{"id":4131,"date":"2026-05-11T01:44:23","date_gmt":"2026-05-11T01:44:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/?p=4131"},"modified":"2026-05-11T01:44:43","modified_gmt":"2026-05-11T01:44:43","slug":"the-politics-of-freebies-populist-promises-and-fiscal-responsibility","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/?p=4131","title":{"rendered":"THE POLITICS OF FREEBIES \u2013 POPULIST PROMISES AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY"},"content":{"rendered":"

TOPIC 30<\/span><\/h2>\n

THE POLITICS OF FREEBIES \u2013 POPULIST PROMISES AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY<\/span><\/h1>\n

Are Election-Time Guarantees Genuine Welfare or Unsustainable Vote Buying?<\/span><\/em><\/h2>\n
\"The
The politics of freebies explained<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
\n
\n

In April 2026, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.K. Stalin announced a new scheme: free bus travel for all women in government transport corporations. Already, Tamil Nadu offers free electricity to farmers, free laptops for students, and free breakfast in government schools. Before the 2024 general elections, Congress promised \u201cMahalakshmi\u201d \u2013 \u20b91 lakh per year to every poor family. Before the 2025 Delhi elections, AAP promised \u20b915,000 per month to every woman and free electricity up to 200 units. Before the 2026 West Bengal elections, TMC promised \u20b91,000 per month to all women. The BJP \u2013 which once criticized freebies as \u201crevadi culture\u201d (freebies) and \u201cpolitical bribery\u201d \u2013 has itself promised free rations, free housing, and loan waivers in various states. The Supreme Court has called the proliferation of freebies \u201ca serious economic issue\u201d and \u201ca burden for future generations.\u201d The Reserve Bank of India has warned that the fiscal cost of freebies is \u201cunsustainable.\u201d Yet voters demand them. And politicians supply them. This article examines the economics of election-time freebies, the legal and political debates, the distinction between \u201cfreebies\u201d and \u201cwelfare,\u201d and the consequences for fiscal federalism.<\/span><\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

\n

WHAT<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 \u201cFreebies\u201d refer to electoral promises of free utilities (electricity, water), transport, cash transfers, loan waivers, gold for weddings, free televisions\/laptops, and other goods or services provided or promised by political parties to voters, typically at government expense.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHO<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 All major political parties (BJP, Congress, AAP, TMC, DMK, SP, BSP, RJD, etc.) make freebie promises. State governments (which bear the primary fiscal burden) implement them. The Supreme Court (which has both condemned freebies and declined to ban them) arbitrates. Economists and the Reserve Bank of India (which warn of unsustainability) provide critique.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHEN<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Freebie promises have intensified since the late 2000s, particularly after the Delhi \u201czero electricity bill\u201d promise by AAP (2013), and have become a nationwide phenomenon across all states in the 2024-2026 election cycles.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHERE<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Across India, with particular intensity in Tamil Nadu, Delhi, Punjab, West Bengal, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHY<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Officially, political parties defend freebies as \u201cwelfare\u201d and \u201csocial justice\u201d \u2013 redistributing resources to the poor, reducing inequality, and fulfilling constitutional Directive Principles. Critics argue freebies are short-term vote-buying strategies that crowd out investment in infrastructure, health, and education, leading to fiscal crises.<\/span><\/p>\n

HOW<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Through budget allocations (often unbudgeted), through subsidies to public utilities, through loan waivers (which shift liability to banks), and through direct benefit transfers (cash into bank accounts).<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 1: WHAT ARE FREEBIES? \u2013 WELFARE VS. VOTE-BUYING<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The distinction between \u201cwelfare\u201d and \u201cfreebies\u201d is contested. Not every government scheme that provides benefits to citizens is a \u201cfreebie.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

1.1 Common Categories<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Category<\/span><\/th>\nExample<\/span><\/th>\nParties Known For<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Free utilities<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nFree electricity (up to 200 units), free water<\/span><\/td>\nAAP (Delhi), DMK (Tamil Nadu), TMC (West Bengal)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Cash transfers<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\n\u20b91 lakh\/year per family (Congress), \u20b91,000\/month per woman (TMC, AAP), \u20b92,500\/ month for unemployed (Tamil Nadu)<\/span><\/td>\nCongress, TMC, AAP, DMK<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Loan waivers<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nFarm loan waiver up to \u20b92 lakh (Congress in Karnataka, Himachal), Shahi Samridh Yojana (Jharkhand<\/span><\/td>\nCongress, BJP (in some states), RJD<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Free transport<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nFree bus travel for women (Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Delhi)<\/span><\/td>\nDMK, Congress, AAP<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Consumer durables<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nFree laptops (Tamil Nadu), free televisions (Tamil Nadu), free cycles for students (Bihar, West Bengal)<\/span><\/td>\nDMK, TMC, RJD<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Gold for weddings<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nPuducherry\u2019s gold for weddings scheme<\/span><\/td>\nCongress-affiliated government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Free education\/health<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nFree schooling, free breakfast, free health insurance (Ayushman Bharat)<\/span><\/td>\nAll parties (differing on scope)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

1.2 The Distinction \u2013 When Does Welfare Become a Freebie?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Supreme Court has called freebies a \u201cserious economic issue\u201d and a \u201cburden for future generations.\u201d But the Court has also acknowledged that not all electoral promises are freebies \u2013 some are legitimate welfare.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Aspect<\/span><\/th>\nWelfare (Legitimate)<\/span><\/th>\nFreebie (Potentially Illegitimate)<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Intent<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nLong-term capacity building (education, health)<\/span><\/td>\nShort-term electoral gain<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Targeting<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nUniversal or means-tested<\/span><\/td>\nOften universal without fiscal assessment<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Financing<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nBudgeted, sustainable revenue stream<\/span><\/td>\nUnbudgeted, borrowed funds<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Implementation<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nInstitutionalized scheme<\/span><\/td>\nAd-hoc, election-driven<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

Economists use the test of \u201cfiscal space\u201d \u2013 does the state have the revenue to sustain the scheme without compromising essential services or borrowing unsustainably?<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 2: THE DATA \u2013 HOW MUCH DO FREEBIES COST?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

2.1 Fiscal Cost of Selected Schemes (Annual, estimated)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Scheme<\/span><\/th>\nState<\/span><\/th>\nEstimated Annual Cost (\u20b9 Cr)<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Free electricity up to 200 units<\/span><\/td>\nDelhi<\/span><\/td>\n3,200<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Free bus travel for women<\/span><\/td>\nTamil Nadu<\/span><\/td>\n2,500<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Free bus travel for women<\/span><\/td>\nKarnataka<\/span><\/td>\n4,000 (projected)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Farm loan waiver (Karnataka, 2023)<\/span><\/td>\nKarnataka<\/span><\/td>\n37,000 (one-time)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Mahalakshmi (\u20b91 lakh\/year\/family \u2013 if implemented)<\/span><\/td>\nNational (Congress promise)<\/span><\/td>\n17,00,000 (17 lakh crore) \u2013 unsustainable<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Free ration (PMGKAY \u2013 national)<\/span><\/td>\nCentral<\/span><\/td>\n3,50,000<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Free electricity for farmers<\/span><\/td>\nPunjab<\/span><\/td>\n8,100<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Free electricity for farmers<\/span><\/td>\nTamil Nadu<\/span><\/td>\n7,600<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

Sources: State budget documents, Reserve Bank of India reports, PRS Legislative Research<\/span><\/p>\n

2.2 State Subsidy Burden as % of GSDP (2025-26 Estimates)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
State<\/span><\/th>\nTotal Subsidies (\u20b9 Cr)<\/span><\/th>\nSubsidies as % of GSDP<\/span><\/th>\nPrimary Freebie Categories<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Punjab<\/span><\/td>\n32,500<\/span><\/td>\n8.2%<\/span><\/td>\nFree power, loan waivers<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Tamil Nadu<\/span><\/td>\n85,000<\/span><\/td>\n6.1%<\/span><\/td>\nFree power, bus travel, electronics<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Delhi<\/span><\/td>\n14,000<\/span><\/td>\n4.3%<\/span><\/td>\nFree power, water<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Karnataka<\/span><\/td>\n62,000<\/span><\/td>\n4.0%<\/span><\/td>\nFree bus, loan waivers (2023)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
West Bengal<\/span><\/td>\n45,000<\/span><\/td>\n3.8%<\/span><\/td>\nFree power, cash transfers<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Andhra Pradesh<\/span><\/td>\n48,000<\/span><\/td>\n3.5%<\/span><\/td>\nFree power, cash transfers<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
All-state average<\/span><\/td>\n\u2013<\/span><\/td>\n2.5-3.0%<\/span><\/td>\n\u2013<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

Source: Reserve Bank of India \u2013 State Finances: A Study of Budgets (2025-26)<\/span><\/p>\n

2.3 The Fiscal Unsustainability Warning<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Chief Economic Adviser V. Anantha Nageswaran has repeatedly warned that the proliferation of freebies is pushing state finances to the brink.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u201cFreebies that are not backed by productivity enhancements are fiscally unsustainable. States are spending more on subsidies than on capital investment. This is a recipe for fiscal crisis.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The RBI\u2019s 2025 report on state finances noted that\u00a0<\/span>state subsidies grew at 15% annually between 2018-2025<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 twice the rate of revenue growth.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 3: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS \u2013 FREE SAMOSA VS. FREE ELECTRICITY<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

3.1 PM Modi\u2018s \u201cRevadi Culture\u201d Critique (July 2022)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Prime Minister Modi\u2019s critique of freebies brought the term \u201crevadi\u201d (a cheap sweet) into political discourse. He argued that freebies \u201cdestroy the tendency to work\u201d and \u201cweaken the economy.\u201d He specifically criticized the AAP\u2019s promise of free electricity and the Congress\u2019s promise of cash transfers.<\/span><\/p>\n

Key Quote:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

\u201cThe \u2018revadi culture\u2019 is very dangerous for the development of the nation. \u2013 Those who have this revadi mindset will not build new expressways, new airports, or new defense corridors. They will only distribute free revadi.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

3.2 The Opposition\u2018s Response \u2013 \u201cFree Samosa vs. Job Loss\u201d<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Opposition leaders responded by contrasting the cost of freebies with the economic hardship caused by demonetization, GST implementation, and COVID-19 lockdowns.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Leader<\/span><\/th>\nResponse<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Arvind Kejriwal (AAP)<\/span><\/td>\n\u201cModi gave free samosa to 800 crore people during his foreign visits. Is that not a freebie? \u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Rahul Gandhi (Congress)<\/span><\/td>\n\u201cThe Prime Minister speaks of revadi culture while his government waived Rs 16 lakh crore of corporate loans. Whose revadi is that?\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Mamata Banerjee (TMC)<\/span><\/td>\n\u201cFree rations are not a freebie \u2013 they are the right of the poor. The PM distributes free ration \u2013 that is his biggest freebie.\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

3.3 The BJP\u2018s Own Freebie Record<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Despite criticizing freebies, the BJP has implemented or promised:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
BJP Freebie\/Subsidy<\/span><\/th>\nContext<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Free ration under PMGKAY<\/span><\/td>\nExtended several times; cost \u20b93.5 lakh crore annually<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Free COVID-19 vaccines<\/span><\/td>\nUniversal vaccination program<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Farm loan waivers<\/span><\/td>\nImplemented in UP (2022), MP (2023), Gujarat (2024) before elections<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Free housing under PM Awas Yojana<\/span><\/td>\nSubsidized housing for poor<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Free electricity for farmers<\/span><\/td>\nPromised in multiple BJP-ruled states<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

The BJP\u2019s critique is thus of freebies\u00a0<\/span>promised by opposition parties<\/span><\/em>\u00a0\u2013 not freebies themselves.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 4: THE LEGAL DEBATE \u2013 CAN FREEBIES BE BANNED?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

4.1 The Supreme Court\u2019s Ashwini Upadhyay Petition (2022-2026)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

BJP lawyer Ashwini Upadhyay filed a PIL seeking to ban political parties from promising \u201cirrational freebies\u201d \u2013 defined as \u201cany distribution of any free commodity, cash, or service which is not authorized by the Constitution and is prone to violate the Doctrine of Level Playing Field.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Key Arguments:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Argument<\/span><\/th>\nExplanation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Freebies violate the \u201clevel playing field\u201d doctrine<\/span><\/td>\nUnequal promises distort electoral competition<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Freebies are \u201ccorrupt practice\u201d under Section 123 of RP Act<\/span><\/td>\nPromising cash or goods in exchange for votes<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Freebies lead to fiscal bankruptcy<\/span><\/td>\nUnsustainable subsidies crowd out capital investment<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

The Government\u2018s Response:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The central government \u2013 despite its critique of freebies \u2013 opposed the PIL, arguing that:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Counter-Argument<\/span><\/th>\nExplanation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Banning freebies is undemocratic<\/span><\/td>\nVoters have the right to choose policies that benefit them<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Distinction between \u201cfreebie\u201d and \u201cwelfare\u201d is subjective<\/span><\/td>\nWhat is a freebie to one person is welfare to another<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Courts cannot micromanage election manifestos<\/span><\/td>\nThis is a parliamentary, not judicial, function<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

4.2 The Supreme Court\u2019s Pending Hearing<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Supreme Court has heard the petition multiple times but has not issued a final judgment. In its last hearing (March 2026), the Court observed:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u201cWe are concerned about the fiscal impact of freebies. But we cannot ban political parties from making promises that are within the constitutional framework. The remedy lies with voters, not with the court.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The Court has asked the Election Commission to consider framing guidelines for freebies in election manifestos \u2013 but has not mandated them.<\/span><\/p>\n

4.3 The Election Commission\u2018s \u201cGuidelines on Manifestos\u201d (2014)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The ECI has existing guidelines requiring parties to:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Requirement<\/span><\/th>\nDetail<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Disclose financial implications<\/span><\/td>\nManifesto must state how promises will be funded<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Not promise irrational freebies<\/span><\/td>\nVague \u2013 not defined<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Maintain \u201clevel playing field\u201d<\/span><\/td>\nNot enforced<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

The ECI has not disqualified any party or candidate for violating these guidelines.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 5: THE ECONOMIC DEBATE \u2013 FREEBIES AS INVESTMENT OR CONSUMPTION?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

5.1 The Case Against Freebies<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Argument<\/span><\/th>\nEvidence<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Crowds out capital investment<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nStates spend more on subsidies than on infrastructure, health, education<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Fiscal unsustainability<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nSubsidy growth (15%) exceeds revenue growth (7.5%)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Distorts incentives<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nFree electricity reduces incentive for conservation; loan waivers encourage default<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Creates dependency<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nVoters become dependent on government handouts<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Redistributes from productive to unproductive<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nSubsidies are consumption, not investment<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

5.2 The Case For Freebies (As Welfare)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Argument<\/span><\/th>\nEvidence<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Reduces poverty<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nCash transfers directly reduce deprivation<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Redistributes wealth<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nFreebies transfer resources from rich (taxpayers) to poor (beneficiaries)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Constitutional mandate<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nDirective Principles require state to ensure adequate means of livelihood<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Stimulates demand<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nCash in hands of poor increases consumption, drives growth<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Women\u2018s empowerment<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nCash transfers to women increase household welfare<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

5.3 The Middle Path \u2013 Conditional vs. Unconditional Freebies<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Type<\/span><\/th>\nExample<\/span><\/th>\nEconomic Impact<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Universal, unconditional<\/span><\/td>\nFree electricity for all<\/span><\/td>\nHigh fiscal cost; benefits rich more than poor<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Targeted, conditional<\/span><\/td>\nCash for school attendance, health checkups<\/span><\/td>\nLower cost; encourages productive behavior<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Capital investment<\/span><\/td>\nFree education, health, infrastructure<\/span><\/td>\nHigh long-term returns; low short-term political gain<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

Economists across the political spectrum largely agree that targeted, conditional \u2018freebies\u2018 (e.g., cash conditional on school attendance) are preferable to universal, unconditional ones.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 6: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY \u2013 WHY FREEBIES WIN ELECTIONS<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

6.1 The Data \u2013 Electoral Impact<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Studies of state elections (2014-2024) show that freebie promises significantly influence voter choice:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Study<\/span><\/th>\nFinding<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) \u2013 2023 analysis<\/span><\/td>\nVoters who received direct benefits (free rations, cash transfers) were 12-15% more likely to vote for the incumbent<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) \u2013 2022 study<\/span><\/td>\nFreebie promises increase vote share by 3-5% \u2013 enough to swing close elections<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
State-specific analysis (Punjab, Delhi)<\/span><\/td>\nFree electricity promise was decisive in AAP victory (2017); loan waiver promise decisive in Congress victory (Karnataka 2023)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

6.2 The Incumbent\u2018s Advantage<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Incumbent governments \u2013 across parties \u2013 discover that implementing freebies before elections is an effective vote-winner. Examples:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Election<\/span><\/th>\nIncumbent<\/span><\/th>\nFreebie Implemented<\/span><\/th>\nResult<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Punjab 2022<\/span><\/td>\nCongress (incumbent)<\/span><\/td>\nFree electricity, loan waiver<\/span><\/td>\nLost \u2013 freebies not enough<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Delhi 2025<\/span><\/td>\nAAP (incumbent)<\/span><\/td>\nFree electricity, water, bus travel for women<\/span><\/td>\nWon<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Karnataka 2023<\/span><\/td>\nBJP (incumbent)<\/span><\/td>\nNo major freebie before election<\/span><\/td>\nLost<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Karnataka 2023<\/span><\/td>\nCongress (challenger)<\/span><\/td>\nPromised free bus, loan waiver<\/span><\/td>\nWon<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

The Pattern:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0Freebies help incumbents retain power, but challengers can also use freebie promises to defeat incumbents \u2013 as the Congress did in Karnataka (2023).<\/span><\/p>\n

6.3 The Escalation Cycle<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Once one party promises a freebie, other parties feel compelled to match or exceed it. This creates an\u00a0<\/span>escalation cycle<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 each election sees higher promises than the last.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Election<\/span><\/th>\nFreebie Baseline<\/span><\/th>\nEscalation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Delhi 2013<\/span><\/td>\nFree water (up to 20 KL)<\/span><\/td>\nAAP set low baseline<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Delhi 2020<\/span><\/td>\nFree water + electricity (up to 200 units)<\/span><\/td>\nIncreased electricity cap<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Delhi 2025<\/span><\/td>\nFree water + electricity + bus for women<\/span><\/td>\nNew addition<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Tamil Nadu 2021<\/span><\/td>\nFree electricity for farmers + free laptop<\/span><\/td>\nBaseline<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Tamil Nadu 2026<\/span><\/td>\nFree electricity + free bus + free breakfast + free water<\/span><\/td>\nSignificantly expanded<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

The escalation cycle has no natural endpoint. Each victory rewards higher promises, until fiscal limits are reached.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 7: THE SUPREME COURT\u2018S DILEMMA \u2013 TO INTERVENE OR NOT<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

7.1 The S. Subramaniam Balaji Judgment (2013)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Supreme Court held that promises of freebies in election manifestos are not \u201ccorrupt practices\u201d under the RP Act unless they constitute \u201cbribery.\u201d The Court distinguished:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Promise<\/span><\/th>\nLegal Status<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Cash or kind in exchange for vote<\/span><\/td>\nCorrupt practice (if proven)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Promise of government scheme after election<\/span><\/td>\nNot corrupt practice (policy matter)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

The Consequence:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0Most freebie promises (free electricity, free bus, loan waiver) are future government policies \u2013 not direct cash payments to voters. They fall outside the definition of \u201ccorrupt practice.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

7.2 The Pending Petition (Ashwini Upadhyay)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The pending PIL seeks to overturn or narrow the Balaji precedent. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled.<\/span><\/p>\n

7.3 The ECI\u2018s Role<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The ECI has issued guidelines but cannot prosecute freebie promises unless they meet the narrow definition of bribery.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 8: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS \u2013 FREEBIES IN OTHER DEMOCRACIES<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Country<\/span><\/th>\nPrevalence of Freebies<\/span><\/th>\nRegulation<\/span><\/th>\nFiscal Impact<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
India<\/span><\/td>\nVery high<\/span><\/td>\nMinimal (only if bribes)<\/span><\/td>\nHigh (state fiscal stress)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
United States<\/span><\/td>\nLow (some welfare promises)<\/span><\/td>\nNone (freedom of speech)<\/span><\/td>\nLow<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
United Kingdom<\/span><\/td>\nLow<\/span><\/td>\nNone<\/span><\/td>\nLow<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Brazil<\/span><\/td>\nHigh (Bolsa Fam\u00edlia \u2013 conditional)<\/span><\/td>\nNone<\/span><\/td>\nModerate<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
South Africa<\/span><\/td>\nModerate (welfare grants)<\/span><\/td>\nNone<\/span><\/td>\nModerate<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Argentina<\/span><\/td>\nHigh (subsidies)<\/span><\/td>\nNone<\/span><\/td>\nHigh (fiscal crisis)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

India\u2018s freebie culture is among the most intense in the world, comparable only to Brazil and South Africa.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Key Difference:<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0In Brazil, freebies (Bolsa Fam\u00edlia) are conditional on school attendance and health checkups \u2013 incentivizing productive behavior. In India, most freebies are unconditional, leading to fiscal stress without behavioral benefits.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 9: THE WAY FORWARD \u2013 REFORM PROPOSALS<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

9.1 Fiscal Responsibility Legislation for States<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Proposal<\/span><\/th>\nImplementation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Cap on subsidies as % of GSDP<\/span><\/td>\nRBI-imposed or Parliament-enacted limit<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Sunset clauses for freebies<\/span><\/td>\nSchemes automatically expire unless re-approved with fiscal impact assessment<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Independent fiscal council<\/span><\/td>\nNon-partisan body to assess long-term sustainability of freebies<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

9.2 Transparency in Manifestos<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Proposal<\/span><\/th>\nImplementation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Mandatory fiscal impact statement<\/span><\/td>\nEvery manifesto promise must state funding source<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Independent costing<\/span><\/td>\nCosting to be verified by Comptroller and Auditor General<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u201cRed Flag\u201d for unsustainable promises<\/span><\/td>\nECI could flag promises that lack credible funding<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

9.3 Reform, Not Ban<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Economists broadly agree that banning freebies is impractical and undemocratic. Instead, the goal should be to\u00a0<\/span>reform freebies away from universal, unconditional transfers toward targeted, conditional welfare.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Reform<\/span><\/th>\nExample<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Target benefits to poor<\/span><\/td>\nFree electricity only up to a consumption threshold, only for Below Poverty Line (BPL) households<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Conditionality<\/span><\/td>\nCash transfers conditional on school attendance, health checkups<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Sunset reviews<\/span><\/td>\nFreebies automatically expire unless reauthorized with fiscal assessment<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

9.4 Incentivize Capital Investment<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The RBI could provide fiscal incentives to states that reduce subsidy-to-GSDP ratios and increase capital investment-to-GSDP ratios.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SECTION 10: THE CENTRAL QUESTION \u2013 DEVELOPMENT OR VOTE-BUYING?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The politics of freebies reflects a deeper tension in democratic theory: what is the legitimate role of the state in redistributing resources?<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Position<\/span><\/th>\nArgument<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Freebies are welfare<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nThe state has a constitutional duty to ensure the welfare of its citizens. Cash transfers, free utilities, and loan waivers are legitimate means of fulfilling that duty.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Freebies are vote-buying<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nPromises timed to elections, with no credible fiscal plan, are not welfare \u2013 they are bribes paid with public money.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

What Is Undeniable:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Fact<\/span><\/th>\nImplication<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Freebies have become pervasive<\/span><\/td>\nVirtually all parties promise them<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Freebies influence voter choice<\/span><\/td>\nElectoral studies show significant impact<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Freebies are fiscally unsustainable<\/span><\/td>\nSubsidy growth outpaces revenue growth<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
The legal framework is silent<\/span><\/td>\nNo ban, no effective regulation<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
The Supreme Court is divided<\/span><\/td>\nWill not ban; will not regulate<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

What Remains Disputed:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Dispute<\/span><\/th>\nExplanation<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Where to draw the line<\/span><\/td>\nUniversal vs. targeted; conditional vs. unconditional<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Who should regulate<\/span><\/td>\nECI, courts, or Parliament?<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
What is the remedy<\/span><\/td>\nBan, regulate, or let voters decide?<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

The Unanswered Question:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

If every election produces higher freebie promises \u2013 and if every freebie promise is fiscally unsustainable \u2013 how long before India\u2018s states face a debt crisis?<\/span><\/p>\n

The RBI has warned. The Chief Economic Adviser has warned. The Supreme Court has observed. But election after election, the freebie cycle continues.<\/span><\/p>\n

Because the party that promises the most, wins. And the party that wins, does not pay the cost \u2013 it passes the bill to future generations.<\/span><\/p>\n

Democracy may be the government of the people, by the people, for the people. But if that government is bought with promises it cannot fulfill \u2013 is it democracy, or is it auction?<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SUMMARY TABLE: THE FREEBIES DEBATE \u2013 INDIA VS. OTHER DEMOCRACIES<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n
\n
<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Aspect<\/span><\/th>\nIndia<\/span><\/th>\nUS<\/span><\/th>\nUK<\/span><\/th>\nBrazil<\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Prevalence of freebies<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nVery high<\/span><\/td>\nLow<\/span><\/td>\nLow<\/span><\/td>\nHigh<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Freebie regulation<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nMinimal (bribery only)<\/span><\/td>\nNone (free speech)<\/span><\/td>\nNone<\/span><\/td>\nNone<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Conditionality<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nMostly unconditional<\/span><\/td>\nN\/A<\/span><\/td>\nN\/A<\/span><\/td>\nMostly conditional<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Fiscal impact<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nHigh (state fiscal stress)<\/span><\/td>\nLow<\/span><\/td>\nLow<\/span><\/td>\nModerate<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Supreme Court intervention<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nLimited (no ban)<\/span><\/td>\nNone<\/span><\/td>\nNone<\/span><\/td>\nN\/A<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ECI guidelines<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nExist (not enforced)<\/span><\/td>\nN\/A<\/span><\/td>\nN\/A<\/span><\/td>\nN\/A<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Reform proposals<\/span><\/strong><\/td>\nMultiple (none enacted)<\/span><\/td>\nNone<\/span><\/td>\nNone<\/span><\/td>\nNone<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
\n

\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

TOPIC 30 THE POLITICS OF FREEBIES \u2013 POPULIST PROMISES AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY Are Election-Time Guarantees Genuine Welfare or Unsustainable Vote Buying? In April 2026, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.K. Stalin announced a new scheme: free bus travel for all women in government transport corporations. Already, Tamil Nadu offers free electricity to farmers, free laptops for […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4133,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"googlesitekit_rrm_CAowk73GDA:productID":"","footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[76,78],"tags":[1305,1306,1307,1091,1301,1291,1312,1302,1309,1299,1062,770,782,1129,1310,1304,1313,1298,1303,1311,354,1308,1285,1300,1314],"class_list":["post-4131","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-discussions-opinions","category-global-topics","tag-aap-promises","tag-bjp-welfare-schemes","tag-congress-mahalakshmi-scheme","tag-democratic-accountability","tag-election-promises","tag-electoral-politics","tag-fiscal-federalism","tag-fiscal-responsibility","tag-free-electricity-schemes","tag-freebie-culture","tag-governance-in-india","tag-indian-economy","tag-indian-elections","tag-indian-politics","tag-loan-waivers","tag-m-k-stalin","tag-political-economy","tag-politics-of-freebies","tag-populism-in-india","tag-rbi-warnings","tag-supreme-court-of-india","tag-tmc-welfare-politics","tag-vote-bank-politics","tag-welfare-schemes-in-india","tag-welfare-vs-freebies"],"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4131","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=4131"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4131\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4134,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4131\/revisions\/4134"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/4133"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=4131"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=4131"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/untoldpages.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=4131"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}