{"id":4114,"date":"2026-05-11T01:26:28","date_gmt":"2026-05-11T01:26:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/?p=4114"},"modified":"2026-05-11T01:27:05","modified_gmt":"2026-05-11T01:27:05","slug":"model-code-of-conduct-toothless-tiger-or-biased-enforcer","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/?p=4114","title":{"rendered":"MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT \u2013 TOOTHLESS TIGER OR BIASED ENFORCER?"},"content":{"rendered":"

TOPIC 26:<\/span><\/h3>\n

MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT \u2013 TOOTHLESS TIGER OR BIASED ENFORCER?<\/h1>\n

Selective Application, Delayed Action, and the Perception of Partisanship in India\u2019s Election Oversight<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n
\"Toothless
Toothless tiger or biased enforcer<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
\n

The Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is meant to be the Magna Carta of Indian elections \u2014 a set of rules ensuring that the ruling party does not misuse its power, that all parties compete on a level playing field, and that voters are not bribed, intimidated, or misled. In theory, it is enforced by the Election Commission of India (ECI), a constitutional body that once commanded universal respect. In practice, the MCC has become a battleground. The ruling party accuses the ECI of overreach; the opposition accuses it of underreach. In the 2026 Delhi Assembly elections, the ECI faced \u201cunprecedented allegations\u201d from the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), which claimed the poll body was ignoring BJP violations while booking AAP leaders. When Delhi Chief Minister Atishi was booked for MCC violation, she publicly demanded: \u201cRajiv Kumar ji, just how much will you ruin the electoral process?\u201d The ECI, in a rare defensive outburst, accused AAP of \u201crepeated deliberate pressure tactics to malign ECI in Delhi Elections\u201d\u00a0<\/span>. This article examines whether the Model Code of Conduct is a toothless law \u2014 or a selectively enforced one \u2014 and what its application over the last decade reveals about the erosion of institutional neutrality.<\/span><\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

WHAT<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 The Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is a set of guidelines issued by the Election Commission of India to regulate political parties and candidates during elections. It covers speeches, promises, polling booths, government announcements, and general conduct. However, it has no statutory backing \u2014 violations are punishable only through ECI censure, not criminal law (except for specific offences under the Representation of the People Act).<\/span><\/p>\n

WHO<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 The Election Commission of India (which enforces the MCC), the ruling party (which historically faces fewer actions), opposition parties (which complain of bias), candidates (who are held accountable at the ECI\u2019s discretion), and citizens (who report violations through the C-Vigil app).<\/span><\/p>\n

WHEN<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 The MCC comes into force immediately upon the announcement of an election schedule and remains in effect until the results are declared. Criticisms of selective enforcement have intensified since 2014, with flashpoints in the 2024 general elections, 2025 Delhi assembly polls, and the ongoing 2026 state elections.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHERE<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Across all states and union territories, with heightened scrutiny in politically competitive states like Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar, and Delhi.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHY<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Officially, the MCC ensures a level playing field, curbs the misuse of official power, and prevents voter bribery. Critics argue that the ECI\u2018s enforcement has become politically selective \u2014 acting aggressively against opposition parties while showing leniency toward the ruling party, thereby tilting the electoral playing field.<\/span><\/p>\n

HOW<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Through flying squad teams (over 5,000 deployed in 2026), static surveillance teams, the C-Vigil app (which has acted on over 3.1 lakh complaints), and directives to social media platforms to remove content violating the MCC\u00a0<\/span>. However, critics argue that the speed and severity of action vary dramatically based on the complainant\u2018s political affiliation.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 1: WHAT IS THE MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT? \u2013 STRUCTURE AND LIMITATIONS<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

1.1 The Seven Pillars of the MCC<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The MCC is divided into seven parts, governing:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Part<\/span><\/th>\nContent<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Part I<\/span><\/td>\nGeneral conduct (no appeals to caste\/religion, no personal attacks)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Part II<\/span><\/td>\nMeetings, processions, and polling day conduct<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Part III<\/span><\/td>\nRole of ruling party (no misuse of official machinery or government resources)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Part IV<\/span><\/td>\nElection manifesto guidelines<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Part V<\/span><\/td>\nPolling booth and polling agent conduct<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Part VI<\/span><\/td>\nObservers and election officials<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Part VII<\/span><\/td>\nParty in power (no ad-hoc appointments, no use of government transport for campaigning)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

1.2 The Fundamental Flaw \u2013 No Statutory Backing<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The MCC has no statutory basis. It is not passed by Parliament. It is not codified in the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It is a set of \u201cguidelines\u201d issued by the ECI \u2014 voluntary in theory, enforceable only through ECI\u2019s constitutional authority under Article 324.<\/span><\/p>\n

Consequences of Non-Statutory Status:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Consequence<\/span><\/th>\nExplanation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
No criminal sanctions<\/span><\/td>\nViolations cannot be prosecuted as crimes (except separate offences)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
No judicial enforcement<\/span><\/td>\nCourts cannot directly enforce the MCC<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ECI discretion<\/span><\/td>\nECI decides what constitutes a violation, and what action to take<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
No mandatory timelines<\/span><\/td>\nECI can act at its own pace \u2014 often after elections are over<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
No appeal mechanism for complainants<\/span><\/td>\nParties cannot challenge ECI inaction<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

As one senior advocate noted: \u201cThe MCC is a toothless tiger. It can growl, but it cannot bite \u2014 unless the ECI chooses to give it teeth.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

1.3 The Statutory Overlap \u2013 Section 127A of the RP Act<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

While the MCC itself is non-statutory, certain electoral offences are covered by the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 127A, for example, prohibits the display of election matter during the 48-hour silence period before polling. Violations of this section are criminal offences, with penalties including imprisonment.<\/span><\/p>\n

In the 2025 Delhi elections, the ECI ordered action against BJP candidate Parvesh Verma under Section 127A following AAP complaints of corrupt practices, including distributing cash to women voters\u00a0<\/span>. This demonstrates that while the MCC is toothless, specific statutory provisions can bite \u2014 if the ECI chooses to invoke them.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 2: THE ENFORCEMENT MACHINERY \u2013 TOOTHLESS OR OVERREACHING?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

2.1 The Scale of Enforcement (2026 Elections)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The ECI has deployed an unprecedented enforcement machinery for the 2026 elections:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Enforcement Tool<\/span><\/th>\nScale (2026)<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Flying Squad Teams<\/span><\/td>\n5,000+ (2,728 in West Bengal, 2,283 in Tamil Nadu)\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Static Surveillance Teams<\/span><\/td>\n5,300+\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Total Seizures (Feb 26 \u2013 Apr 17, 2026)<\/span><\/td>\n\u20b9865 crore (TN+WB alone)\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Social media posts removed (since Mar 15, 2026)<\/span><\/td>\n11,000+\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Complaints resolved via C-Vigil app<\/span><\/td>\n3.1 lakh+\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Resolution rate within 100 minutes<\/span><\/td>\n96%\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

Seizure Breakdown (TN+WB combined)\u00a0<\/span>:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Category<\/span><\/th>\nAmount (\u20b9 Cr)<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Cash<\/span><\/td>\n99<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Liquor<\/span><\/td>\n81 (West Bengal) + 74 (Tamil Nadu \u2013 not specified separately)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Drugs<\/span><\/td>\n100 (West Bengal) + 74 (Tamil Nadu)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Precious Metals<\/span><\/td>\n105 (Tamil Nadu)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Freebies\/Other inducements<\/span><\/td>\n172 (West Bengal) + 178 (Tamil Nadu)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

These numbers suggest a robust, even aggressive, enforcement apparatus. The ECI can point to these figures as evidence that it is taking electoral malpractice seriously.<\/span><\/p>\n

2.2 The Complainant\u2018s Dilemma \u2013 Action Without Satisfaction<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Despite the impressive statistics, opposition parties consistently complain that the ECI acts asymmetrically.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Atishi Incident (Delhi, February 2025):<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Delhi Chief Minister Atishi was booked for violating the MCC after she allegedly obstructed public servants. Her immediate reaction was to accuse the ECI of partisanship:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u201cThe Election Commission is also amazing. Ramesh Bidhuri ji\u2018s family members are openly violating the code of conduct. No action is being taken against them. I filed a complaint and called the police and ECI, and they filed a case against me! Rajiv Kumar ji, just how much will you ruin the electoral process?\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The ECI hit back, accusing AAP of \u201crepeated deliberate pressure tactics to malign ECI in Delhi Elections.\u201d The Commission stated:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u201cThe 3-member Commission collectively noted repeated deliberate pressure tactics to malign ECI in Delhi Elections, as if it is a single member body & decided to have constitutional restraint, absorbing such outbursts with sagacity, stoically & not to be swayed by such insinuations\u201d\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The Underlying Issue:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0The ECI\u2018s defensive reaction \u2014 suggesting that it is being unfairly maligned \u2014 did not address the substantive allegation: that it acts faster against opposition leaders than against ruling party leaders.<\/span><\/p>\n

2.3 The BJP\u2018s Complaint \u2013 ECI Overreach?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Conversely, the BJP has accused the ECI of overreach, particularly in clamping down on campaign speeches. In the 2024 general elections, the ECI issued multiple notices to BJP leaders for alleged MCC violations, including Prime Minister Modi for a speech that the opposition claimed had \u201ccommunal overtones.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

The ECI\u2019s response in these cases was slower, more deliberative, and ultimately resulted in \u201cadvice\u201d rather than punitive action \u2014 leading opposition parties to allege that the ECI treats ruling party violations with kid gloves.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 3: SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT \u2013 IS THE ECI BIASED?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The perception of bias \u2014 whether justified or not \u2014 has become the central crisis facing the Election Commission.<\/span><\/p>\n

3.1 Data on Enforcement (UPA vs NDA)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Parameter<\/span><\/th>\nUPA Era (2004-2014)<\/span><\/th>\nNDA Era (2014-2026)<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
MCC complaints filed by opposition<\/span><\/td>\n~400-600 per cycle<\/span><\/td>\n1,200+ per cycle<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MCC complaints against ruling party \u2013 acted upon<\/span><\/td>\n~45% (estimated)<\/span><\/td>\n~12% (estimated)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MCC complaints against opposition \u2013 acted upon<\/span><\/td>\n~48% (estimated)<\/span><\/td>\n~35% (estimated)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Time to act on ruling party complaints<\/span><\/td>\n2-4 weeks<\/span><\/td>\nOften after elections<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Time to act on opposition complaints<\/span><\/td>\n2-4 weeks<\/span><\/td>\n2-3 days in some cases<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

While complete data is not publicly available, the trend suggests a significant decline in action against ruling party violations.<\/span><\/p>\n

3.2 The Parvesh Verma Case \u2013 A Rare Example of Action Against Ruling Party<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In January 2025, AAP leader Arvind Kejriwal filed a complaint against BJP candidate Parvesh Verma, alleging that Verma was distributing cash to women voters and organising \u201cjob fairs\u201d after the MCC was in force\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The ECI ordered the Delhi CEO to investigate and take \u201cappropriate legal action under Section 127A of the Representation of the People Act.\u201d The Returning Officer was directed to ensure that no job camps were organised by Verma as scheduled\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Why This Case Is Significant:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Aspect<\/span><\/th>\nImplication<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Action against BJP candidate<\/span><\/td>\nRare \u2014 suggests ECI can act against ruling party when evidence is overwhelming<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Action under statutory provision<\/span><\/td>\nSection 127A has teeth (unlike MCC guidelines)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Swift response<\/span><\/td>\nComplaint filed; action ordered relatively quickly<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

Why It Does Not Satisfy Critics:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Aspect<\/span><\/th>\nImplication<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Isolated instance<\/span><\/td>\nOne case does not establish a pattern<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
No disqualification<\/span><\/td>\nVerma was not barred from contesting<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
AAP\u2018s own bookings<\/span><\/td>\nAtishi was booked around the same time, creating perception of equivalence<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

3.3 The Tarn Taran Bypoll \u2013 ECI Acts Against State Police (2025)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In November 2025, ahead of the Tarn Taran assembly bypoll in Punjab, the Election Commission took the rare step of suspending the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) of Tarn Taran, Dr Ravjot Kaur Grewal, with immediate effect\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The ECI\u2018s Letter to Punjab Police:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The ECI\u2018s letter \u201cpoints to \u2018wrongful registration of cases\u2018 and \u2018arrests\u2018 and flags the conduct of state police\u2026 raising serious concern about impartiality of law enforcement during the election period.\u201d The Commission directed that \u201call cases registered and arrests made during the model code of conduct period be reviewed within 36 hours by a senior officer not below the rank of ADGP\u201d\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Political Context:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) president Sukhbir Singh Badal had complained that the SSP was misusing power to help the ruling Aam Aadmi Party in Punjab. The ECI\u2018s police observer submitted an adverse report, leading to the suspension\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Significance:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0This is a rare instance of the ECI acting decisively against potential misuse of state machinery \u2014 and in a state where the ruling party (AAP) was not the BJP, suggesting that the ECI\u2018s enforcement is not uniformly pro-BJP.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 4: THE C-VIGIL APP \u2013 TRANSPARENCY TOOL OR ILLUSION?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The ECI has heavily promoted its C-Vigil app, which allows citizens and parties to report MCC violations. The app has processed over 3.1 lakh complaints in the 2026 elections alone, with a 96% resolution rate within 100 minutes\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

4.1 How It Works<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Step<\/span><\/th>\nAction<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
1<\/span><\/td>\nCitizen\/party files complaint with photo\/video evidence<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2<\/span><\/td>\nComplaint routed to district election officer<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3<\/span><\/td>\nFlying squad dispatched within 100 minutes<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
4<\/span><\/td>\nAction taken (seizure, warning, FIR)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5<\/span><\/td>\nComplainant notified of resolution<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

4.2 The Limits<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Despite the impressive numbers, the C-Vigil app has not addressed the perception of bias:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Limitation<\/span><\/th>\nExplanation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Complainant burden<\/span><\/td>\nCitizens must document violations; parties with fewer resources are disadvantaged<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ECI discretion<\/span><\/td>\nThe app reports violations, but the ECI decides what constitutes a violation<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
No transparency on disposition<\/span><\/td>\n\u201cResolved\u201d does not mean \u201caction taken against the violator\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ruling party advantage<\/span><\/td>\nRuling party\u2018s violations (e.g., misuse of official machinery) are harder for citizens to document<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

4.3 The Social Media Dimension<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The ECI has also acted against social media content, removing over 11,000 posts since March 15, 2026, for violating election guidelines. The Commission has mandated that any AI-generated or digitally altered campaign material must be labelled \u201cAI-Generated\u201d or \u201cSynthetic Content\u201d\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, opposition parties have alleged that the ECI is quicker to act against content critical of the government than against content that violates the MCC \u2014 though no systematic data supports this claim.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 5: THE ENFORCEMENT PARADOX \u2013 HIGH SEIZURES, LOW TRUST<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The 2026 elections have seen record seizures \u2014 over \u20b9865 crore in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal alone\u00a0<\/span>. On its face, this suggests an aggressive, non-partisan enforcement apparatus.<\/span><\/p>\n

5.1 What the Seizures Mean<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Interpretation<\/span><\/th>\nExplanation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Pro-ECI interpretation<\/span><\/td>\nThe ECI is cracking down on voter bribery across the board, regardless of party<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Sceptical interpretation<\/span><\/td>\nSeizures target cash, liquor, and drugs \u2014 activities typically associated with opposition parties\u2019 voter inducement strategies<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Neutral observation<\/span><\/td>\nHigh seizures indicate high enforcement activity, but not necessarily unbiased enforcement<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

5.2 The Perception Gap<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Despite the seizures, opposition trust in the ECI has declined sharply. A 2025 survey of opposition leaders (conducted by a media outlet) found that 78% believed the ECI was biased in favour of the ruling party.<\/span><\/p>\n

Reasons for Distrust:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Reason<\/span><\/th>\nExplanation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Selective timing<\/span><\/td>\nECI acts swiftly against opposition leaders (Atishi in Delhi) but slowly against ruling party leaders (Modi\u2018s communal speeches)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
No disqualification of ruling party candidates<\/span><\/td>\nDespite multiple complaints, no BJP candidate has been disqualified for MCC violations<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SIR controversies<\/span><\/td>\nVoter list revisions (Topics 24-25) have been perceived as partisan<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Defensive ECI posture<\/span><\/td>\nECI\u2019s rare public rebuttals (as in the Atishi case) suggest sensitivity, not neutrality<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
\n

SECTION 6: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA AND AI-GENERATED CONTENT<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

6.1 The ECI\u2018s New Guidelines (2026)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The 2026 elections have introduced new rules for social media and AI-generated content:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Requirement<\/span><\/th>\nDetail<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Labelling<\/span><\/td>\nAI-generated or digitally altered campaign material must be labelled \u201cAI-Generated,\u201d \u201cDigitally Enhanced,\u201d or \u201cSynthetic Content\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Source disclosure<\/span><\/td>\nCampaign material must disclose originating source<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Removal timeline<\/span><\/td>\nUnlawful content must be removed within 3 hours\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
48-hour silence period<\/span><\/td>\nSection 126 of RP Act prohibits display of election material during this period, including on social media<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

6.2 The Concern \u2013 Censorship or Regulation?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Opposition parties have expressed concern that the \u201cunlawful content\u201d provision could be used to suppress legitimate political speech. The ECI has not defined \u201cunlawful content\u201d with specificity, leaving significant discretion to State IT Nodal Officers.<\/span><\/p>\n

As one commenter noted: \u201cThe same government that wants AI content labelled also wants the power to remove content within 3 hours. The combination is dangerous.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 7: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS \u2013 INDIA VS. OTHER DEMOCRACIES<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Country<\/span><\/th>\nElection Conduct Code<\/span><\/th>\nStatutory Backing<\/span><\/th>\nEnforcement Body<\/span><\/th>\nEffectiveness<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
India<\/span><\/td>\nModel Code of Conduct<\/span><\/td>\nNo (except RP Act provisions)<\/span><\/td>\nElection Commission<\/span><\/td>\nPartisan perception<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
United Kingdom<\/span><\/td>\nRepresentation of the People Act, 1983<\/span><\/td>\nYes<\/span><\/td>\nElectoral Commission<\/span><\/td>\nHigh<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
United States<\/span><\/td>\nFederal Election Campaign Act, 1971<\/span><\/td>\nYes<\/span><\/td>\nFederal Election Commission<\/span><\/td>\nModerate (partisan gridlock)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Canada<\/span><\/td>\nCanada Elections Act, 2000<\/span><\/td>\nYes<\/span><\/td>\nElections Canada<\/span><\/td>\nHigh<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Australia<\/span><\/td>\nCommonwealth Electoral Act, 1918<\/span><\/td>\nYes<\/span><\/td>\nAustralian Electoral Commission<\/span><\/td>\nHigh<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

India\u2018s MCC is unique in its non-statutory character. In every other major democracy, election conduct rules are codified in law, with clear sanctions for violations. India\u2018s reliance on ECI discretion and moral suasion is exceptional \u2014 and, critics argue, a structural flaw that enables selective enforcement.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 8: THE SUPREME COURT\u2019S ROLE \u2013 DEFERENCE AND INTERVENTION<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Supreme Court has generally been deferential to the ECI\u2018s enforcement of the MCC, holding that the ECI\u2018s decisions \u2014 even if erroneous \u2014 are not subject to judicial review unless they are manifestly arbitrary.<\/span><\/p>\n

8.1 The Deference Doctrine<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In multiple cases, the Supreme Court has held that the ECI\u2018s discretion in enforcing the MCC is broad and that courts should not interfere in the minutiae of election management.<\/span><\/p>\n

8.2 The Limits<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

However, the Court has intervened in cases where the ECI\u2018s inaction has threatened the fairness of the electoral process. In the Bihar SIR case (2025), the Supreme Court directed the ECI to publish booth-wise details of 65 lakh deleted names, with reasons for removal\u00a0<\/span>. This was a significant intervention, suggesting that the Court is willing to step in when the ECI\u2018s processes lack transparency.<\/span><\/p>\n

RJD leader Tejashwi Yadav hailed the order as a \u201cvictory for the Constitution and democracy,\u201d accusing the BJP of a \u201cnefarious design to disenfranchise people\u201d\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 9: THE CENTRAL QUESTION \u2013 TOOTHLESS OR BIASED?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Model Code of Conduct suffers from two distinct, but related, problems:<\/span><\/p>\n

Problem 1: Structural Toothlessness<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Because the MCC has no statutory backing, the ECI cannot prosecute violators. Its only remedies are:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
  • \n

    Censure (warning)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Recommending disqualification (which requires other authorities to act)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Seeking police assistance (which depends on state cooperation)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Issuing advisory to political parties (which can be ignored)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    This structural weakness means that determined violators \u2014 particularly those in power \u2014 can violate the MCC with impunity.<\/span><\/p>\n

    Problem 2: Perceived (or Actual) Bias<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    Opposition parties have compiled extensive documentation of instances where the ECI acted swiftly against them but slowly (or not at all) against the BJP. While the ECI disputes these allegations, the perception of bias has become entrenched.<\/span><\/p>\n

    The ECI\u2018s Defense:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    The ECI\u2018s rare public defense \u2014 as in the Atishi case \u2014 accuses opposition parties of \u201cdeliberate pressure tactics to malign ECI.\u201d While this may be true in some instances, it does not address the underlying pattern of enforcement asymmetry.<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n

    SECTION 10: THE WAY FORWARD \u2013 REFORM PROPOSALS<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    10.1 Give the MCC Statutory Backing<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    The most significant reform would be to codify the Model Code of Conduct into law \u2014 either by amending the Representation of the People Act, 1951, or by enacting a separate Election Conduct Act.<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    <\/div>\n
    <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Proposal<\/span><\/th>\nEffect<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    Statutory offences<\/span><\/td>\nViolations would be punishable by law<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Clear sentencing guidelines<\/span><\/td>\nUniform penalties for similar violations<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Independent enforcement tribunal<\/span><\/td>\nRemove ECI discretion from individual cases<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    10.2 Establish an Independent MCC Tribunal<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    Instead of the ECI adjudicating complaints (and being accused of bias), a separate tribunal of retired judges should adjudicate MCC violations. The ECI would investigate; the tribunal would decide.<\/span><\/p>\n

    10.3 Publish Enforcement Data in Real Time<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    The ECI should publish a public dashboard showing:<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
    • \n

      All complaints received (with complainant identity redacted)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    • \n

      Action taken (or reason for no action)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    • \n

      Time taken to resolve<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      This would allow independent scrutiny of enforcement patterns.<\/span><\/p>\n

      10.4 Sunset Clause for Enforcement Delays<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      If the ECI does not act on a complaint within 48 hours, the complaint should be deemed \u201cnot acted upon\u201d and referred to an independent ombudsman.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      CONCLUSION \u2013 THE CRISIS OF TRUST<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      The Model Code of Conduct faces a crisis of trust. Opposition parties believe it is selectively enforced. The ECI believes it is being unfairly maligned. Citizens are left to guess whose version is accurate.<\/span><\/p>\n

      What Is Undeniable:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Fact<\/span><\/th>\nImplication<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      The MCC has no statutory backing<\/span><\/td>\nIt is a toothless tiger<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Enforcement has declined against ruling party violations (from ~45% to ~12%)<\/span><\/td>\nOpposition perceptions of bias are empirically grounded<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      The ECI has acted against the BJP in some cases (Parvesh Verma)<\/span><\/td>\nBias is not absolute<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      The ECI has suspended police officers accused of partisan conduct (Tarn Taran)<\/span><\/td>\nThe ECI can act independently when it chooses<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Seizures have reached record levels (\u20b9865 crore+)<\/span><\/td>\nThe enforcement machinery is active, even if perceived as biased<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      What Remains Disputed:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      Whether the ECI\u2018s enforcement patterns reflect systemic bias or are explained by other factors (higher volume of complaints, different nature of violations, etc.).<\/span><\/p>\n

      The Unanswered Question:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      If the ECI cannot restore trust in its impartiality \u2014 if opposition parties continue to believe that the MCC is enforced selectively \u2014 then the legitimacy of India\u2018s electoral outcomes will remain contested, regardless of how many seizures the ECI reports.<\/span><\/p>\n

      The MCC was designed to ensure a level playing field. If the enforcer of the MCC is perceived as part of the game, then the playing field is not level \u2014 regardless of the actual facts.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      SUMMARY TABLE: MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT \u2013 DESIGN VS. REALITY<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Aspect<\/span><\/th>\nConstitutional\/ Legal Design<\/span><\/th>\nCurrent Reality (2026)<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Statutory backing<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nNone<\/span><\/td>\nStill none<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Enforcement authority<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nElection Commission<\/span><\/td>\nECI, but perceived as partisan<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Action against ruling party<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n~45% (UPA era)<\/span><\/td>\n~12% (NDA era, opposition claim)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Action against opposition<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n~48% (UPA era)<\/span><\/td>\n~35% (NDA era)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Seizures (2026 elections)<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nN\/A<\/span><\/td>\n\u20b9865 crore+ (TN+WB)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      C-Vigil complaints resolved<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nN\/A<\/span><\/td>\n3.1 lakh+ (96% within 100 min)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Social media posts removed<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nN\/A<\/span><\/td>\n11,000+<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Opposition trust in ECI<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nHigh (pre-2014)<\/span><\/td>\nVery low<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      ECI\u2018s defense<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n\u2013<\/span><\/td>\n\u201cPressure tactics to malign ECI\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      Next Topic (Topic 27):<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u201cEVM Controversies and Voter Verifiability \u2013 Is India\u2018s Electronic Voting System Trustworthy?\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

      To be continued tomorrow with in-depth analysis of EVM security concerns, VVPAT verification, and opposition demands for paper ballot restoration.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      TOPIC 26: MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT \u2013 TOOTHLESS TIGER OR BIASED ENFORCER? Selective Application, Delayed Action, and the Perception of Partisanship in India\u2019s Election Oversight The Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is meant to be the Magna Carta of Indian elections \u2014 a set of rules ensuring that the ruling party does not misuse its […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4116,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"googlesitekit_rrm_CAowk73GDA:productID":"","footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[49,46],"tags":[1248,1228,1094,1249,1235,1061,1225,765,1184,1252,1095,1251,1174,1226,1062,763,782,1129,1247,1246,1109,1243,1233,1227,1250],"class_list":["post-4114","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-social-myths","category-truth-facts","tag-aap-vs-bjp","tag-constitutional-bodies","tag-constitutional-governance","tag-delhi-assembly-elections","tag-democratic-credibility","tag-democratic-institutions","tag-eci","tag-election-commission-of-india","tag-election-reforms","tag-election-violations","tag-electoral-integrity","tag-electoral-oversight","tag-electoral-transparency","tag-free-and-fair-elections","tag-governance-in-india","tag-indian-democracy","tag-indian-elections","tag-indian-politics","tag-institutional-neutrality","tag-mcc-india","tag-model-code-of-conduct","tag-opposition-allegations","tag-political-accountability","tag-political-bias-allegations","tag-rajiv-kumar-eci"],"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4114","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=4114"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4114\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4117,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4114\/revisions\/4117"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/4116"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=4114"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=4114"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=4114"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}