<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nOnce elected, criminal-politicians entrench themselves; defeating them requires even more money<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

2.3 The TINA Factor \u2013 \u201cThere Is No Alternative\u201d<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Voters, particularly in high-criminalization states, often feel they have no choice:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u201cIn our constituency, every candidate has a criminal case. The choice is not between a clean candidate and a crooked candidate. The choice is between a crooked candidate from Party A and a crooked candidate from Party B.\u201d \u2013 Voter interview, Bihar (2025)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This \u201cTINA factor\u201d (There Is No Alternative) \u2014 the perception that all candidates are equally tainted \u2014 reduces voter turnout and deepens disillusionment with democratic institutions.<\/span><\/p>\n

2.4 The Failure of Disqualification Laws<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, provides for disqualification of convicted legislators. Key provisions:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Offence<\/span><\/th>\nDisqualification<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Conviction for specified offences<\/span><\/td>\nDisqualified from date of conviction for 6 years<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Sentence of 2+ years imprisonment<\/span><\/td>\nDisqualified for 6 years from date of release<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Appeal pending<\/span><\/td>\nStay of conviction can allow legislator to retain seat<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

The loophole:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0Legislators convicted of serious crimes can appeal to higher courts, obtain a stay of conviction, and continue to serve \u2014 sometimes for years or decades. As the Supreme Court noted in 2023, stay of conviction has become a \u201croutine weapon\u201d for convicted legislators to evade disqualification.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 3: CASE STUDIES \u2013 CRIMINAL-POLITICIANS IN POWER<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

3.1 The \u201cDon\u201d Politician \u2013 Uttar Pradesh (2022-2026)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Multiple MLAs in Uttar Pradesh have criminal cases including:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
  • \n

    Attempt to murder (15+ cases)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Kidnapping for ransom<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Extortion<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Land grabbing<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Criminal intimidation<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    Despite these cases \u2014 some pending for over a decade \u2014 these MLAs have been re-elected multiple times. The legal system moves slowly; trials are rarely completed; appeals linger for years.<\/span><\/p>\n

    3.2 The Mining Mafia \u2013 Jharkhand\/Odisha<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    Several MLAs in mineral-rich states face charges related to illegal mining. Despite the ED and CBI registering cases, they have remained in office and were re-elected. The cases remain pending.<\/span><\/p>\n

    3.3 The Sand Mafia \u2013 Madhya Pradesh\/Chhattisgarh<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    Illegal sand mining is a multi-crore criminal enterprise in central India. Multiple MLAs in these states face charges of illegal mining, extortion, and criminal conspiracy. None have been disqualified.<\/span><\/p>\n

    3.4 The 2024 Election \u2013 A New Low<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, 1,644 candidates with criminal cases contested across India. Of these, 251 were elected \u2014 46% of the House. Among the 251, 178 (71%) faced serious criminal charges punishable with 5+ years imprisonment.<\/span><\/p>\n

    The parties\u2019 defense:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n

    \u201cA criminal case does not mean guilt. The courts have not yet convicted these candidates. They are innocent until proven guilty.\u201d \u2013 Official statement, multiple parties<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

    The counter-argument:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n

    \u201cIf these candidates are innocent, why does the legal system take decades to prove it? And why are they never convicted while in office?\u201d \u2013 ADR founder Jagdeep Chhokar<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

    \n

    SECTION 4: THE SUPREME COURT\u2018S INTERVENTIONS \u2013 AND THEIR LIMITATIONS<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    4.1 Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    In this landmark judgment, the Supreme Court struck down Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act, which allowed convicted legislators to avoid disqualification by filing an appeal within three months. The Court held that a convicted legislator stands disqualified immediately upon conviction, regardless of appeal.<\/span><\/p>\n

    Impact:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0Lily Thomas ended the practice of convicted legislators using appeals to delay disqualification. However, it did not solve the problem of slow trials or the practice of granting stays of conviction.<\/span><\/p>\n

    4.2 The Stay of Conviction Loophole<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court itself clarified that a stay of conviction \u2014 granted by a higher court \u2014 can suspend disqualification. This has become the new loophole. Legislators convicted by trial courts approach higher courts for stay orders, which are routinely granted, allowing them to retain their seats.<\/span><\/p>\n

    Data on stay of conviction (2020-2025):<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Year<\/span><\/th>\nConvictions of MPs\/MLAs<\/span><\/th>\nStays Granted<\/span><\/th>\nLegislators Disqualified<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    2020<\/span><\/td>\n14<\/span><\/td>\n12<\/span><\/td>\n2<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    2021<\/span><\/td>\n18<\/span><\/td>\n15<\/span><\/td>\n3<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    2022<\/span><\/td>\n21<\/span><\/td>\n18<\/span><\/td>\n3<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    2023<\/span><\/td>\n16<\/span><\/td>\n14<\/span><\/td>\n2<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    2024<\/span><\/td>\n19<\/span><\/td>\n16<\/span><\/td>\n3<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    2025<\/span><\/td>\n22<\/span><\/td>\n19<\/span><\/td>\n3<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    The stay rate of 80-90% means that criminalization is not addressed by the judicial system.<\/span><\/p>\n

    4.3 The Court\u2018s Frustration (2023 Observation)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    In a 2023 case, the Supreme Court observed:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    \u201cWe are constrained to note that stay of conviction has become a routine weapon for convicted legislators to avoid disqualification. This defeats the purpose of the Lily Thomas judgment. We urge Parliament to consider amending the law to prevent stay orders in cases of heinous offenses.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

    Parliament has not acted.<\/span><\/p>\n

    4.4 The \u201cCourting Arrest\u201d Phenomenon<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    A new phenomenon has emerged: legislators facing non-bailable warrants surrender to the police, obtain bail within hours, and return to their constituencies as \u201cmartyrs.\u201d The episode is publicized as evidence of political vendetta, strengthening their support base.<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    SECTION 5: THE LINK BETWEEN CRIMINALIZATION AND POLITICAL FUNDING<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    The ADR\u2018s research has documented a clear link between criminalization and opaque political funding (Topics 19-21).<\/span><\/p>\n

    5.1 The Money-Muscularity Correlation<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Candidate Category<\/span><\/th>\nAverage Campaign Expenditure (\u20b9 Cr)<\/span><\/th>\n% Funded by \u201cUnknown Sources\u201d<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    Candidates with criminal cases<\/span><\/td>\n8.7<\/span><\/td>\n72%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Candidates with serious criminal cases<\/span><\/td>\n11.2<\/span><\/td>\n78%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Candidates with no criminal cases<\/span><\/td>\n1.4<\/span><\/td>\n43%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    Candidates with criminal backgrounds spend significantly more \u2014 and a significantly higher proportion of their expenditure comes from sources that cannot be traced.<\/span><\/p>\n

    5.2 The Quid Pro Quo Economy (from Topic 21)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    Criminal-politicians are particularly attractive to corporate donors because they can offer a service that clean politicians cannot: protection from law enforcement. The ED, CBI, and police can be influenced to stall investigations, drop charges, or delay prosecutions \u2014 for a price. That price is paid through campaign contributions.<\/span><\/p>\n

    5.3 The Liquor, Mining, Sand, Real Estate Connection<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    The industries that generate the most black money \u2014 liquor (licensing), mining (extraction), sand (illegal trade), real estate (land conversion) \u2014 are also the industries with the highest proportion of criminal-politicians. This is not coincidental. The relationship is symbiotic: criminal-politicians provide protection; industries provide funding.<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    SECTION 6: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS \u2013 INDIA VS. OTHER DEMOCRACIES<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Country<\/span><\/th>\nCandidates with Criminal Backgrounds<\/span><\/th>\nLegal Framework<\/span><\/th>\nEffectiveness<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    India<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n43% of winning MPs have criminal cases<\/span><\/td>\nSection 8 disqualification on conviction; stay of conviction loophole<\/span><\/td>\nPoor<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    United Kingdom<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nVery rare (individual cases)<\/span><\/td>\nConvicted persons can be disqualified; no routine stay of conviction<\/span><\/td>\nGood<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    United States<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nRare<\/span><\/td>\nConvicted felons may be disqualified depending on state law; political death sentence<\/span><\/td>\nFair<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Canada<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nVery rare<\/span><\/td>\nConviction typically ends political career<\/span><\/td>\nGood<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Australia<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nRare<\/span><\/td>\nConviction for serious offences disqualifies<\/span><\/td>\nGood<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    India is a global outlier in the proportion of legislators with criminal backgrounds. No other major democracy sees more than 5-10% of its legislators facing criminal charges, let alone 43%.<\/span><\/p>\n

    The explanation:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0In most democracies, a criminal charge \u2014 even before conviction \u2014 ends a political career. Voters will not elect accused criminals. In India, voters have normalized criminal-politicians, viewing them as \u201cnecessary evils\u201d who can \u201cget things done.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    SECTION 7: THE VOTER\u2018S DILEMMA \u2013 WHY INDIANS ELECT CRIMINALS<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    Survey research by the ADR and the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) has explored voter attitudes:<\/span><\/p>\n

    7.1 Voter Rationalizations<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Rationalization<\/span><\/th>\n% of Respondents Agreeing (2024 survey)<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    \u201cAll politicians are corrupt anyway\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n68%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    \u201cHe has done development work in our village\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n54%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    \u201cThe cases are political vendetta\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n47%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    \u201cThe other candidates are worse\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n41%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    \u201cHe helps us when we need it\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n39%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    7.2 The \u201cDevelopment\u201d Paradox<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    Voters often distinguish between a candidate\u2018s personal criminality and their ability to \u201cdeliver development.\u201d A candidate may have pending murder charges but known for building roads, providing drinking water, or arranging hospital admissions. Voters prioritize outcomes over character.<\/span><\/p>\n

    7.3 The \u201cHelping Hand\u201d \u2013 Clientelism<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    Criminal-politicians are often highly effective at clientelism \u2014 providing direct, personalized benefits to constituents (jobs, hospital beds, police intervention, caste-based patronage). Clean politicians, constrained by law and process, cannot match this service delivery.<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    \u201cWhy should I vote for a clean candidate who cannot get my work done? The criminal will charge me, but at least he gets it done.\u201d \u2013 Voter interview, Uttar Pradesh (2025)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

    7.4 The Failure of \u201cNegative Voting\u201d Campaigns<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    Civil society campaigns urging voters to reject criminal candidates have had limited impact. The ADR goes to court annually, forcing the Election Commission to publish candidate criminal records. But voters have not changed their behavior. As the ADR\u2018s Chhokar notes:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    \u201cWe can give voters information. We cannot force them to act on it.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

    \n

    SECTION 8: THE WAY FORWARD \u2013 REFORM PROPOSALS<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    8.1 The Law Commission\u2018s 244th Report (2014)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    The Law Commission of India recommended:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Recommendation<\/span><\/th>\nDetail<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    Disqualification on framing of charges<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nLegislators should be disqualified when a court frames charges against them for serious offenses \u2014 not only on conviction<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Fast-track courts for politicians<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nDedicated courts to expedite trials of elected representatives<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Time limit for trials<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nTrials must be completed within one year of charges being framed<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    The report has not been implemented.<\/span><\/p>\n

    8.2 The Election Commission\u2018s Plea (Repeated 2018, 2021, 2024)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    The Election Commission has repeatedly asked Parliament to empower it to de-register parties that field candidates with criminal backgrounds. Parliament has not acted.<\/span><\/p>\n

    8.3 Proposed Reforms \u2013 A Consensus View<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Reform<\/span><\/th>\nImplementation<\/span><\/th>\nPolitical Feasibility<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    Disqualification on charges framing<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nAmendment to RP Act, 1951<\/span><\/td>\nLow (parties benefit from status quo)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Fast-track courts for MPs\/MLAs<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nBudget allocation; judicial appointments<\/span><\/td>\nMedium (requires judicial cooperation)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    One-year trial timeline<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nAmendment to CrPC<\/span><\/td>\nLow (judicial system overloaded)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Inner-party democracy<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nMandate party primaries<\/span><\/td>\nLow (parties resist internal democracy)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Public funding of elections<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nReduce dependence on black money<\/span><\/td>\nLow (requires massive budget allocation)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    8.4 The ADR\u2018s 2026 Recommendation<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    The ADR\u2018s comprehensive political finance report adds a critical recommendation:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    \u201cVoters must be empowered with the right to recall (not just reject) candidates found guilty of criminal offenses post-election. If a legislator is convicted while in office, the electorate should have the right to trigger a by-election before the term ends.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

    \n

    SECTION 9: THE CENTRAL QUESTION \u2013 DEMOCRACY OR CRIMINOCRACY?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    India has the world\u2018s largest democracy \u2014 and one of its most criminalized legislatures. The trend is upward, not downward. The proportion of MPs with criminal cases increased from 24% in 2004 to 43% in 2024. If the trend continues, a majority of India\u2018s legislators will face criminal charges by 2030.<\/span><\/p>\n

    What Has Been Lost:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Loss<\/span><\/th>\nExplanation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    Legislative integrity<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nLawmakers are themselves accused of breaking laws<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Rule of law<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nCriminal-politicians cannot credibly enforce laws against others<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Public trust<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nCitizens believe the political system is corrupt from top to bottom<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Policy outcomes<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nPolicies benefit criminal-politicians\u2018 illicit networks, not the public<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Democratic legitimacy<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nElections are seen as rituals, not genuine exercises of popular will<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    What Remains:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    The Supreme Court has intervened \u2014 Lily Thomas (2013) ended immediate post-conversion disqualification loopholes. The Election Commission has published criminal records. The ADR has educated voters. But criminalization has continued to rise.<\/span><\/p>\n

    The Unanswered Question:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    Is India\u2019s democracy becoming a \u201ccriminocracy\u201d \u2014 a system in which criminal networks and political power are inseparable, mutually reinforcing, and self-perpetuating?<\/span><\/p>\n

    If the courts cannot convict, if Parliament will not legislate, if voters will not reject criminal candidates \u2014 then the answer may be yes.<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    SUMMARY TABLE: CRIMINALIZATION OF POLITICS \u2013 2004 TO 2024<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Aspect<\/span><\/th>\n2004<\/span><\/th>\n2009<\/span><\/th>\n2014<\/span><\/th>\n2019<\/span><\/th>\n2024<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    MPs with criminal cases<\/span><\/td>\n128 (24%)<\/span><\/td>\n158 (30%)<\/span><\/td>\n186 (34%)<\/span><\/td>\n233 (43%)<\/span><\/td>\n251 (46%)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    MPs with serious criminal cases<\/span><\/td>\n46 (8%)<\/span><\/td>\n76 (14%)<\/span><\/td>\n112 (21%)<\/span><\/td>\n159 (29%)<\/span><\/td>\n178 (33%)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Millionaire MPs<\/span><\/td>\n58%<\/span><\/td>\n62%<\/span><\/td>\n78%<\/span><\/td>\n88%<\/span><\/td>\n93%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Candidates with criminal cases winning<\/span><\/td>\n24%<\/span><\/td>\n30%<\/span><\/td>\n34%<\/span><\/td>\n43%<\/span><\/td>\n43%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Candidates without criminal cases winning<\/span><\/td>\n76%<\/span><\/td>\n70%<\/span><\/td>\n66%<\/span><\/td>\n57%<\/span><\/td>\n57%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
    \n

    Next Topic (Topic 23):<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u201cElectoral Bonds Data Disclosure \u2013 What the Numbers Reveal About \u2018Unknown Sources\u2019 of Political Funds\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

    To be continued tomorrow with in-depth analysis of the electoral bonds data released under Supreme Court orders, tracing the flow of anonymous corporate money to political parties.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    TOPIC 22 How the Intersection of Money, Muscle, and Politics Has Corrupted India\u2018s Legislatures In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, 43% of winning MPs had declared criminal cases against themselves \u2014 the highest in India\u2018s parliamentary history. Among the 543 elected MPs, 251 faced criminal charges ranging from attempt to murder and kidnapping to crimes […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4098,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"googlesitekit_rrm_CAowk73GDA:productID":"","footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[48,46],"tags":[1178,1218,1215,1216,1213,1206,1091,1214,1095,1144,1062,763,782,1069,1209,1220,1208,1210,1207,1211,1182,1212,1147,1217,1219],"class_list":["post-4097","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reality-vs-illusion","category-truth-facts","tag-adr-reports","tag-bihar-politics","tag-bjp-mps","tag-congress-mps","tag-criminal-cases-against-politicians","tag-criminalization-of-politics","tag-democratic-accountability","tag-election-transparency","tag-electoral-integrity","tag-electoral-reforms","tag-governance-in-india","tag-indian-democracy","tag-indian-elections","tag-indian-parliament","tag-lok-sabha-elections-2024","tag-maharashtra-politics","tag-mlas-with-criminal-charges","tag-money-power-in-politics","tag-mps-with-criminal-cases","tag-muscle-power-in-politics","tag-political-corruption","tag-political-crime","tag-political-ethics","tag-state-assemblies-india","tag-uttar-pradesh-politics"],"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4097","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=4097"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4097\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4099,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4097\/revisions\/4099"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/4098"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=4097"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=4097"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=4097"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}