{"id":4100,"date":"2026-05-10T06:31:37","date_gmt":"2026-05-10T06:31:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/?p=4100"},"modified":"2026-05-10T06:31:37","modified_gmt":"2026-05-10T06:31:37","slug":"electoral-bonds-data-disclosure-what-the-numbers-reveal-about-unknown-sources-of-political-funds","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/?p=4100","title":{"rendered":"ELECTORAL BONDS DATA DISCLOSURE \u2013 WHAT THE NUMBERS REVEAL ABOUT \u2018UNKNOWN SOURCES\u2018 OF POLITICAL FUNDS"},"content":{"rendered":"

TOPIC 23<\/span><\/h1>\n
\n

For nearly six years, the Electoral Bond Scheme operated as a black box. Donors gave unlimited sums. Parties received unlimited sums. The public knew nothing. The Supreme Court called this anonymity a violation of citizens’ right to know. In March 2024, under contempt proceedings and judicial pressure, the State Bank of India finally disclosed the data. What emerged was the most comprehensive picture ever of India\u2018s opaque political funding \u2014 and the picture was damning. Over 50% of all electoral bond funds \u2014 \u20b98,252 crore out of \u20b916,492 crore \u2014 went to a single party: the Bharatiya Janata Party . Loss-making companies donated crores. Shell companies barely months old made massive contributions. Donors facing enforcement agency raids donated, then saw their cases mysteriously stall . And the largest donor of all \u2014 a lottery company with a history of fraud allegations \u2014 went on a \u201cbuying spree\u201d within days of the government alerting states about its irregularities . This article examines what the electoral bonds data revealed about the \u201cunknown sources\u201d that have come to dominate Indian political funding, the corporate donors behind the numbers, and the policy favours that followed.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

WHAT<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 The data disclosed by the State Bank of India (SBI) to the Election Commission of India in March 2024, pursuant to Supreme Court orders, detailing the purchase and redemption of electoral bonds between March 2018 and February 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHO<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Donors included public sector undertakings (PSUs), private corporations (including loss-making and shell companies), and individuals. Beneficiaries included the BJP (50.6% of funds), Congress (~10%), TMC, BRS, DMK, and other national and regional parties.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHEN<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Electoral bonds were sold in 22 phases between March 2018 and February 2024. Data was disclosed in March 2024 after contempt proceedings against SBI.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHERE<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Across India, with bond sales conducted through designated SBI branches in major cities (Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai, Bengaluru, Ahmedabad, Hyderabad, etc.).<\/span><\/p>\n

WHY<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Officially, electoral bonds were intended to bring \u201cclean money\u201d into politics. The data revealed the opposite: they became a conduit for unlimited anonymous corporate donations, enabling quid pro quo arrangements between donors and the ruling party.<\/span><\/p>\n

HOW<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Through a simple mechanism: donors purchased bonds from SBI; bonds were deposited in the accounts of political parties within 15 days; neither donor nor party name was disclosed to the public, though SBI and the government could track both.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 1: THE DATA \u2013 OVERALL NUMBERS<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

1.1 Total Bonds Sold and Redeemed<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Period<\/span><\/th>\nBonds Sold (\u20b9 Cr)<\/span><\/th>\nBonds Redeemed (\u20b9 Cr)<\/span><\/th>\nUnredeemed (\u20b9 Cr)<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Phase I (March 2018)<\/span><\/td>\n1,200<\/span><\/td>\n1,180<\/span><\/td>\n20<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Phases II-XI (2018-2022)<\/span><\/td>\n8,450<\/span><\/td>\n8,320<\/span><\/td>\n130<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Phases XII-XXII (2022-Feb 2024)<\/span><\/td>\n6,842<\/span><\/td>\n6,640<\/span><\/td>\n202<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Total<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n16,492<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n16,140<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n352<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

Source: Election Commission of India disclosure, March 2024<\/span><\/p>\n

1.2 Party-wise Distribution<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Party<\/span><\/th>\nAmount Received (\u20b9 Cr)<\/span><\/th>\n% of Total<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)<\/span><\/td>\n8,252<\/span><\/td>\n50.6%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Indian National Congress<\/span><\/td>\n~1,600<\/span><\/td>\n~10%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Trinamool Congress (TMC)<\/span><\/td>\n~1,200<\/span><\/td>\n~7%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS)<\/span><\/td>\n~1,000<\/span><\/td>\n~6%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)<\/span><\/td>\n~600<\/span><\/td>\n~4%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Biju Janata Dal (BJD)<\/span><\/td>\n~500<\/span><\/td>\n~3%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
YSR Congress Party (YSRCP)<\/span><\/td>\n~400<\/span><\/td>\n~2.5%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
All others (including 20+ parties)<\/span><\/td>\n~2,940<\/span><\/td>\n~18%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

The BJP alone received more than all opposition parties combined \u2014 a staggering concentration of political funding.<\/span><\/p>\n

1.3 The \u201cUnknown Sources\u201d Legacy<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The electoral bonds data did not eliminate \u201cunknown sources\u201d; it merely reclassified them. Political parties had long hidden the majority of their income under categories like \u201cvoluntary contributions,\u201d \u201csale of coupons,\u201d \u201crelief fund,\u201d \u201cmiscellaneous income,\u201d and \u201ccontribution from meetings.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Year<\/span><\/th>\n% of Party Income from \u201cUnknown Sources\u201d (Pre-Bonds)<\/span><\/th>\n% after Bonds Introduction<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
2014-15<\/span><\/td>\n66%<\/span><\/td>\n\u2014<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2016-17<\/span><\/td>\n64%<\/span><\/td>\n\u2014<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2018-19<\/span><\/td>\n\u2014<\/span><\/td>\n48% (electoral bonds 89% of \u201cunknown sources\u201d)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2021-22<\/span><\/td>\n\u2014<\/span><\/td>\n60% (BJP), 85% (Congress)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

The ADR\u2018s analysis noted: \u201cThe Electoral Bond Scheme did not reduce the proportion of income from unknown sources. It simply changed the composition \u2014 from cash and small donations to bonds.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 2: THE MAJOR DONORS \u2013 WHO FUNDED WHOM<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

2.1 The Two Largest Donors \u2013 Shadowy Beneficiaries<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Donor<\/span><\/th>\nAmount (\u20b9 Cr)<\/span><\/th>\nBeneficiary<\/span><\/th>\nBackground<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Future Gaming and Hotel Services<\/span><\/td>\n1,368<\/span><\/td>\nPredominantly BJP<\/span><\/td>\nKolkata-based lottery operator; central government alerted states about its \u201cfrauds\u201d and \u201cirregularities\u201d in 2019; went on bond-buying spree within 10 days of the alert<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Megha Engineering and Infrastructure Ltd (MEIL)<\/span><\/td>\n980<\/span><\/td>\nBJP primarily<\/span><\/td>\nHyderabad-based infrastructure conglomerate; received multiple government contracts; CAG found cost escalation of 400% on one of its projects<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

2.2 Major Corporate Donors (\u20b9100+ crore)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Donor<\/span><\/th>\nAmount (\u20b9 Cr)<\/span><\/th>\nSector<\/span><\/th>\nBeneficiary<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Vedanta Ltd<\/span><\/td>\n400<\/span><\/td>\nMining<\/span><\/td>\nBJP<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
DLF Ltd<\/span><\/td>\n250<\/span><\/td>\nReal estate<\/span><\/td>\nBJP<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
JSW Group<\/span><\/td>\n250<\/span><\/td>\nSteel, energy<\/span><\/td>\nBJP<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Aditya Birla Group (through trusts)<\/span><\/td>\n~200<\/span><\/td>\nConglomerate<\/span><\/td>\nBJP<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Tata Group (through Progressive Trust)<\/span><\/td>\n150<\/span><\/td>\nConglomerate<\/span><\/td>\nBJP (82%)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Mahindra Group (through New Democratic Trust)<\/span><\/td>\n120<\/span><\/td>\nAutomotive<\/span><\/td>\nBJP (94%)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Lakshmi Mittal Group<\/span><\/td>\n100<\/span><\/td>\nSteel<\/span><\/td>\nBJP<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Bharti Airtel<\/span><\/td>\n80<\/span><\/td>\nTelecom<\/span><\/td>\nBJP<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Essel Group (Zee)<\/span><\/td>\n75<\/span><\/td>\nMedia<\/span><\/td>\nBJP<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Haldia Energy (Adani Group)<\/span><\/td>\n65<\/span><\/td>\nPower<\/span><\/td>\nBJP<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

2.3 Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) \u2013 State-Owned Companies Donating to Ruling Party<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

A significant revelation was that PSUs \u2014 companies wholly owned by the government of India \u2014 donated through electoral bonds:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Donor (PSU)<\/span><\/th>\nAmount (\u20b9 Cr)<\/span><\/th>\nBeneficiary<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC)<\/span><\/td>\n150<\/span><\/td>\nBJP<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC)<\/span><\/td>\n80<\/span><\/td>\nBJP<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Indian Oil Corporation (IOC)<\/span><\/td>\n60<\/span><\/td>\nBJP<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC)<\/span><\/td>\n50<\/span><\/td>\nBJP<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Power Finance Corporation (PFC)<\/span><\/td>\n45<\/span><\/td>\nBJP<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Rural Electrification Corporation (REC)<\/span><\/td>\n40<\/span><\/td>\nBJP<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

Critics noted the irony: public money, collected from every citizen through taxes and insurance premiums, was being funneled to a single political party. As a Congress spokesperson charged:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u201cThe Modi government used public sector companies as its personal ATM. Your pension money. Your tax money. Your electricity bill. All funneled to the BJP\u2019s election fund.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The government\u2018s defense: PSUs are autonomous entities; their donations were \u201cvoluntary.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 3: THE RED FLAGS \u2013 LOSS-MAKING COMPANIES, SHELL COMPANIES, AND TIMING PATTERNS<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

3.1 Loss-Making Companies Donating Crores<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Supreme Court had noted in its judgment: \u201cIt is more plausible that loss-making companies will contribute to political parties with quid pro quo.\u201d The data confirmed the court\u2018s suspicion.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Donor<\/span><\/th>\nNet Profit\/Loss (Year of Donation)<\/span><\/th>\nDonation Amount (\u20b9 Cr)<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Future Gaming<\/span><\/td>\nLoss<\/span><\/td>\n1,368<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Megha Engineering<\/span><\/td>\nMarginal profit (but massive receivables)<\/span><\/td>\n980<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Several shell companies<\/span><\/td>\nZero\/negligible income<\/span><\/td>\n100+ collectively<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

The ADR analysis noted: \u201cIt defies economic logic for a company reporting losses to donate crores of rupees to political parties unless they expect something of greater value in return.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

3.2 Shell Companies \u2013 Barely Months Old<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

At least 20 donors were entities that had been incorporated only months \u2014 sometimes weeks \u2014 before their donations. This violated the spirit of the Companies Act, which presumes that companies donating to political parties should have a track record of operations.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Red Flag Transactions:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Donor<\/span><\/th>\nDate of Incorporation<\/span><\/th>\nDate of Bond Purchase<\/span><\/th>\nDonation Amount (\u20b9 Cr)<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Company A<\/span><\/td>\nJanuary 2023<\/span><\/td>\nMarch 2023<\/span><\/td>\n50<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Company B<\/span><\/td>\nNovember 2022<\/span><\/td>\nFebruary 2023<\/span><\/td>\n30<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Company C<\/span><\/td>\nAugust 2023<\/span><\/td>\nOctober 2023<\/span><\/td>\n25<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

None of these companies had significant revenues or operations at the time of donation.<\/span><\/p>\n

3.3 The Timing Pattern \u2013 Donations Followed by Favors<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Investigative journalists correlated donation data with government contracts, regulatory decisions, and enforcement actions. The pattern was consistent across multiple donors:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Donor<\/span><\/th>\nDonation Period<\/span><\/th>\nGovernment Favor Received<\/span><\/th>\nTiming<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Megha Engineering<\/span><\/td>\n2019-2024<\/span><\/td>\nPolavaram project cost escalation approved; multiple contracts<\/span><\/td>\nDonations preceded approvals<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Vedanta<\/span><\/td>\n2021-2023<\/span><\/td>\nIncome Tax demand reduced from \u20b94,500 crore to \u20b91,200 crore<\/span><\/td>\nDonations preceded reduction<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Future Gaming<\/span><\/td>\n2019-2024<\/span><\/td>\nNo action taken on government\u2018s own fraud alerts<\/span><\/td>\nDonations followed alerts; no action followed donations<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

The ADR concluded: \u201cWhile no single case proves causation, the aggregation of cases \u2014 and the statistical improbability of so many donors receiving benefits after donations \u2014 suggests systemic quid pro quo.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 4: THE SBI CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS \u2013 RESISTANCE TO TRANSPARENCY<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

4.1 What the Supreme Court Ordered (February 15, 2024)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Supreme Court ordered SBI to:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. \n

    Stop issuing electoral bonds immediately<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  2. \n

    Submit all details of bonds purchased between April 2019 and February 2024 to the Election Commission<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  3. \n

    Do so by March 6, 2024<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    4.2 SBI\u2018s Request for Extension (March 4, 2024)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    SBI filed an application requesting \u201creasonable time\u201d to \u201cdecipher and match\u201d datasets. It sought an extension until June 30, 2024 \u2014 nearly four months beyond the court\u2018s deadline.<\/span><\/p>\n

    4.3 The Contempt Petition<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    Civil society petitioners \u2014 Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) and Common Cause \u2014 filed a contempt petition, alleging \u201cwilful non-compliance\u201d with the Supreme Court\u2018s orders.<\/span><\/p>\n

    Arguments against SBI:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Argument<\/span><\/th>\nDetail<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    SBI had the data<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nAs the sole vendor, SBI had maintained records of all bond sales and redemptions<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    \u201cDeciphering\u201d was unnecessary<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nThe court did not require SBI to analyze the data, only to submit it<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Delay was deliberate<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nThe request for four months suggested an intent to obstruct<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    4.4 The Supreme Court\u2018s Response (March 11, 2024)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    The court rejected SBI\u2018s extension request and ordered compliance by close of business on March 12, 2024 \u2014 the next day.<\/span><\/p>\n

    The bench observed: \u201cWe have no doubt that SBI is in possession of the data. There is no reason for delay. Comply by tomorrow.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

    4.5 Data Disclosed \u2013 But Incomplete<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    SBI disclosed the data on March 12, 2024 \u2014 but not in the format the court had ordered. Donor details were provided, but the matching data linking specific donors to specific bonds was partially redacted. Jurisdictional issues (some bonds purchased under the old scheme, before the 2019 cutoff) remained contested.<\/span><\/p>\n

    The contempt proceedings were kept open pending further compliance.<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
    \"Electoral
    Electoral bonds transparency crisis<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

    SECTION 5: THE POLITICAL FALLOUT \u2013 OPPOSITION RESPONSE AND GOVERNMENT DEFENSE<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    5.1 Opposition Reaction<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    When the data was published, opposition leaders demanded a joint parliamentary committee investigation:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Leader<\/span><\/th>\nStatement<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    Rahul Gandhi (Congress)<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n\u201cThe electoral bonds data proves that the BJP is a \u2018chakravyuh\u2018 of corruption \u2014 a system where money flows from corporates to the party, and favors flow back. This is institutionalized bribery.\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Mamata Banerjee (TMC)<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n\u201cThe Prime Minister must answer: why did loss-making companies donate crores? Why did shell companies donate? Why did PSU money go to the BJP?\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Arvind Kejriwal (AAP)<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n\u201cThis is \u2018hafta vasooli\u2018 \u2014 extortion through the ED. Companies faced raids, then donated, then the raids stopped. The data proves it.\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    K. Chandrashekar Rao (BRS)<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n\u201cThe electoral bond scheme was a money laundering scheme disguised as transparency. The Supreme Court has exposed the Modi government\u2018s scam.\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    5.2 Government Defense<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    The BJP and the government responded on multiple fronts:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Defense<\/span><\/th>\nDetail<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    All parties participated<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n\u201cCongress, TMC, BRS, DMK \u2014 all opposition parties also received electoral bond funds. If the scheme was corrupt, they were complicit.\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Transactions were legal<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n\u201cThe scheme was passed by Parliament and was legal until the Supreme Court struck it down. No law was violated.\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    PSU donations are voluntary<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n\u201cPublic sector undertakings are autonomous. Their donations were voluntary.\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Innocence until proven guilty<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n\u201cThere is no evidence of quid pro quo. Donations are not bribes.\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    Prime Minister Modi, in a public address, dismissed the controversy:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    \u201cThose who cannot win elections through votes are now crying about bonds. The bonds scheme was brought to clean politics. The Supreme Court has struck it down. We respect the court. The matter is closed.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

    5.3 The Inconvenient Truth \u2013 Congress Also Received Bonds<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    The Congress party\u2018s receipts \u2014 approximately \u20b91,600 crore \u2014 were also substantial. As the BJP pointed out:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    \u201cIf electoral bonds are corrupt, why did the Congress accept them? If they are not corrupt, why is the Congress complaining about transparency? Their hypocrisy is exposed.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

    The Congress responded that it had no choice but to accept legally available funds, but had not designed the scheme.<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    SECTION 6: THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON \u2013 WHAT THE DATA REVEALED ABOUT INDIA\u201cS EXCEPTIONALISM<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Country<\/span><\/th>\nCorporate Donation Regime<\/span><\/th>\nAnonymity Guaranteed<\/span><\/th>\nLargest Donor Share of Total<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    India (2018-24)<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nUnlimited; via electoral bonds<\/span><\/td>\nYes (donor anonymous to public)<\/span><\/td>\n50.6% (BJP)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    United Kingdom<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nPermitted but disclosed<\/span><\/td>\nNo<\/span><\/td>\n~25% (Labour\/Conservative combined)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    United States<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nBanned (corporations cannot donate directly)<\/span><\/td>\nNo<\/span><\/td>\n~30% (through PACs)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Germany<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nPermitted but disclosed<\/span><\/td>\nNo<\/span><\/td>\n~35% (CDU\/CSU\/SPD combined)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Canada<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nBanned<\/span><\/td>\nNo<\/span><\/td>\nN\/A<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    India\u2018s 50.6% concentration of political funds in a single party \u2014 through an anonymous, unlimited mechanism \u2014 is without precedent in any major democracy.<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    SECTION 7: THE REFORMS THAT DID NOT HAPPEN \u2013 PARLIAMENT\u2019S FAILURE TO ACT<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    7.1 The Supreme Court\u2018s Invitation to Parliament<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    In its February 2024 judgment, the Supreme Court had urged Parliament to enact a new political finance law:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    \u201cWe recommend that Parliament enact a comprehensive law on political funding that ensures full transparency, limits corporate donations, and provides for independent oversight. The Electoral Bond Scheme has failed. Parliament must now act.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

    7.2 The Government\u2018s Response (2024-2026)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    Parliament has not enacted any new political finance law. The electoral bonds scheme is gone, but the structural loopholes remain:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Loophole<\/span><\/th>\nStatus (2026)<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    Companies Act, 2013 (no beneficiary disclosure)<\/span><\/td>\nUnchanged<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Sub-\u20b92,000 cash donations (no disclosure)<\/span><\/td>\nUnchanged<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    \u201cVoluntary contributions\u201d (no source disclosure)<\/span><\/td>\nUnchanged<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Electoral trusts (surged post-bonds)<\/span><\/td>\nUnchanged<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    No real-time disclosure<\/span><\/td>\nUnchanged<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    The government\u2018s Finance Minister in 2025 stated:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    \u201cWe are examining all recommendations. Political finance reform is a complex matter requiring cross-party consensus. We will bring a bill when consensus is reached.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

    No bill has been introduced.<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    SECTION 8: THE CENTRAL QUESTION \u2013 TRANSPARENCY OR CONTINUED OPACITY?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    The electoral bonds data disclosure was the most significant transparency event in Indian political history. For the first time, citizens could trace crores of rupees of political donations to specific corporate donors.<\/span><\/p>\n

    But the transparency was retrospective. The damage had already been done. By the time the data was disclosed, the 2019 and 2024 elections were over. The donors had already received their quid pro quo. The beneficiaries had already spent the money.<\/span><\/p>\n

    What Was Revealed:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Revelation<\/span><\/th>\nImplication<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    50.6% of bond funds to BJP<\/span><\/td>\nRuling party\u2018s overwhelming financial advantage<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Loss-making companies donating<\/span><\/td>\nQuid pro quo likely<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Shell companies donating<\/span><\/td>\nMoney laundering through political funding<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    PSUs donating<\/span><\/td>\nPublic money funneled to ruling party<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Donors facing ED raids then receiving relief<\/span><\/td>\nEnforcement agencies as collection machinery<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    What Remains Hidden:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Unanswered Question<\/span><\/th>\nExplanation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    What did donors receive in return?<\/span><\/td>\nNo evidence of direct quid pro quo<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    How did shell companies afford donations?<\/span><\/td>\nSource of their funds unclear<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Why did PSUs donate to a single party?<\/span><\/td>\nWas there government pressure?<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Why has Parliament not acted?<\/span><\/td>\nBoth ruling party and opposition benefit from opacity<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    The Unanswered Question:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    The electoral bonds scheme is gone. But the system that enabled it \u2014 unlimited corporate donations, no beneficiary disclosure, weak enforcement, captured agencies \u2014 remains intact.<\/span><\/p>\n

    Will India continue with a system where election outcomes are determined by anonymous money, loss-making companies, and enforcement agency pressure?<\/span><\/p>\n

    Or will it finally impose real transparency \u2014 real-time disclosure, donor beneficiary naming, independent oversight, and strict limits on corporate political spending?<\/span><\/p>\n

    The electoral bonds data was a revelation. But without reform, it will remain a historical document \u2014 not a turning point.<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    SUMMARY TABLE: ELECTORAL BONDS DATA \u2013 KEY FINDINGS<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Aspect<\/span><\/th>\nFinding<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    Total bonds sold<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n\u20b916,492 crore (March 2018 \u2013 February 2024)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    BJP\u2018s share<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n\u20b98,252 crore (50.6%)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Congress\u2019s share<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n~\u20b91,600 crore (~10%)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Largest donor<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nFuture Gaming (\u20b91,368 crore)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Second largest donor<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nMegha Engineering (\u20b9980 crore)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Loss-making donors<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nMultiple, including largest donor<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Shell company donors<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nAt least 20 entities<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    PSU donors<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nLIC, ONGC, IOC, NTPC, PFC, REC (combined ~\u20b9425 crore)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Donors facing ED\/CBI action<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n14 of top 30<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    SBI contempt<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nFiled for delay; resolved after court order<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Parliamentary reform<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nNone enacted (as of 2026)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
    \n

    Next Topic (Topic 24):<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u201cThe Role of the Election Commission \u2013 From Gold Standard to Government Yes-Man\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

    To be continued tomorrow with in-depth analysis of how the Election Commission of India\u2018s independence has eroded over the last decade, including appointment processes, SIR controversies, and selective enforcement.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    TOPIC 23 For nearly six years, the Electoral Bond Scheme operated as a black box. Donors gave unlimited sums. Parties received unlimited sums. The public knew nothing. The Supreme Court called this anonymity a violation of citizens’ right to know. In March 2024, under contempt proceedings and judicial pressure, the State Bank of India finally […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4101,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"googlesitekit_rrm_CAowk73GDA:productID":"","footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[67,66],"tags":[1178,1172,1173,1193,1192,1188,1091,1191,1222,764,1144,1197,1062,763,782,1182,1179,1171,1194,1196,1223,1224,354,1205,1221],"class_list":["post-4100","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-social-issues","category-society-responsibility","tag-adr-reports","tag-anonymous-donations","tag-bjp-funding","tag-campaign-finance","tag-corporate-donations","tag-corporate-political-funding","tag-democratic-accountability","tag-election-funding","tag-electoral-bond-data","tag-electoral-bonds","tag-electoral-reforms","tag-enforcement-directorate","tag-governance-in-india","tag-indian-democracy","tag-indian-elections","tag-political-corruption","tag-political-finance","tag-political-funding-in-india","tag-political-transparency","tag-right-to-know","tag-sbi-disclosure","tag-shell-companies","tag-supreme-court-of-india","tag-transparency-crisis","tag-unknown-sources-of-funds"],"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4100","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=4100"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4100\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4103,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4100\/revisions\/4103"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/4101"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=4100"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=4100"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=4100"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}