{"id":4118,"date":"2026-05-11T01:30:26","date_gmt":"2026-05-11T01:30:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/?p=4118"},"modified":"2026-05-11T01:31:13","modified_gmt":"2026-05-11T01:31:13","slug":"4118","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/?p=4118","title":{"rendered":"EVM CONTROVERSIES AND VOTER VERIFIABILITY"},"content":{"rendered":"

TOPIC 27<\/span><\/h1>\n

EVM CONTROVERSIES AND VOTER VERIFIABILITY<\/h1>\n

Is India\u2019s Electronic Voting System Trustworthy? The Debate Over EVM Security, VVPAT Verification, and Paper Trail Transparency<\/em><\/h3>\n
\n

Since their phased introduction in the 1990s, Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) have transformed Indian elections \u2014 making them faster, cheaper, and more efficient. But efficiency has come at the cost of trust. Opposition parties across the political spectrum \u2014 from the Congress and TMC to the CPI(M) and AAP \u2014 have repeatedly raised questions about EVM security, manipulation, and the lack of a verifiable paper trail. The Supreme Court has dismissed multiple petitions seeking 100% VVPAT slip counting, most recently in April 2026, deeming the allegations \u201cvague\u201d and an \u201cabuse of the process of law\u201d\u00a0<\/span>. The Election Commission asserts that EVMs are \u201ctamper-proof\u201d and that \u201cvote theft doesn\u2018t even arise\u201d\u00a0<\/span>. Yet the allegations persist. In the aftermath of the 2026 West Bengal elections, TMC leader Abhishek Banerjee alleged that EVMs \u201ccan be swapped\u201d even if not manipulated, citing mismatched serial numbers and anomalous battery charge levels\u00a0<\/span>. The Bombay High Court, in a landmark order, directed an EVM audit in the presence of a losing candidate \u2014 the first time such a transparent diagnostic check has been ordered\u00a0<\/span>. This article examines the technical, legal, and political dimensions of the EVM controversy, assesses the credibility of opposing claims, and evaluates whether India\u2018s electronic voting system can ever command the trust of all stakeholders.<\/span><\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

WHAT<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 The controversy over the security, transparency, and verifiability of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) used in Indian elections, including allegations of manipulation, swapping, and tampering; the role of Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) slips as a paper backup; and the legal and technical debates over the adequacy of current verification mechanisms.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHO<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 The Election Commission of India (which defends EVM integrity), the Supreme Court (which has adjudicated multiple challenges), opposition parties (Congress, TMC, CPI(M), AAP, and others who raise doubts), civil society organizations (like the Association for Democratic Reforms), and technology experts (who debate the security of EVM hardware and software).<\/span><\/p>\n

WHEN<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 The controversy has intensified since the 2014 general elections, with major flashpoints in 2019 (pre-election protests), 2024 (Supreme Court judgment on VVPAT verification), and the 2026 West Bengal elections (where TMC alleged widespread irregularities).<\/span><\/p>\n

WHERE<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Across India, with particular intensity in politically competitive states like West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, and Maharashtra.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHY<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Officially, the ECI argues that EVMs are tamper-proof, that manual counting would introduce errors, and that VVPAT verification of a sample of EVMs (mandated by the Supreme Court in 2024) provides sufficient safeguard. Critics argue that without 100% VVPAT counting, electronic manipulation cannot be ruled out, and that voter trust requires a fully verifiable paper trail.<\/span><\/p>\n

HOW<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Through the alleged swapping of EVM units after voting; through manipulation of the microcontroller \u201cburnt memory\u201d; through discrepancies in EVM serial numbers reported in statutory Form 17C; through anomalous battery charge levels contradictory to standard usage; and through the opaque handling of EVMs between polling and counting.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 1: THE TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE \u2013 HOW EVMS AND VVPAT WORK<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

1.1 Components of the EVM System<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Indian EVM system consists of three independent units:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Component<\/span><\/th>\nFunction<\/span><\/th>\nSecurity Features<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Ballot Unit (BU)<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nVoter presses button next to candidate\u2018s name\/symbol<\/span><\/td>\nTamper-evident seals; unique serial number<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Control Unit (CU)<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nRecords votes; controls voting process; stored in strongroom after polling<\/span><\/td>\nReal-time clock; memory with write-once feature; battery backup<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT)<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nPrints paper slip visible to voter for 7 seconds; slip drops into sealed box<\/span><\/td>\nPaper trail for physical verification<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

1.2 How Votes Are Recorded<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

When a voter presses a button on the Ballot Unit:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. \n

    The Control Unit registers the vote in its memory<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  2. \n

    The VVPAT unit prints a paper slip (showing candidate serial number, name, and symbol)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  3. \n

    The voter views the slip through a transparent window for 7 seconds<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  4. \n

    The slip drops into a sealed compartment<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  5. \n

    The vote is recorded electronically<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    The paper slips are never given to the voter \u2014 they remain in the VVPAT machine\u2018s sealed box.<\/span><\/p>\n

    1.3 The Post-Polling Sealing Process<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    After polling concludes:<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
    • \n

      The Control Unit is sealed and placed in a strongroom<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    • \n

      The VVPAT paper slip box is sealed separately<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    • \n

      Strongrooms are guarded by central paramilitary forces<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    • \n

      CCTV surveillance covers strongrooms 24\/7<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    • \n

      Candidates and their agents can monitor the seals<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      The ECI maintains that this process makes EVM tampering \u201cvirtually impossible.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      SECTION 2: THE ELECTION COMMISSION\u2018S DEFENSE \u2013 \u201cVOTE THEFT DOESN\u2018T EVEN ARISE\u201d<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      Following allegations of discarded VVPAT slips in West Bengal\u2018s Noapara constituency ahead of vote counting in the 2026 assembly elections, West Bengal Chief Electoral Officer Manoj Kumar Agarwal strongly defended the EVM system\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Agarwal\u2018s Statement:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n

      \u201cThe issue of vote theft doesn\u2018t even arise; votes are locked in the EVM. The security is so tight that the question of vote theft doesn\u2018t come up at all.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

      Key Elements of the ECI\u2018s Defense:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Argument<\/span><\/th>\nExplanation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Tamper-proof hardware<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nEVMs are standalone devices with no wireless connectivity; cannot be hacked remotely<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Write-once memory<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nOnce a vote is recorded, memory cannot be altered<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Physical security<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nStrongrooms guarded by central forces; candidates monitor seals<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Randomization<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nEVMs are randomly allocated to polling stations; no one knows which machine will go where<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      VVPAT verification<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nVVPAT slips of one randomly selected polling station per assembly segment are counted to verify EVM totals<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Judicial validation<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nSupreme Court has repeatedly upheld EVM integrity<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The ECI also points to the unprecedented scale of enforcement in 2026:<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Enforcement Metric<\/span><\/th>\nScale<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Flying Squad Teams<\/span><\/td>\n5,000+ (2,728 in WB, 2,283 in TN)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Static Surveillance Teams<\/span><\/td>\n5,300+<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Total Seizures (cash, liquor, drugs, freebies)<\/span><\/td>\n\u20b9865 crore+ (WB + TN)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      C-Vigil complaints resolved<\/span><\/td>\n3.1 lakh+ (96% within 100 minutes)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The ECI\u2018s position, as articulated by Agarwal, is that the EVM system is not merely secure but \u201cso tight\u201d that questioning it is baseless.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      SECTION 3: THE ALLEGATIONS \u2013 EVM SWAPPING, DISCREPANCIES, AND MANIPULATION<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      Despite the ECI\u2018s assurances, opposition parties \u2014 most vocally the Trinamool Congress after the 2026 West Bengal elections \u2014 have raised a series of specific allegations.<\/span><\/p>\n

      3.1 The \u201cSwapping\u201d Allegation \u2013 Abhishek Banerjee\u2018s Charge<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      TMC general secretary Abhishek Banerjee made a nuanced but serious allegation: EVMs may not be manipulated electronically, but they can be physically swapped\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      \u201cWhile the votes cast within the EVMs themselves may not have been manipulated, the EVM units can be swapped.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

      The Specifics of the Allegation:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Allegation<\/span><\/th>\nDetail<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Serial number mismatch<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nWhen EVMs used for voting were cross-checked at counting tables, their serial numbers did not match records listed in Form 17C (the statutory record of EVM serial numbers assigned to each polling station)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Scope<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nReports from \u201cnumerous locations\u201d across West Bengal<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Specific examples<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n10 mismatched EVMs from Kalyani; similar reports from Memari<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Formal complaints<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nAll documented and submitted to Returning Officers<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The Implication:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0If EVM units were swapped after polling but before counting, votes recorded on one machine could be attributed to a different constituency \u2014 or votes could be added or removed without electronic tampering.<\/span><\/p>\n

      3.2 The Battery Charge Anomaly<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      Banerjee also pointed to an unusual pattern in EVM battery charge levels\u00a0<\/span>:<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      \u201cThe machines were used for 12 hours, but 90 per cent of the machines had 92-95 per cent charge. How is this possible?\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

      The Technical Context:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Normal Expectation<\/span><\/th>\nAnomaly Alleged<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      EVM batteries are designed to last for 2-3 days of continuous operation<\/span><\/td>\nCharging an EVM before use typically brings it to ~100%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Normal usage over 12 hours would reduce charge modestly<\/span><\/td>\nThe reported 92-95% charge after 12 hours is not technically impossible but statistically anomalous if widespread<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Variability expected across machines<\/span><\/td>\nTMC claims 90% of machines showed this pattern<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The ECI has not responded publicly to the battery charge allegation.<\/span><\/p>\n

      3.3 Counting Irregularities \u2013 Agents Removed, Delays Manufactured<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      Beyond EVM hardware, Banerjee alleged serious procedural irregularities at counting centres\u00a0<\/span>:<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Allegation<\/span><\/th>\nDetail<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Forced removal of counting agents<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nAfter 2:00 PM, counting agents were \u201cforcibly removed or driven away through violence\u201d at approximately 100 counting centres<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Manufactured leads<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nBy holding back vote counts while projecting leads, the BJP \u201cmanufactured an atmosphere that the BJP had already won\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Delayed counting<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nIn centres where 80-90% of counting should have been completed by 2:00 PM, only 3-4 rounds had been completed<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Pending rounds<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nIn some places, 20-24 rounds of counting remained pending<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The CCTV Footage Demand:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n

      \u201cI give you 100 such CCTV footage from counting centres and let EC release 10 such footage. The footage of the entire day from counting centres, especially from 12 noon to 6 pm, be released.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

      The ECI has not released comprehensive CCTV footage from counting centres.<\/span><\/p>\n

      3.4 The \u201cRandomisation Rule\u201d Violation<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      Banerjee cited the Supreme Court\u2018s directive that \u201crandomisation rule should be implemented in both letter and spirit,\u201d which requires the presence of employees from\u00a0<\/span>both<\/span><\/em>\u00a0State and Central governments at counting centres\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

      His Allegation:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Requirement (SC order)<\/span><\/th>\nReality (per TMC)<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Both State and Central government employees present<\/span><\/td>\nOnly Central government employees present<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Counting Observers from mixed backgrounds<\/span><\/td>\nCounting Observers and Micro-Observers were central government appointees<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Returning Officers from neutral pool<\/span><\/td>\nECI installed its own Returning Officers, \u201creplacing state government officials with their own hand-picked loyalists\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Mixed security personnel<\/span><\/td>\nSecurity consisted \u201centirely of paramilitary forces\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The Discarded VVPAT Slips Incident (Noapara, April 2026):<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      Days before the vote counting, VVPAT slips allegedly from booth number 29 of Noapara Assembly constituency were found discarded in Subhashnagar of Ichapur Nilganj Panchayat under Madhyamgram Assembly\u00a0<\/span>. CPI(M) candidate Gargi Chatterjee, along with police personnel, reached the spot following the discovery.<\/span><\/p>\n

      The ECI did not offer a public explanation for how VVPAT slips \u2014 which are supposed to remain sealed in VVPAT machines until counting \u2014 ended up discarded in a panchayat area.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      SECTION 4: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE \u2013 SUPREME COURT\u2018S LIMITED PATIENCE<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      4.1 The 2024 Supreme Court Judgment<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      In April 2024, a bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna (now CJI) and Dipankar Datta dismissed a clutch of petitions seeking mandatory cross-verification of EVM votes with VVPAT slips\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Key Holdings:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Holding<\/span><\/th>\nDetail<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Right to verify \u2260 Right to 100% counting<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nThe Court acknowledged voters\u2018 right to ensure their vote is accurately recorded, but held that this does not equate to a right to 100% VVPAT slip counting<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      No right to physical access<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nVoters have no right to physically access the VVPAT slips or to put them in the drop box themselves<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      VVPAT verification mechanism sufficient<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nThe existing procedure (counting VVPAT slips from one randomly selected polling station per assembly segment) provides adequate verification<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      4.2 The April 2026 Dismissal \u2013 \u201cVague Allegations, Gross Abuse of Process\u201d<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      In April 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed another PIL seeking 100% manual counting of VVPAT slips\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

      The Court\u2018s Observations:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Observation<\/span><\/th>\nImplication<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Allegations are \u201cvague\u201d<\/span><\/td>\nThe petitioner provided no specific evidence of manipulation<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      \u201cGross abuse of process of law\u201d<\/span><\/td>\nThe Court viewed the petition as an attempt to harass the ECI without factual basis<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Election petitions are the proper remedy<\/span><\/td>\nCandidates challenging election results should file election petitions with the High Court, not PILs<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The Bench\u2018s Remark:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n

      \u201cIt would not be examining the same issues over and over again.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

      The Court\u2018s frustration is evident: multiple petitions raising similar EVM concerns have been filed, and the Court has consistently ruled that the existing safeguards are sufficient.<\/span><\/p>\n

      4.3 The Bombay High Court\u2018s Landmark Order (April 2026)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      In a significant development, the Bombay High Court ordered an EVM audit in the presence of a losing candidate \u2014 the first time such a transparent diagnostic check has been ordered in Indian electoral history\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

      The Case:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Aspect<\/span><\/th>\nDetail<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Petitioner<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nArif Naseem Khan (Congress), former minister<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Constituency<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nChandivali Assembly seat, Mumbai<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Winning candidate<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nDilip Lande (Shiv Sena)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Legal basis<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nSupreme Court\u2018s April 2024 judgment, which allows candidates to request technical examination of up to 5% of EVMs per assembly segment after results are declared<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The Court\u2018s Direction:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Direction<\/span><\/th>\nSignificance<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      \u201cDiagnostic check\u201d to be performed by BEL engineers<\/span><\/td>\nNot an internal ECI check \u2014 independent engineers<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      In the direct presence of the candidate<\/span><\/td>\nTransparency \u2014 candidate can observe the entire process<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Up to 20 EVM machines from the constituency to be audited<\/span><\/td>\n~5% of machines (consistent with SC\u2019s 2024 direction)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      VVPAT units also to be examined<\/span><\/td>\nPaper trail included in audit<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      Scheduled dates:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0April 16-17, 2026.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Why This Matters:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      This is the first time that EVMs will be \u201ctechnically opened and verified in front of a candidate\u201d rather than just being handled by Election Commission officials\u00a0<\/span>. The Congress party hailed the decision as one that \u201cwill significantly enhance transparency in the electoral process.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

      If the audit reveals discrepancies, it could open the door to broader challenges to EVM integrity. If it confirms the machines\u2018 integrity, it could bolster the ECI\u2018s credibility.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      SECTION 5: THE DEMANDS \u2013 WHAT OPPOSITION PARTIES WANT<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      5.1 The CPI(M) Demand in Tripura (March 2026)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      In Tripura\u2018s Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC) elections, CPI(M) state secretary Jitendra Chaudhury demanded that the State Election Commission ensure the use of EVMs equipped with VVPAT\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

      The Background:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Issue<\/span><\/th>\nDetail<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Concern<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nState Election Commission reportedly planned to deploy older EVM units without VVPAT attachments<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      CPI(M) argument<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n\u201cWhile questions have been raised nationally about the functioning of EVMs, voters tend to place greater trust in the system when VVPAT is used, as it provides a verifiable paper trail\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Appeal<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nEnsure that \u201call polling stations are equipped with updated EVMs along with VVPAT systems to maintain transparency and credibility\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      VVPAT is not merely a technical add-on \u2014 it is, for many voters and parties, a necessary condition for electoral trust.<\/span><\/p>\n

      5.2 The TMC\u2018s Post-Bengal Demands (May 2026)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      Following the BJP\u2018s decisive victory in West Bengal, TMC leader Abhishek Banerjee articulated a series of demands\u00a0<\/span>:<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Demand<\/span><\/th>\nJustification<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Release of CCTV footage from counting centres<\/span><\/td>\nTo verify allegations of agent removal and delayed counting<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Transparent counting of VVPAT slips<\/span><\/td>\nTo verify that electronic totals match paper trails<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Independent investigation of EVM mismatches<\/span><\/td>\nTo address serial number discrepancies<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Restoration of trust in electoral institutions<\/span><\/td>\nAs Banerjee stated, \u201cDemocracy can only survive when electoral institutions inspire trust and confidence among citizens\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      Banerjee\u2018s broader critique: \u201cDemocratic institutions that are meant to function impartially appeared compromised, raising serious concerns about the fairness, credibility and transparency of the electoral process in West Bengal\u201d\u00a0<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

      5.3 The Long-Standing Opposition Demand \u2013 100% VVPAT Counting<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      The consistent opposition demand \u2014 across parties and elections \u2014 has been for 100% mandatory counting of VVPAT slips, not just the one randomly selected polling station per assembly segment currently required.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Arguments for 100% VVPAT Counting:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Argument<\/span><\/th>\nDetail<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Complete verifiability<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nEvery vote can be verified against paper trail<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Deterrent effect<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nWould make tampering pointless<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Voter confidence<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nWould restore trust in electronic system<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Precedent<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nMany countries use paper ballots or paper trails exclusively<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      Arguments Against (ECI\/Government Position):<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Argument<\/span><\/th>\nDetail<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Logistical burden<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nCounting VVPAT slips manually would take weeks, not hours<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Human error<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nManual counting introduces its own errors<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Cost<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nWould require massive additional staff and infrastructure<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Existing safeguards sufficient<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nRandom verification provides statistically adequate checks<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The Supreme Court has consistently rejected 100% VVPAT counting demands, most recently in April 2026.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      SECTION 6: THE TRUST DEFICIT \u2013 WHY DOUBTS PERSIST<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      Despite the ECI\u2018s robust defense and the Supreme Court\u2018s repeated validation, doubts about EVM integrity persist. This is not merely a technical problem \u2014 it is a crisis of trust.<\/span><\/p>\n

      6.1 The Asymmetry of Information<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      ECI Has Access To<\/span><\/th>\nVoters\/Parties Have Access To<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Full chain of custody<\/span><\/td>\nLimited observation<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      EVM source code (contested)<\/span><\/td>\nNo access to source code<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Internal security audits<\/span><\/td>\nNo independent audits<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Strongroom access<\/span><\/td>\nExternal monitoring only<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      VVPAT slips (post-counting)<\/span><\/td>\nNo access to slips<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      This asymmetry fuels suspicion. When only one side has full information, the other side cannot independently verify claims of integrity.<\/span><\/p>\n

      6.2 The Pattern of Allegations \u2013 Not Limited to One Party<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Party<\/span><\/th>\nElection<\/span><\/th>\nAllegation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Congress<\/span><\/td>\nMultiple<\/span><\/td>\nEVM manipulation<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      TMC<\/span><\/td>\n2026 West Bengal<\/span><\/td>\nSwapping, serial number mismatch, battery anomalies<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      AAP<\/span><\/td>\n2025 Delhi<\/span><\/td>\nEVM tampering<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      CPI(M)<\/span><\/td>\n2026 Tripura<\/span><\/td>\nLack of VVPAT in older machines<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      BRS<\/span><\/td>\n2024 Telangana<\/span><\/td>\nEVM manipulation<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The breadth of allegations \u2014 across party lines and across states \u2014 suggests that distrust of EVMs is not confined to a single political formation. It is a systemic concern.<\/span><\/p>\n

      6.3 The Form 17C Controversy<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      Form 17C is the statutory record of EVM serial numbers assigned to each polling station. It is prepared before polling and signed by candidates\u2018 agents.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Abhishek Banerjee\u2018s allegation \u2014 that EVM serial numbers on the machines at counting did not match those recorded in Form 17C \u2014 goes to the heart of the swapping charge\u00a0<\/span>. If true, it would mean that the EVM unit that recorded votes at a polling station was not the unit presented for counting.<\/span><\/p>\n

      The ECI\u2018s Silence:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0The ECI has not publicly addressed the serial number mismatch allegation.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      SECTION 7: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS \u2013 INDIA VS. OTHER COUNTRIES<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Country<\/span><\/th>\nVoting System<\/span><\/th>\nVoter Verifiability<\/span><\/th>\nControversy Level<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      India<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nEVM + VVPAT (sample verification)<\/span><\/td>\nLow (no individual voter verification)<\/span><\/td>\nHigh<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      United States<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nMixed (paper ballots, optical scanners, some EVMs)<\/span><\/td>\nVaries by state; paper trail common<\/span><\/td>\nModerate<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Germany<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nPaper ballots (EVMs declared unconstitutional in 2009)<\/span><\/td>\nHigh (paper trail)<\/span><\/td>\nLow (since EVM ban)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Netherlands<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nPaper ballots (EVMs banned after 2008 security concerns)<\/span><\/td>\nHigh<\/span><\/td>\nLow<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Brazil<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nEVM (no VVPAT)<\/span><\/td>\nLow<\/span><\/td>\nModerate<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      Key Observation:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0Germany\u2018s Federal Constitutional Court banned EVMs in 2009, holding that \u201conly a voting system that allows all essential steps of the election to be reliably verified by the citizen is constitutional.\u201d The Court found that electronic systems without a verifiable paper trail violated the principle of public elections. The Netherlands followed a similar path in 2008.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Relevance to India:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0While India\u2018s Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld EVMs, the constitutional principle cited by Germany\u2018s Court \u2014 that public verifiability is essential to democratic legitimacy \u2014 is not fundamentally different in Indian constitutional law. The divergence is in judicial assessment of risk.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      SECTION 8: THE WAY FORWARD \u2013 RESTORING TRUST<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      8.1 The April 2026 Mumbai Audit \u2013 A Template?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      The Bombay High Court\u2018s order for an EVM audit in the presence of a losing candidate\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0could serve as a template for restoring trust.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Feature<\/span><\/th>\nSignificance<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Independent engineers (BEL)<\/span><\/td>\nNot ECI\u2018s internal team<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Candidate presence<\/span><\/td>\nTransparency<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      VVPAT included<\/span><\/td>\nPaper trail verified<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Court oversight<\/span><\/td>\nJudicial accountability<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      If the April 2026 audit \u2014 scheduled for April 16-17 \u2014 confirms EVM integrity, it could bolster the ECI\u2018s credibility. If discrepancies are found, it would validate opposition concerns.<\/span><\/p>\n

      8.2 Expanding VVPAT Verification<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Proposal<\/span><\/th>\nLikelihood<\/span><\/th>\nImpact on Trust<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Increase VVPAT counting from 1 to 5 polling stations per segment<\/span><\/td>\nMedium (ECI could implement without legislation)<\/span><\/td>\nModerate<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Mandate 100% VVPAT counting<\/span><\/td>\nLow (rejected by SC repeatedly)<\/span><\/td>\nHigh (if implemented)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Allow voter to deposit VVPAT slip in box<\/span><\/td>\nLow (SC has rejected)<\/span><\/td>\nHigh<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      8.3 Independent EVM Security Audits<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      The ECI should allow independent cybersecurity experts (nominated by opposition parties and civil society) to audit EVM hardware and software. The source code \u2014 currently treated as classified \u2014 should be made available to trusted third parties under non-disclosure agreements.<\/span><\/p>\n

      8.4 Real-Time Voter Verification<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      If voters could see a printed slip and deposit it themselves into a ballot box \u2014 while still casting an electronic vote \u2014 the paper trail would be complete. This system is used in some democracies. The Supreme Court has rejected this proposal in India, but it could be revisited.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      SECTION 9: THE CENTRAL QUESTION \u2013 EFFICIENCY OR VERIFIABILITY?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      The EVM debate pits two democratic values against each other: efficiency and verifiability.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Value<\/span><\/th>\nECI\u2018s Position<\/span><\/th>\nCritics\u2019 Position<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Efficiency<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nEVMs produce results in hours, not weeks<\/span><\/td>\nSpeed should not come at the cost of trust<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Verifiability<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nRandom VVPAT checks are statistically sufficient<\/span><\/td>\nOnly 100% manual verification can guarantee integrity<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Security<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nPhysical safeguards prevent tampering<\/span><\/td>\nPhysical safeguards can be circumvented; without software transparency, trust is blind<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Cost<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nPaper ballots would be more expensive<\/span><\/td>\nDemocracy\u2018s cost is not a valid trade-off for integrity<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The Unanswered Question:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      Is it more important to have election results quickly \u2014 or to be certain that those results are accurate?<\/span><\/p>\n

      The ECI and the Supreme Court have chosen efficiency, with limited verifiability. Opposition parties and civil society organizations continue to demand verifiability, even at the cost of speed.<\/span><\/p>\n

      The 2026 West Bengal elections \u2014 with their massive SIR deletions, EVM allegations, and counting irregularities \u2014 have intensified this debate. The TMC\u2018s demand for CCTV footage and VVPAT counting reflects a deeper crisis: when a significant segment of political society believes the electoral system is rigged, the legitimacy of the outcome is compromised regardless of the actual facts.<\/span><\/p>\n

      What Has Been Lost:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Loss<\/span><\/th>\nExplanation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Cross-party trust<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nOpposition parties no longer accept electoral outcomes as legitimate<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Voter confidence<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nMany voters believe EVMs can be manipulated<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      ECI\u2018s reputation<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nOnce seen as neutral, now perceived as partisan<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Judicial credibility<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nRepeated dismissals of EVM petitions fuel perception of bias<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Democratic legitimacy<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nWhen elections are not trusted, democracy suffers<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      What Remains:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      The EVM system remains in place. The Supreme Court has validated it. The ECI defends it. But trust \u2014 once broken \u2014 is not easily restored.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      CONCLUSION \u2013 A SYSTEM THAT WORKS BUT IS NOT TRUSTED<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      The Indian EVM system is technically robust. The ECI\u2018s security protocols are strict. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the system\u2018s integrity. Yet millions of Indians \u2014 including entire political parties \u2014 do not trust it.<\/span><\/p>\n

      What Is Undeniable:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Fact<\/span><\/th>\nImplication<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      EVMs have never been successfully hacked in a controlled test<\/span><\/td>\nTechnical security is strong<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Multiple courts have upheld EVM integrity<\/span><\/td>\nJudicial validation exists<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Opposition parties across states have alleged manipulation<\/span><\/td>\nDistrust is widespread<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      ECI\u2018s enforcement of MCC and SIR has been controversial<\/span><\/td>\nECI\u2018s perceived partisanship fuels EVM distrust<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      VVPAT provides a paper trail, but only sample is counted<\/span><\/td>\nVerification is incomplete<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      The Path Forward:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      The Bombay High Court\u2018s audit order\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0offers a possible path: transparent, candidate-observable, court-supervised diagnostic checks on a statistically significant sample of EVMs after every election. If such audits consistently confirm EVM integrity, trust may gradually return. If discrepancies are found, the system must be reformed.<\/span><\/p>\n

      The Unanswered Question:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      Can India\u2018s EVM system \u2014 technically secure but politically distrusted \u2014 survive the accumulating evidence of perceived partisanship in other areas of election management? Or will the crisis of trust in India\u2018s electoral machinery reach a point where even technically robust systems are rejected by those who lose?<\/span><\/p>\n

      Democracy requires not just fair elections, but the perception of fairness. On that metric, India\u2018s EVM system is failing \u2014 not because it is insecure, but because it is not trusted.<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      SUMMARY TABLE: EVM CONTROVERSY \u2013 CLAIMS VS. COUNTER-CLAIMS<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Aspect<\/span><\/th>\nECI Position<\/span><\/th>\nOpposition Allegations<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      EVM security<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n\u201cVote theft doesn\u2018t even arise\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\nUnits can be swapped\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      VVPAT verification<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nRandom sample is sufficient<\/span><\/td>\n100% counting required<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Serial numbers<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nProperly recorded in Form 17C<\/span><\/td>\nMismatch between Form 17C and counted machines\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Battery charge<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nWithin technical norms<\/span><\/td>\nAnomalous 92-95% after 12 hours\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Counting process<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nTransparent and orderly<\/span><\/td>\nAgents removed; delays manufactured\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Randomisation rule<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nImplemented in letter and spirit<\/span><\/td>\nOnly central government employees present\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Supreme Court<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nHas repeatedly upheld EVMs<\/span><\/td>\nHas permitted diagnostic checks in candidate presence\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
      \n

      Next Topic (Topic 28):<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u201cPost-Election Violence and Accountability \u2013 Who Protects the Losers?\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

      To be continued tomorrow with in-depth analysis of violence against opposition workers after elections, the role of state police, and the effectiveness of ECI\u2018s post-poll violence monitoring mechanisms.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

       <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      TOPIC 27 EVM CONTROVERSIES AND VOTER VERIFIABILITY Is India\u2019s Electronic Voting System Trustworthy? The Debate Over EVM Security, VVPAT Verification, and Paper Trail Transparency Since their phased introduction in the 1990s, Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) have transformed Indian elections \u2014 making them faster, cheaper, and more efficient. But efficiency has come at the cost of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4119,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"googlesitekit_rrm_CAowk73GDA:productID":"","footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[76,80],"tags":[1260,1262,1061,765,1184,1214,1095,1251,1259,1254,1253,1258,1226,1062,763,782,1129,1257,1133,354,1263,1232,1256,1255,1261],"class_list":["post-4118","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-discussions-opinions","category-public-opinions","tag-abhishek-banerjee","tag-bombay-high-court","tag-democratic-institutions","tag-election-commission-of-india","tag-election-reforms","tag-election-transparency","tag-electoral-integrity","tag-electoral-oversight","tag-electoral-technology","tag-electronic-voting-machines","tag-evm-controversy","tag-evm-security","tag-free-and-fair-elections","tag-governance-in-india","tag-indian-democracy","tag-indian-elections","tag-indian-politics","tag-paper-trail-verification","tag-political-controversies","tag-supreme-court-of-india","tag-voter-trust","tag-voting-rights","tag-voting-transparency","tag-vvpat-verification","tag-west-bengal-elections"],"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4118","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=4118"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4118\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4122,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4118\/revisions\/4122"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/4119"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=4118"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=4118"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=4118"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}