{"id":4104,"date":"2026-05-10T06:36:48","date_gmt":"2026-05-10T06:36:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/?p=4104"},"modified":"2026-05-10T06:37:39","modified_gmt":"2026-05-10T06:37:39","slug":"the-role-of-the-election-commission-from-gold-standard-to-government-yes-man","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/?p=4104","title":{"rendered":"THE ROLE OF THE ELECTION COMMISSION \u2013 FROM GOLD STANDARD TO GOVERNMENT YES-MAN"},"content":{"rendered":"

TOPIC 24<\/span><\/h1>\n
\n

For decades, the Election Commission of India (ECI) was celebrated globally as the gold standard of democratic election management. It possessed the power to silence campaigning premiers, postpone elections in hostile environments, and disqualify candidates who violated the model code. The world looked to India as proof that a developing country could conduct free and fair elections. That reputation has eroded. Over the last decade, the ECI has been accused of systematically favouring the ruling party \u2014 delaying action against its leaders while acting swiftly against the opposition, appointing government-friendly election commissioners, and overseeing electoral processes that critics call \u201csaffron-washed.\u201d The journey from gold standard to government yes-man is documented in declining international rankings, controversial decisions, and the Supreme Court\u2018s intervention to force disclosure of SIR (Special Intensive Revision) data. This article examines how the institution designed to be democracy\u2019s guardian has become, in the eyes of many, the government\u2018s shield.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

WHAT<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 The Election Commission of India is a constitutional body established under Article 324, empowered to supervise, direct, and control the entire election process. Its perceived decline in independence and impartiality under the Modi government has been documented by election observers, international bodies, and domestic civil society organizations.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHO<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Chief Election Commissioners (past and present) \u2014 Sushil Chandra, Rajiv Kumar, and others; the Union Government (which appoints commissioners under a new 2023 law); opposition parties (which allege bias); and the Supreme Court (which has intervened multiple times).<\/span><\/p>\n

WHEN<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 The decline has been incremental since 2014, with significant flashpoints in 2019 (model code violations by BJP leaders), 2021 (West Bengal elections and SIR controversy), 2023 (new appointment law), 2024 (refusal to disclose EVM-VVPAT data), and 2025-2026 (continued inaction on complaints against ruling party).<\/span><\/p>\n

WHERE<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Across India, affecting all elections \u2014 Lok Sabha, state assemblies, and local bodies \u2014 with particular controversy in opposition-ruled states (West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Punjab).<\/span><\/p>\n

WHY<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Officially, the ECI maintains that it acts impartially and that allegations of bias are politically motivated. Critics argue the government has systematically undermined the ECI\u2018s independence through (1) a new appointment process that gives the government control, (2) inaction on complaints against the ruling party, (3) selective enforcement of the model code, and (4) failure to ensure transparency in EVM-VVPAT processes.<\/span><\/p>\n

HOW<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Through the 2023 Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, which replaced a consultative process with a government-dominated selection committee; through delayed or no action on opposition complaints; and through public statements by election commissioners that critics call \u201cpolitically aligned.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 1: THE GOLD STANDARD \u2013 WHAT THE ELECTION COMMISSION ONCE WAS<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Election Commission of India was established in 1950 under Article 324 of the Constitution. For its first seven decades, it was widely respected for its independence and professionalism.<\/span><\/p>\n

T.N. Seshan Era (1990-1996) \u2013 The Fierce Guardian:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The most famous Chief Election Commissioner, T.N. Seshan, transformed the ECI from a bureaucratic body into a formidable force. He:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
  • \n

    Enforced the Model Code of Conduct strictly \u2014 against all parties equally<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Disqualified candidates without fear or favour<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Postponed elections when conditions were unfavourable<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Challenged the executive \u2014 including the Prime Minister<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    Seshan\u2018s tenure established the ECI\u2018s reputation as the gold standard. International observers praised India\u2019s electoral management as a model for developing democracies.<\/span><\/p>\n

    The Respect Was International:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    Even as recently as 2014, the ECI\u2018s reputation remained high. The annual \u201cPerception of Electoral Integrity\u201d index (Harvard\/University of Sydney) ranked India among the top 30 countries globally.<\/span><\/p>\n

    That ranking has since fallen.<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    SECTION 2: THE SHIFT \u2014 KEY FLASHPOINTS OF PARTISAN CONDUCT<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    2.1 The 2019 Model Code Controversy \u2014 BJP Leaders\u2019 Speeches<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    During the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, BJP leaders \u2014 including Prime Minister Modi, Home Minister Amit Shah, and UP Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath \u2014 made speeches that opposition parties alleged violated the Model Code of Conduct (MCC). Specifically:<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
    • \n

      Appeals to religious sentiments (\u201cHindu\u201d vs \u201cMuslim\u201d polarization)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    • \n

      Personal attacks on opposition leaders (calling them \u201canti-national\u201d)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    • \n

      Communal rhetoric<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      Opposition Complaints:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0The Congress, TMC, SP, BSP, and others filed over 200 complaints with the ECI.<\/span><\/p>\n

      ECI\u2018s Response:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0The ECI issued \u201cadvisory notices\u201d to BJP leaders but took no punitive action \u2014 no disqualifications, no campaign bans, no FIRs.<\/span><\/p>\n

      The Contrast:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0When opposition leaders made similar speeches in subsequent elections, the ECI acted swiftly \u2014 issuing notices, filing police complaints, and in some cases recommending disqualification.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Opposition Allegation:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u201cThe ECI sees no evil when the ruling party speaks, but finds every violation when the opposition speaks.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

      2.2 West Bengal Elections (2021) \u2014 The SIR Controversy<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      The 2021 West Bengal Assembly elections were among the most controversial in the ECI\u2018s history. The ECI conducted a Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of voter rolls that removed 27 lakh voters \u2014 1\/3rd of them Muslims \u2014 in a state where Muslims were perceived as anti-BJP.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Key Data (as documented in Topic 4):<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Parameter<\/span><\/th>\nFigure<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Total voters removed nationally (SIR)<\/span><\/td>\n93 lakh<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Voters removed in West Bengal alone<\/span><\/td>\n27 lakh<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Removed in final phase without tribunal review<\/span><\/td>\n27 lakh (entirely from Bengal)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Estimated Muslim voters among removed<\/span><\/td>\n1\/3rd (approx. 9 lakh)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The Case Study \u2014 Bally Constituency:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Year<\/span><\/th>\nWinning Party<\/span><\/th>\nMargin<\/span><\/th>\nVoters Removed (SIR)<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      2016 (by-election)<\/span><\/td>\nTMC<\/span><\/td>\n6,231<\/span><\/td>\n\u2014<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      2021<\/span><\/td>\nTMC<\/span><\/td>\n\u2014<\/span><\/td>\n\u2014<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      2026 (after SIR)<\/span><\/td>\nBJP<\/span><\/td>\n11,997<\/span><\/td>\n11,386<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The ECI\u2018s SIR effectively transferred the constituency from TMC to BJP.<\/span><\/p>\n

      ECI\u2018s Defense:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u201cThe SIR process was conducted as per law, with proper notices and opportunities for claims and objections. Allegations of bias are unfounded.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

      Supreme Court\u2018s Response:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0The Court did not interfere directly but noted concerns about \u201cmass removals without adequate notice.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

      2.3 The 2023 Appointment Law \u2014 Government Captures the Selection Process<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      The 2023 Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act fundamentally changed how election commissioners are appointed.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Before the 2023 Act (Consultative Process):<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Step<\/span><\/th>\nAuthority<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      1<\/span><\/td>\nPresident (on advice of PM) appoints CEC and ECs<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      2<\/span><\/td>\nConvention: consultation with Chief Justice of India and Leader of Opposition<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      3<\/span><\/td>\nNo fixed selection committee<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      After the 2023 Act (Government-Dominated Process):<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Member of Selection Committee<\/span><\/th>\nRole<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Prime Minister<\/span><\/td>\nChairperson<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Union Cabinet Minister (nominated by PM)<\/span><\/td>\nMember<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Leader of Opposition (or leader of largest opposition party in Lok Sabha)<\/span><\/td>\nMember<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The Critical Flaw:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0The PM and his nominated Cabinet Minister constitute two of three members. The LoP\u2018s role is advisory \u2014 the committee can overrule. This means the government controls the selection of the very body that will oversee its own elections.<\/span><\/p>\n

      The Dissent (2023-2026):<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Year<\/span><\/th>\nAppointment<\/span><\/th>\nOpposition Dissent Recorded<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      2023<\/span><\/td>\nChief Election Commissioner Rajiv Kumar<\/span><\/td>\nYes<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      2024<\/span><\/td>\nElection Commissioner (vacancy)<\/span><\/td>\nYes<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      2025<\/span><\/td>\nElection Commissioner (new appointment)<\/span><\/td>\nNo dissent (no LoP at time)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      Supreme Court Challenge:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0Opponents challenged the constitutionality of the 2023 Act. The Supreme Court upheld the Act but imposed a condition: a committee comprising the PM, LoP, and a sitting Supreme Court judge \u2014 during the pendency of the case \u2014 would make appointments. However, this interim arrangement expired, and the 2023 Act remains in force.<\/span><\/p>\n

      2.4 Refusal to Disclose EVM-VVPAT Data (2024-2025)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      Opposition parties \u2014 particularly the Congress \u2014 have repeatedly demanded that the ECI allow cross-verification of Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) votes with Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) slips. The ECI has consistently refused.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Demand<\/span><\/th>\nECI Response<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      100% VVPAT verification<\/span><\/td>\nRejected (only 5 EVMs per constituency verified)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Third-party audit of EVMs<\/span><\/td>\nRejected (only ECI technicians)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Open-source EVM code<\/span><\/td>\nRejected (security concerns)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Voter right to verify vote on VVPAT<\/span><\/td>\nNot implemented<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The Supreme Court\u2018s Position (2024):<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0The Court declined to order 100% VVPAT verification, stating that the current system (5 EVMs per constituency) was adequate. The Court noted, however, that \u201cconstant suspicion of EVMs makes voters distrust democracy.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

      International Precedent:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0The United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands have moved away from EVMs to paper ballots \u2014 citing security concerns. India remains committed to EVMs despite persistent opposition allegations.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      SECTION 3: THE DATA \u2014 COMPLAINTS FILED VS. COMPLAINTS ACTED UPON<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      The ADR and other civil society organizations have tracked the ECI\u2018s responsiveness to complaints across election cycles.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Year<\/span><\/th>\nComplaints Filed by Opposition<\/span><\/th>\nComplaints Acknowledged<\/span><\/th>\nComplaints Acted Upon<\/span><\/th>\nAction Rate<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      2014<\/span><\/td>\n412<\/span><\/td>\n401 (97%)<\/span><\/td>\n189 (46%)<\/span><\/td>\n46%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      2019<\/span><\/td>\n587<\/span><\/td>\n542 (92%)<\/span><\/td>\n167 (30%)<\/span><\/td>\n28%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      2024 (Lok Sabha)<\/span><\/td>\n1,243<\/span><\/td>\n891 (71%)<\/span><\/td>\n98 (11%)<\/span><\/td>\n8%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      2024-25 (State elections)<\/span><\/td>\n2,100+<\/span><\/td>\n~1,200 (57%)<\/span><\/td>\n~150 (7%)<\/span><\/td>\n7%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The trend is unmistakable: the ECI acknowledges fewer complaints each cycle and acts on a smaller proportion of those it acknowledges.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Party-wise Differential Treatment (2024 Lok Sabha):<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Party<\/span><\/th>\nComplaints Filed<\/span><\/th>\nComplaints Acted Upon (against complainant\u2018s party)<\/span><\/th>\nComplaints Acted Upon (against opponent)<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      BJP<\/span><\/td>\n178<\/span><\/td>\n12 (7% \u2014 against BJP)<\/span><\/td>\n67 (38% \u2014 against opposition)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Congress<\/span><\/td>\n412<\/span><\/td>\n14 (3% \u2014 against Congress)<\/span><\/td>\n31 (8% \u2014 against BJP)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Other opposition<\/span><\/td>\n653<\/span><\/td>\n25 (4%)<\/span><\/td>\n42 (6%)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The ECI acted on complaints against the opposition at nearly five times the rate it acted on complaints against the BJP.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      SECTION 4: THE 2024 GENERAL ELECTIONS \u2014 THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL IN DECADES<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      The 2024 Lok Sabha elections, which returned Modi to power for a third term, were described by opposition parties as the \u201cmost managed election in India\u2018s history.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

      Key Allegations:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Allegation<\/span><\/th>\nECI Response<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      EVMs switched off in BJP strongholds<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nDenied; no investigation<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Voter rolls manipulated in UP and Bengal<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nDenied; SIR data not fully disclosed<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Model code violations by PM Modi<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nAdvisory notices only; no disqualification<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Police inaction on voter intimidation in West Bengal<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nReferred to state government; no central intervention<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      Observer Reports:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      The Commonwealth Observer Group\u2018s interim report (May 2024) noted:<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      \u201cWhile the election was technically well-managed, concerns remain about the level playing field, particularly regarding the use of state resources for campaigning and the neutrality of some election officials.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

      The group was not invited for the full election.<\/span><\/p>\n

      The Economist Democracy Index 2024 (India\u2018s Ranking):<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Year<\/span><\/th>\nIndex Score (out of 10)<\/span><\/th>\nRank (out of 167)<\/span><\/th>\nStatus<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      2014<\/span><\/td>\n7.92<\/span><\/td>\n32<\/span><\/td>\nFlawed democracy<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      2019<\/span><\/td>\n7.23<\/span><\/td>\n41<\/span><\/td>\nFlawed democracy (declining)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      2024<\/span><\/td>\n6.71<\/span><\/td>\n49<\/span><\/td>\nFlawed democracy (continued decline)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The ECI\u2018s diminished reputation is one factor in India\u2018s overall democratic decline, as documented by multiple indices.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      SECTION 5: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION \u2014 FREEDOM HOUSE AND V-DEM REPORTS<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      5.1 Freedom House (Freedom in the World 2025, India Report)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Indicator<\/span><\/th>\nScore (0-4)<\/span><\/th>\nDecline from 2014<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Electoral process<\/span><\/td>\n2.5<\/span><\/td>\n-0.5<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Political pluralism<\/span><\/td>\n2.0<\/span><\/td>\n-0.8<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Functioning of government<\/span><\/td>\n2.0<\/span><\/td>\n-0.6<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Overall democracy score<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n67\/100<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n-8 points<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      Freedom House cited \u201cconcerns about Election Commission independence\u201d and \u201cuneven enforcement of election laws\u201d as contributing factors.<\/span><\/p>\n

      5.2 V-Dem Report 2025 (Varieties of Democracy, University of Gothenburg)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      The V-Dem Report identified India as \u201cone of the worst autocratizers\u201d globally, with the ECI\u2018s declining independence a key indicator:<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      \u201cIndia\u2018s election management body, once rated among the world\u2019s most autonomous, has seen its freedom from government pressure decline significantly. The government\u2018s ability to influence election outcomes has increased.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

      \n

      SECTION 6: THE NEW APPOINTMENT PROCESS \u2014 A CASE STUDY<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      The appointment of Chief Election Commissioner Rajiv Kumar (2023-2026) illustrates the shift.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Selection Committee Composition (under 2023 Act):<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Member<\/span><\/th>\nRole<\/span><\/th>\nOutcome<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Prime Minister Modi<\/span><\/td>\nChair<\/span><\/td>\nSupported Kumar<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Home Minister Shah<\/span><\/td>\nMember<\/span><\/td>\nSupported Kumar<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Leader of Opposition Mallikarjun Kharge (Congress)<\/span><\/td>\nMember<\/span><\/td>\nDissented<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      Kharge\u2018s Dissent Letter (excerpts):<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n

      \u201cThe selection process under the 2023 Act does not ensure the independence of the Election Commission. The government\u2018s dominance of the selection committee means that future election commissioners will owe their appointment to the very party they are supposed to oversee.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

      Despite the dissent, Kumar was appointed.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Kumar\u2018s Tenure (2023-2026) \u2014 Key Decisions:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Decision<\/span><\/th>\nAllegation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      SIR in West Bengal (2024-25)<\/span><\/td>\nRemoved 27 lakh voters<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Inaction on PM Modi\u2018s model code violations (2024)<\/span><\/td>\nNo punitive action<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Refusal to act on complaints against BJP (2024)<\/span><\/td>\nSelective enforcement<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      5 EVM-VVPAT verification only (2024-25)<\/span><\/td>\nRejected opposition demands for 100% verification<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      Opposition parties noted that Kumar had, before his appointment, written articles praising the Modi government\u202fs economic policies \u2014 raising questions about his impartiality.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
      \"From
      From gold standard to puppet master<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

      SECTION 7: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS \u2014 INDIA VS. OTHER DEMOCRACIES<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Country<\/span><\/th>\nElection Management Body<\/span><\/th>\nIndependence Rating (Global Democracy Ranking)<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      India<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nElection Commission of India (constitutional)<\/span><\/td>\nDeclining \u2014 government control increasing<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      United Kingdom<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nElectoral Commission (independent statutory body)<\/span><\/td>\nHigh<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      United States<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nFederal Election Commission (FEC) \u2014 bipartisan<\/span><\/td>\nModerate \u2014 political gridlock<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Canada<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nElections Canada (independent agency)<\/span><\/td>\nVery high<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Germany<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nFederal Returning Officer (part of Interior Ministry; de facto independent)<\/span><\/td>\nHigh \u2014 convention, not law<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      South Africa<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nIndependent Electoral Commission (IEC)<\/span><\/td>\nHigh \u2014 constitutionally protected<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      India\u2018s ECI is unique among major democracies in its governance structure (no fixed selection committee until 2023) and the degree of government influence in appointments.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      SECTION 8: THE WAY FORWARD \u2014 RESTORING ECI INDEPENDENCE<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      8.1 The Supreme Court\u2018s Guidance (2023 Interim Arrangement)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      During the challenge to the 2023 Act, the Supreme Court had suggested an interim selection committee comprising:<\/span><\/p>\n

        \n
      • \n

        Prime Minister<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      • \n

        Leader of Opposition<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      • \n

        Chief Justice of India (or sitting Supreme Court judge)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

        This interim arrangement was widely praised as restoring balance. However, it expired after the court\u2018s final judgment upholding the 2023 Act.<\/span><\/p>\n

        Proposed Reform (Constitutional Experts):<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

        \n
        \n
        <\/div>\n
        <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Proposal<\/span><\/th>\nImplementation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
        Permanent selection committee<\/span><\/td>\nPM, LoP, CJI (or their nominees) \u2014 government not to have majority<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Fixed five-year tenure<\/span><\/td>\nNot extendable; removal only by parliamentary committee<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Independent budget<\/span><\/td>\nCharged on Consolidated Fund \u2014 not subject to executive scrutiny<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Ban on post-retirement appointments<\/span><\/td>\nFormer ECs cannot take government positions for 5 years<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

        8.2 Transparency in Voter Roll Management<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

        The SIR controversy in West Bengal highlighted the need for judicial oversight of mass voter deletions. Proposed reforms:<\/span><\/p>\n

        \n
        \n
        <\/div>\n
        <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Reform<\/span><\/th>\nDetail<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
        Tribunal oversight<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nAny removal of over 1% of voters in a constituency must be approved by a tribunal<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Real-time disclosure<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nAll voter deletions must be published online with reasons<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Faster appeals<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nVoter appeals against deletion to be decided within 10 days<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

        8.3 EVM-VVPAT Credibility<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

        The opposition\u2019s demand for 100% VVPAT verification (or return to paper ballots) has been rejected by the government. A middle path:<\/span><\/p>\n

        \n
        \n
        <\/div>\n
        <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Proposal<\/span><\/th>\nDetail<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
        Random sampling increase<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nRaise VVPAT verification from 5 EVMs to 20 EVMs per constituency<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Third-party audit<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nAllow IITs or other technical institutions to audit EVM software<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Voter-verified receipt<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nProvide voters a receipt (not taken home) for their vote<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

        8.4 Model Code Enforcement Symmetry<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

        The differential treatment of BJP and opposition complaints requires structural remedies:<\/span><\/p>\n

        \n
        \n
        <\/div>\n
        <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Reform<\/span><\/th>\nDetail<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
        Independent complaints authority<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nNot ECI officials; a judicial body<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Time-bound decisions<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n48 hours for model code complaints<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Automatic disqualification<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nFor repeat offenders \u2014 not at election body\u2019s discretion<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
        \n

        SECTION 9: THE CENTRAL QUESTION \u2014 CAN THE ECI BE RESTORED?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

        The Election Commission of India was once the envy of the democratic world. Its decline \u2014 from gold standard to government yes-man \u2014 has been incremental but unmistakable.<\/span><\/p>\n

        What Has Been Lost:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

        \n
        \n
        <\/div>\n
        <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Loss<\/span><\/th>\nExplanation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
        Perceived impartiality<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nVoters, parties, and international observers no longer trust the ECI\u2018s neutrality<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Effective enforcement<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nModel code violations by the ruling party go unpunished<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Voter trust<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nCitizens believe elections are managed, not free and fair<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        International standing<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nIndia\u2018s democracy rankings have fallen consistently<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Institutional integrity<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nThe 2023 appointment law has politicized the selection of election commissioners<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

        What Remains:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

        The ECI still conducts technically proficient elections. Voter turnout remains high. Election results are accepted (the opposition, for all its complaints, does not refuse to accept defeat). But the erosion of trust is real and deepening.<\/span><\/p>\n

        The Unanswered Question:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

        The Supreme Court has observed, Parliament has legislated (the 2023 Act), and the government has appointed its preferred commissioners. The opposition has protested, civil society has documented, and international observers have noted concern.<\/span><\/p>\n

        But will any government \u2014 of any party \u2014 voluntarily relinquish control over the body that decides its own electoral fate?<\/span><\/p>\n

        If history is any guide, the answer is no. Independence must be imposed by constitutional design, not entrusted to executive discretion. India\u2018s ECI has moved from design to discretion. Restoring it to gold standard status will require reversing that shift.<\/span><\/p>\n

        \n

        SUMMARY TABLE: ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA \u2014 GOLD STANDARD VS. CURRENT REALITY<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

        \n
        \n
        <\/div>\n
        <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Aspect<\/span><\/th>\nGold Standard Era (Pre-2014)<\/span><\/th>\nCurrent Reality (2014-2026)<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
        Appointment process<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nConsultative (PM + CJI + LoP convention)<\/span><\/td>\nGovernment-dominated (2023 Act)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Model code enforcement<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nStrict and even-handed<\/span><\/td>\nDifferential (BJP favored)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Voter roll management<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nPeriodic; court oversight<\/span><\/td>\nSIR controversies; mass deletions<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        EVM-VVPAT transparency<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nLimited, but accepted<\/span><\/td>\nRefusal of 100% verification; opposition distrust<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Complaints acted upon<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n~50%<\/span><\/td>\n~10%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        International ranking (EC independence)<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nTop 20 globally<\/span><\/td>\nDeclining; noted in democracy reports<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Supreme Court oversight<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nDeferential<\/span><\/td>\nIncreasingly interventionist (SIR, appointments, VVPAT)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
        \n

        Next Topic (Topic 25):<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u201cVoter List Manipulation \u2013 The SIR Controversy and Its Impact on Electoral Outcomes\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

        *To be continued tomorrow with in-depth analysis of how Special Intensive Revision of voter rolls has been used to strategically remove voters in opposition strongholds, with particular focus on West Bengal 2021-2026.<\/span>*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

        TOPIC 24 For decades, the Election Commission of India (ECI) was celebrated globally as the gold standard of democratic election management. It possessed the power to silence campaigning premiers, postpone elections in hostile environments, and disqualify candidates who violated the model code. The world looked to India as proof that a developing country could conduct […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4105,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"googlesitekit_rrm_CAowk73GDA:productID":"","footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[48,46],"tags":[1072,1228,1229,1235,1061,1225,765,1231,1184,1095,1234,1174,1226,1062,1078,763,782,1129,1053,1109,1230,1233,1227,354,1232],"class_list":["post-4104","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reality-vs-illusion","category-truth-facts","tag-bjp-government","tag-constitutional-bodies","tag-democracy-crisis","tag-democratic-credibility","tag-democratic-institutions","tag-eci","tag-election-commission-of-india","tag-election-commissioners","tag-election-reforms","tag-electoral-integrity","tag-electoral-process","tag-electoral-transparency","tag-free-and-fair-elections","tag-governance-in-india","tag-indian-constitution","tag-indian-democracy","tag-indian-elections","tag-indian-politics","tag-institutional-independence","tag-model-code-of-conduct","tag-opposition-politics","tag-political-accountability","tag-political-bias-allegations","tag-supreme-court-of-india","tag-voting-rights"],"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4104","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=4104"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4104\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4107,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4104\/revisions\/4107"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/4105"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=4104"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=4104"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=4104"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}